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Abstract
This thesis compares the development of Canadian and 
American public policy in two important fields where 
transnational policy differences are evident - income 
security and industrial relations. These case studies 
provide evidence which challenges orthodox political 
culture explanations of North American policy differences, 
particularly the stereotype of greater Canadian ideological 
tolerance of state action. The thesis demonstrates that 
both nations have contained a wide range of attitudes 
towards the role of government in social and economic 
affairs. It reveals the similar reactions of interest 
groups in each country to proposed state intervention, 
based on class interest, not ideological tradition. Using 
a synthesis of neopluralism and the "new institutionalism", 
the thesis will demonstrate the need for a multi-causal 
approach to explain policy differences between these 
nations;' it will highlight the importance of differing 
political structures as sources of policy variation.
The thesis details the responses of major national 
interest groups to federal level policy proposals in each 
field in selected cases from early century to the 1960s. 
Data was drawn from archival files, interest group 
journals, submissions to executive and legislative actors, 
publications, and major secondary studies. The method 
employed will approximate the Canadian tradition of 
political history, involving qualitative, rather than 
quantitative examination of historical data.
The evidence presented reveals that both business and 
labour groups sought to manipulate state intervention to 
strengthen their position in industrial relations and 
labour negotiations; support for state action fluctuated 
depending on the negotiating strength of business and 
labour. In income security matters, business and medical 
professionals sought to forestall government programmes, 
and to keep those adopted as restrictive as possible. After 
an initial period of American labour voluntarism, unions in 
both countries sought to expand the scope and generosity of 
public income security programmes, to compensate for the 
inequalities of capitalism.
Despite these similarities in attitudes, policy 
differences did emerge, in areas like health insurance. 
Greater Canadian intervention in these areas seems 
attributable to the flexibility of the parliamentary system 
in Canada, which was more conducive to third party 
development, allowed third parties to influence policy in 
minority governments, and permitted stronger executive 
direction of policy development. The inflexibility of 
America*s fragmented policy-making system delayed reforms 
which had earlier support in that country. Rejection of 
republican institutions was the significant legacy of 
Canada's founding tradition, not a collectivist preference 
for state intervention in social and economic affairs. 
Current Canadian efforts to emulate American institutions - 
particularly the introduction of an elected Senate - could 
reduce this flexibility in the system and hinder future 
interventionist initiatives.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1 Introduction
a) Summary
This thesis compares the development of Canadian and 
American public policy in two areas where transnational 
differences are evident - income security and industrial 
relations. These case studies provide evidence which 
challenges orthodox political cultural explanations of 
North American policy differences, particularly the 
stereotype of greater Canadian ideological tolerance of 
state action. Debates over key policy changes in these 
policy fields reveal that both nations have contained a 
wide range of opinions on the appropriate role of 
government in economic and social affairs. Comparison of 
interest group responses to proposed policy innovations 
reveals similar class divisions in these two countries. 
Also, the evolution of policy does not conform to predicted 
traditional ideological differences. Policy variations 
often reflected differing political institutions and 
electoral systems, which created different institutional 
possibilities for the expression of interest group demands. 
Hence the most significant impact of tradition was a 
procedural distinctiveness, derived from Canada's rejection 
of Republicanism; the substance of policy was influenced by 
a common liberal tradition in both countries.
b) The Problem
While numerous theories have been developed to explain 
public policy formulation1, comparative North American 
analysis has often emphasized cultural factors; "the 
operation of culturally-based dominant values that inhibit 
or preclude some kinds of government action and favour 
others".2 America's homogeneous liberalism, emphasizing 
individualism and laissez faire, is contrasted with 
Canada's ideological diversity. In the latter country, 
conservative and socialist elements allegedly have induced 
a greater willingness to employ state remedies for social 
and economic problems. As Presthus writes, "the organic,
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collectivist drift of Canadian social philosophy contrasts 
sharply with the highly individualistic, competitive thrust 
of American social thought and behaviour11.3 As a 
consequence, "in Canada the state has been viewed, by and 
large, as a beneficent agency, protecting the citizen and 
promoting the general welfare; in the United States, the 
state has been regarded with suspicion, as a potential 
threat to the liberty of the individual".4 While pioneering 
works were more sophisticated5, this orthodoxy frequently 
receives reflexive, simplified reiteration in comparative 
studies6 and is applied automatically to explain policy 
variations without examination of the circumstances leading 
to adoption of specific policies7? in Seymour Lipset's 
words, a "Tory orientation" in Canadian ideology somehow 
accounts for the "larger number of functions for the state" 
in Canadian society.8
While ideological traditions may indeed influence 
policy development in certain areas, it can not be assumed 
that every Canadian policy intervention necessarily 
reflects their impact. This emphasis on uniform national 
values creates a misleading image of national consensus 
which ignores important class and group value differences 
within nations. This causes analysts to overlook 
complexities in political ideologies in each country; in 
particular Canadian scholars often seem only dimly aware of 
the variety of attitudes towards the state found in the 
American political culture. Emphasis on past traditions 
ignores the impact of similar processes of modernization 
and development on political demands and policy require­
ments in the two countries, which have spawned the 
development of new ideologies by different classes or 
ethnic groups.9 The emphasis on values as policy 
determinants overlooks the vital role of interests, and 
especially pressure group demands as sources of policy 
change and neglects the unequal political influence of 
different interest groups. Finally, many studies
underestimate the importance of institutional differences 
between parliamentary and presidential systems. These 
institutional variations influence policy outcomes and
9
determine which values in society will have a policy 
impact. The greater flexibility of the parliamentary model 
has induced policy variations which have been misconstrued 
as Canadian rejection of liberalism.
Students of social, economic and policy history have 
often revealed evidence questioning the conventional 
explanation, in studies of particular eras or policies in 
each country. However, these insights are to be found in 
scattered studies of individual policy developments in one 
or the other country. To date, no studies have attempted a 
systematic comparison of policy evolution and attitudes in 
the two countries in different policy fields. In 
particular, Canadians have been lax in examining primary or 
secondary material on the United States. As Denis Smith 
notes:
Scarcely any of our scholars or journalists have 
attempted to see the United States*as a whole and 
to deal with the central issues of its history 
and culture.10
As a result, comparisons are based on stereotypes which, 
despite massive American scholarly evidence to the 
contrary, suggest that this complex society has very 
uniform attitudes rejecting an active government.
c) Aims of the Thesis
This thesis attempts to provide a sounder empirical 
basis for comparison, by analysing specific cases of policy 
development in the two countries. It will first survey the 
secondary literature to compare the evolution in the 
organization and ideologies of key sectors of society: 
popular groups (labour and agrarian), central groups 
(business and professional) and public sector actors 
(bureaucrats and politicians). It then studies in detail 
the progressive extension in state functions in income 
security and industrial relations since early century and 
the responses of major interest groups to this government 
activity. These two policy areas have been selected because 
of the divisive debates which they have generated in the 
two countries and their centrality to class-based political 
competition. Data will be drawn from interest group
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journals, submissions to executive and legislative actors, 
government documents and secondary studies.
The method employed will approximate the Canadian 
tradition of political history, involving qualitative, 
rather than quantitative examination of historical data.11 
This approach reflects the impossibility of conducting 
posthumous polling, to gauge the attitudes of previous 
generations. Cases will be spread out over time from early 
century to the 1960s, to test for changes, and to determine 
whether Canada and the United States have grown increas­
ingly similar as transnational influences accelerate. This 
analysis will be followed by a survey of the impact of 
institutional differences on policy in the selected cases. 
The conclusions will weigh the relative importance of 
ideology, interests, and institutions and suggest future 
research directions, particularly the undertaking of case 
studies in other policy areas, consideration of 
international influences, and examination of the impact of 
intrastate and intergovernmental relations.
d) A Synthesis of Perspectives
This thesis adopts a neo-pluralist philosophy in 
political analysis.12 As defined by Dunleavy and O'Leary, 
this approach rejects simplistic, unicausal theorizing and 
recognizes the inherent complexity of political phenomena.13 
In particular, this thesis rejects ideological determinism14 
- the notion that consensual, traditional community values, 
operating through a democratic regime, promote policy 
directions which reflect the wishes of the majority? it 
also rejects Marxist notions of material determinism15 and 
ideological hegemony. There is no single dominant political 
culture in society? instead all modern nations are divided 
into diverse interests, whose response to state action are 
conditioned by their own needs and desires. Any nation 
consists of class-based subcultures, and class similarities 
extend across national borders.18
These class-based subcultures are not evenly balanced 
in influence over public opinion or public policy? rather, 
those groups possessing control over economic forces in
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society (business and related professionals) are in a 
"privileged position" to influence ideological preferences 
and government action to their own benefit. Subordinate 
classes in the economy are not without political power, 
composing an electorally more significant element. Apart 
from elections, in normal conditions, this democratic check 
will be a weaker influence on government action than 
business pressures.
Some critics allege that neo-pluralism shares 
weaknesses attributed to neo-Marxism: it is a society-
centred perspective which overlooks the essential autonomy 
and self-interested nature of the state and its 
bureaucratic and political managers. For Leslie Pal, neo- 
pluralists explain public policy by "tracing it back to the 
balance of political power among interested groups. The 
state more or less 'registers' this balance of power and 
interests in the form of public policy".17 Writers such as 
Theda Skocpol argue the need to bring the state back to a 
position of centrality in comparative political analysis, 
to understand fully its position as an autonomous political 
actor, capable of "goal setting" independent of societal 
forces.18
However, neo-pluralist analysis has paid significant 
attention to the emergence of professionalised, 
bureaucratic state organizations in modern democracies; 
authors such as Lindblom certainly acknowledge the self- 
interested and self perpetuating nature of bureaucracies, 
public and private.19 While acutely concerned with the 
limits on state power, neo-pluralist analysis can also 
consider variations in state structures, and their 
implications for policy development. In particular, the 
"new institutionalism", as developed by Peter Hall, permits 
consideration of the importance of institutional factors, 
while remaining sensitive to societal constraints on the 
state.20 A synthesis of neo-pluralism and institutionalism 
will thus inform the analysis in this thesis.
e) Framework of Analysis
Comparative analyses must account for a number of
12
different factors: social structure and interest groups; 
political culture and ideologies; and political structure 
and state institutions. All of these variables are 
important determinants of public policy.
Social structure - the pattern of relationships 
between various groups in society and between public and 
private sectors - will be defined in neo-pluralist terms 
and analytically divided into these principal categories. 
Popular groups refer to those whose chief means of 
influencing the state is through their electoral strength 
(e.g. agrarian and labour groups); central groups are those 
whose key resources for influencing the state come through 
their control of the economic processes of society or 
through monopoly of skills or resources (e.g. business and 
professional groups)21. Public actors are those involved in 
managing the state apparatus (politicians and senior 
bureaucrats)Social structures give rise to sets of 
interests, reflecting the interactions between these 
various groups, their needs or desires in relation to each 
other and the state. Interests are defined as perceptions 
of beneficial policies and state actions in specific short­
term circumstances; this definition involves assessments of 
a specific state action or policy proposal's impact on a 
group's political, or financial circumstances.
Political culture - defined here as the national matrix of 
political ideologies23 - is a unique pattern composed of 
diverse ideological elements, reflecting the diverse 
interests in society. It is not static or "congealed"24, but 
evolves with social circumstances and group interests. 
Ideology refers to enduring systems of beliefs, values and 
objectives about the appropriate role of the state, 
developed by each social group25; "widely shared set[s] of 
understandings as to what government ought to do, and ... 
concerning the purposes of public policy"26.
Two levels of ideological formulations must be 
considered.27 Analysts must examine the original pattern of 
values in society. These provide a context within which 
subsequent developments occur, by influencing the initial 
development of political myths, public policies, political
13
parties and political institutions. Initial values are 
important because the "folklore or mythology that contain 
the blueprint of a system in theory has some effect upon 
the operation of a system in practice".28 Thus analysts must 
consider a traditional level of ideology preserved by 
social forces autonomous from social structure. Formal 
Ideology refers to coherent articulations of fundamental 
beliefs or values, initially derived from major events and 
influences early in a nation's history (revolution, early 
immigrant patterns, etc.) but subject to evolution from 
internal change and international cross fertilization. 
Formal ideology will be preserved in myths, philosophies, 
institutions, constitutions, and autonomous social forces 
like universities, art and literature, and church. This 
traditional ideology evolves somewhat independently of 
social circumstances.29 It is this form of ideology which 
has often been considered the primary determinant of 
attitudes towards the role of the state in North America.
However, these scholars neglect an organic level of 
ideologies directly conditioned by social circumstances? 
developed by different social groups (popular, central and 
public) in response to their everyday circumstances and 
interests about state action. Popular Ideology emerges from 
the experiences and needs of popular (e.g. farmer and 
labour) groups? it may range from accommodation with the 
existing social system, individual self-improvement within 
it, and radical challenges to the system. Central Ideology 
of business and professional groups, reflects evolving 
attitudes towards desired roles for the state based on 
self-interest or social awareness? it ranges from 
progressive interventionism, to status quo pragmatism, to 
anti-statism. Public Ideology is developed by state actors 
(bureaucrats and politicians) in response to interest group 
pressures, traditional beliefs and personal interests? 
public actors' attitudes also include limited state, status 
quo and reformist or interventionist elements. Variations 
will be evident in the ideologies and interests of 
different branches and agencies in government. This 
indicates the importance of considering differences in the
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division of powers between levels and branches of 
government in each country, as the outcomes of policy will 
depend in part on the values and interests of a coalition 
of forces in different sections of the government 
machinery.
A differentiated conception of social structure and 
political culture cannot provide a complete explanation of 
policy origins. As Peter Hall suggests, there is a "need 
for a more complete investigation of social and political 
institutions, for it is in the routines and rationalities 
imposed by a particular complex of institutions that a 
specific culture is born11.30 Analysis must examine "the 
institutional relationships, both formal and conventional, 
that bind the components of the state together and 
structure its relations with society" for these "provide 
the context in which most normal politics is conducted". 
Institutional arrangements determine the relative influence 
of societal and political actors over policy outcomes, and 
influence group and individual definition of self-interest; 
as Hall summarizes, "organizational factors affect both the 
degree of pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and 
the likely direction of that pressure." Policy is not a 
mere reflection of the balance of societal pressures for 
that "pressure is mediated by an organizational dynamic 
that imprints its own image on the outcome".31
In the North American case, variations in political 
structures assume considerable significance. Political 
structure encompasses both the state as an entity within a 
given social system of capitalism and more specific 
arrangements for political activity and government 
decision-making. A neo-pluralist conception of the state - 
the authoritative decisionmaking institutions in society - 
suggests state decision makers (bureaucrats and 
politicians) are both autonomous and self-interested. These 
public actors seek to maximize departmental, personal and 
political interests However, they are constrained by two 
major forces. Electoral constraints involve the need to win 
periodic elections in a system with wide suffrage, by 
retaining support from diverse social classes and groups.
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Economic constraints necessitate avoidance of policies 
which may be damaging to economic performance and business 
confidence. This constraint stems not solely from the power 
of business as a pressure group. State actors rely on the 
private economy for fiscal capacity, which is reduced if 
economic downturn occurs? electoral fortunes are also 
adversely affected by poor economic indicators, like 
falling currency exchange, high interest rates and 
widespread unemployment. This constraint necessitates a 
basic respect for the rules of capitalism, and reduces the 
freedom to pursue socialist policies.32
These twin constraints insure attention to the
interests and demands of both popular and central groups 
as well as to public actors' own designs. A shifting 
pattern of the strength of such influences may be
anticipated. No advance prediction can be made, and
empirical research is required to determine this balance 
in any particular case. However, it seems likely that state 
attention to business needs will be greater in normal times 
and that any tendency to run counter to business desires 
will be greater in crises, of war and depression, during 
which electoral threats from popular groups may be greatest 
and social unrest feared. As Hall argues, institutional 
relationships are ever evolving, and are subject to 
"radical change at critical conjunctures".33 This thesis 
that state autonomy from capitalist concerns is greatest in 
times of crisis will be tested in the cases, and the
differing types of crisis in parliamentary versus 
presidential systems will be considered.
The organization of the state is important in 
determining which ideologies are influential in 
policymaking. As Skocpol concludes, "These structures 
powerfully shape and limit state intervention in the 
economy and they determine the ways in which class 
interests and conflicts get organized into (or out of) 
politics in a given time and place".34 Political 
institutions refer to constitutional and conventional 
arrangements for political representation and policy 
development. While both the Canadian and American state
16
face similar societal constraints, political institutions 
vary between the two countries and help explain many policy 
variations. Of particular importance are executive- 
legislative relations, federal division of powers with 
states and provinces, judicial review and judicial policy­
making and electoral systems.
The thesis will examine the evolution of policy in 
light of these factors. It examines policy development in 
the case studies to compare the willingness of each nation 
to employ interventionist or socialistic policy options. 
Examination of the debates surrounding consideration of 
proposed policy innovations will also permit assessment of 
the nature of elite opinion among organized interest groups 
in each society. In this fashion the thesis demonstrates 
the similar ideological character of policy, and the 
similar societal demands which helped shape that policy. 
The analysis demonstrates the need to examine the role of 
political and social institutions as sources of policy 
variations.
f) Problems of Comparative Analysis
Ideally, analysis should comprehensively cover all of 
the factors outlined. This study will constitute only an 
initial preliminary to this larger task. It has, of 
necessity, been selective in choice of interest groups, of 
cases, of data sources, of explanatory factors and of level 
of government to analyse. However, it does provide some 
useful new data to assess the arguments respecting 
ideological variations in policy development. By assembling 
data which accounts for differing class interests, and 
which compares reactions to proposals as they were 
introduced (not merely comparing policy after adoption), 
this historical study can provide a basis for informed 
interpretation of policy variations.
Several problems in comparative analysis must be 
noted. First, in studies of contemporary policy, Canada and 
the U.S. are treated as "most similar nations" because of 
shared historical, economic and cultural conditions. 
However, the policymaking environment was not identical,
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since the level of socio-economic development differed for 
many of the decades considered in this analysis.35 The date 
at which Canada developed an industrial economy, and 
concomitant class structure, is a matter of dispute; some 
scholars date this development from the mid-lSOOs.36 
Nonetheless, the level of industrial development doubtless 
lagged behind that of the United States, a leading 
industrial power; agriculture and other primary activities 
remained central to Canadian economic development for many 
years. Therefore, caution must be exercised in interpreting 
the data. In particular what may appear as greater Canadian 
demand for state action may actually reflect the weaker 
development of the economy and interest groups; at several 
points in the thesis, it will be argued that Canadian 
groups sought state protection due to their weaker position 
in a marginal, developing economy. On the other hand, the 
lag in development of income security and industrial 
relations policies may have reflected the lesser 
development of Canada's urban industrial base, which 
resulted in delayed demand for policy innovation.37
Second, it was also difficult to obtain comparable 
historical data since access to centralized Canadian 
archives proved easier than to the diffuse, scattered 
American collections. Therefore, greater reliance was 
placed on interest group publications, government documents 
and secondary studies in some of the American cases. Also, 
the data collected here mainly captures attitudes of elite 
interests in the two countries and cannot be taken as 
representative of the whole population; these interests may 
have similar views of state action in many nations, given 
their similar positions in a capitalist economy.
Finally, lesser attention was given to the attitudes 
of policymakers. This decision reflects the needed 
selectivity in such a massive undertaking. This study 
cannot disprove the conventional wisdom about the 
ideological variations between these nations and their 
impact on policy. Only if more evidence of public sector 
attitudes and policy development were presented could this 
be accomplished. The thesis can only suggest the similarity
18
of societal demand in two capitalist nations? the review of 
policy developments also challenges the purported earlier 
and greater Canadian experimentation with statist policy 
devices. This thesis remains a preliminary exercise, 
awaiting further study of public sector ideologies and 
primary American sources.
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2 Ideologies and Interest Groups in North America
a) Formal Ideology: The Traditional Inheritance
In comparative analyses of political culture, American 
political thought is often said to conform to the great 
ideas of nineteenth century Lockean liberalism? individual 
liberty and equality, private property rights, free 
competition in the marketplace, a limited nightwatchman 
state, and scientific progress. This liberal hegemony is 
ascribed to a few basic sources? fragment cultures of 
European immigration1, egalitarian frontier conditions2 
revolutionary rejection of state power and high social 
mobility. American liberal ideals, a synthesis of thought 
and circumstances, became enshrined as a national creed, 
which prevented Americans from examining or accepting 
rival ideologies.3 Liberalism's influence on political life, 
party system and public policy is considered pervasive by 
writers of the consensus school of American political 
science? notably it has removed the possibility for 
development of viable socialist or social democratic 
political parties or policies.4
Some scholars insist that Canada's unique founding 
experiences led to a more diversified political tradition. 
Gad Horowitz and S.M. Lipset argue that the Loyalists 
brought Tory5 "feudal survivals" into the nascent 
Canadian political matrix6? subsequent immigration brought 
non-liberal values which could not be assimilated.7 For 
Edgar Friedenberg, the evolutionary road to independence 
produced greater "deference" to government authority?8 
confident of their authority, Canadian political elites 
have tolerated greater ideological diversity than in the 
U.S.9 The harsh Canadian frontier necessitated greater 
government direction and community cooperation in the 
settlement process, reducing the individualistic impact of 
the frontier.10 Canadian liberalism hence coexisted with and 
was modified by collectivist, interventionist values - 
notably democratic socialism and "Red Toryism". By the time 
the Canadian political culture "congealed", its 
distinctiveness from the American liberal "monolith" was
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permanently established.11
Early social conditions in the two societies give some 
credence to this portrayal of ideological distinctiveness. 
The U.S. was "an almost perfect laboratory" for Locke's 
ideas with its boundless land, unlimited resources, a ready 
challenge to the ingenuity, initiative and self-reliance of 
individuals".12 Even after industrialization undermined this 
frontier egalitarianism, the "objective natural laws" of 
liberalism was "an ideological chain protecting America as 
it was with iron strength" and making "men who were equal 
in liberty content with inequality in the distribution of 
property".13 Early reform efforts seemed constrained by the 
predominance of this laissez-faire orthodoxy, which made 
even the most farsighted strive to avoid infringements on 
"economic liberty" even in pursuit of individual justice.14
In Canada, social and economic conditions were more 
conducive to an active state. Confederation, established 
in defiance of economic forces, was itself an artificial 
arrangement necessitating continuous state intervention. 
From the outset, the Canadian state moved to protect 
imperial preferences, establish tariff protection for local 
manufacturers, and extend transport links to geographic 
extremities to forestall American expansion. Canadians 
resisted the dismantling of imperial preferences and 
establishment of a liberal trading regime. Among English 
Canadians, all things English were embraced as the mark of 
distinction from the revolutionary, republicanism to the 
south; the hierarchical British North American colonies, 
with their political cliques and their mercantile elites, 
did vary from the more egalitarian American frontier (if 
not from the older Eastern states). French Canada 
contributed to the social conservatism of the new nation, 
with its church dominated, semi-feudal seigneurial agrarian 
system. Both communities thus contributed to the 
perpetuation of a conservative political outlook which had 
elsewhere succumbed to the forces of modernization.
However, the enduring impact of these formative 
conditions must be questioned. While they confronted 
different circumstances, the ideological influences on the
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two societies were not entirely divergent. Kenneth MacRae 
argues that the Loyalists were rejecting independence and 
republicanism, but shared the Lockean ethos of the 
revolutionaries. They simply preferred continued attachment 
to the British crown, with many induced to come to Canada 
by free land and government appointments, not by ideology.15 
Retention of the monarchy, evolution to responsible 
government, and anti-Americanism made minor modifications 
to Canadian liberalism, producing less hostility to state 
action.16 But the levelling effects of frontier life were 
also at work to undermine any attempt to recreate a 
hierarchical class structure in the New World wilderness.
Rod Preece has gone further in suggesting that the 
Anglo-Saxon conservative tradition has always had 
individualist, laissez-faire emphases, not organic 
collectivism. British conservatives were adhering closely 
to this limited notion of justifiable intervention in 
accepting state responsibilities in social and economic 
affairs. But British conservatives were no less vigorous 
than the Americans in defence of individual liberty and 
property rights against state power. Hence the American and 
British influences on Canadian ideology have been 
essentially similar? only minor variations, based on 
political institutions, may be found between Canada's 
pragmatic Lockean conservatives and America's dogmatic 
ones.17 The so-called "Red Tory" tradition of 
interventionism is hence a myth. Canadian conservatives 
have been no less disposed to support individualism, 
property rights and business conservatism than the American 
right. Canadian policies of intervention via National 
Policy tariffs and public corporations were essentially 
liberal in intent, designed to foster a free-enterprise 
economy.18
There seems considerable evidence in support of the 
latter thesis. Any early differences in attitudes the role 
of the state were always relative rather than absolute. The 
Hamiltonians and Whigs of the United States provided an 
alternative vision to unbridled individualism, seeing state 
capital as an essential contributor to "material progress",
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through development of transportation and banking systems 
and commercial protection.19 American state promotionalism 
and protectionism was prominent by the end of the century? 
any difference in the relative extent of Canadian economic 
intervention seems attributable to the harsh geography and 
climate, and the embryonic markets, not to any ideological 
disposition. ^ Moreover, in Canada, supporters of liberal 
policy were increasingly influential as the economy 
expanded and private capital grew more viable. As will be 
demonstrated below, Canada's industrial relations and 
income security policy showed little evidence of an 
interventionist tradition of "noblesse oblige"; Canada's 
voluntarist approach to such matters seemed closer to 
American than European practice for many years. Despite 
continuing distinctions in rhetoric, the policy record 
reveals no early Canadian commitment to communitarianism or 
interventionism. Indeed there was considerable similarity 
in emphasis of the founding fathers in the two countries as 
they sought to protect property rights against the possible 
inroads of majoritarian democracy and of international 
competition? the state was to be powerful enough to pursue 
protection, but limited in its intrusion on private 
capital.20
Important differences were evident in the organization 
of state power which profoundly influenced the ideological 
flavour of subsequent policy. The Loyalist exiles were 
fleeing republicanism, not liberalism. They rejected the 
model of presidential politics and separation of powers so 
carefully crafted by America's founders. They displayed an 
allegiance to the Crown and did not fear executive 
authority as much as the American revolutionists. This 
induced acceptance of the executive model of the British 
parliamentary system, with its emerging cabinet and 
bureaucratic ascendancy over the legislature. Confederation 
was expressly undertaken to overcome the stalemate in the 
Province of Canada with its legislative coalitions and weak 
cabinets. It aimed not at limiting the executive, but at 
making effective executive leadership more likely. This 
entailed a differing organization of the state structure
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and of relations between the executive and legislative 
branches of government; the Americans fragmented national 
power while the Canadians centralized it. A different 
procedural consensus hence emerged in the constitutions of 
each country.
However, this did not involve a differing substantive 
conception of the role of the state in economic and social 
affairs. This is hardly surprising, given the common 
inheritance of British ideas and philosophies in the two 
countries. Canada was not isolated from the emergence of 
liberalism as the dominant ideological trend in nineteenth 
century British politics21; while specific interest decried 
the loss of preferences and protection, many Canadians 
shared the preference for free markets and individual 
rights. Attachment to an idealized British tradition did 
not prevent adoption of British liberalizing innovations in 
Canadian politics and public policy. While the creation of 
a stronger executive power eventually paved the way for 
interventions blocked in America's fragmented congressional 
politics, the Canadian ideological tradition did not 
initially incorporate an appreciably different notion of 
acceptable state action.
b) Social Evolution and Interest Groups
In addition, while the social structures of the mid- 
1800s may have encouraged ideological difference, social 
and economic transformation introduced changes in the 
ideological dispositions in both countries. The liberal 
consensus view sees the relative classlessness of American 
society as obviating the ideological conflicts of Europe. 
As Kenneth MacNaught argues, this is a "crucial 
obfuscation".22 The agrarian frontier rapidly gave way to 
ordered commercialism and industrialism, which brought 
American class relations quite close to European patterns.23 
Social and economic inequality and hierarchical power 
relations in commerce and industry created social classes 
in North America receptive to reformist, non-liberal 
ideas. Modernization induced increased similarities in 
social and economic conditions in the two countries. A
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variety of responses and ideologies were developed, or 
adapted from European precedents to meet modern problems. 
Ideological differences within nations became more 
pronounced than ideological variations between them. A 
survey of secondary studies on ideological evolution 
reveals the similarity in group attitudes in the two 
countries.
c) Popular Ideology
Social movements advocating a strong role for the 
state developed first in the United States. The large 
population of small farmers reacted to their loss of 
status, independence and income with the emergence of a 
centralized commercial, transportation and banking system.25 
This populist movement proposed reforms including 
regulation of railway rates, easier credit, price 
stabilization, and government ownership of milling and 
storage facilities - in short, an expansion in the scope 
and nature of state activity.26 While ultimately seeking the 
defence of individuals against large corporations27,
adoption of populist policies at the state level provided
• • • 28a model for Canada's agrarian "socialism".
• # 29 • • 30 •Both the organization and policies of Canadian 
farmers organizations in Ontario and Western Canada 
borrowed significantly from American models. The economic 
regionalization of the Canadian economy ensured greater 
durability of agrarian radicalism in this country31; 
differences in political institutions - notably the absence 
of the primaries and of the presidential executive - 
necessitated creation of distinct farmer political 
organizations, thereby enhancing the movements' political 
visibility and durability. An anti-partisan approach and 
the urbanization of society limited agrarian influence in 
national politics32; in the Western agrarian provinces, 
farmer groups were instrumental in creating new parties, 
whose development was facilitated by the electoral and 
parliamentary systems. But the Social Credit movement was 
a force promoting individualism; despite its reputation as
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an agrarian socialist"33 movement, the Saskatchewan CCF 
retreated from radicalism and copied many policies of the 
American farmer parties, although it did innovate in social 
insurance in subsequent years.34
American labour also experimented with non-liberal 
alternatives? advocates of socialism, state ownership and 
social insurance emerged at an early date.35 American 
socialists could draw upon the egalitarian ethos of the 
American tradition to stir support against the new class 
hierarchy. But socialists were hampered by the ethnic 
fragmentation of the workforce, with radicals eventually 
isolated in foreign language associations.36 The main voice 
of American labour by the turn of the century, the American 
Federation of Labor, under the leadership of Samuel 
Gompers, adopted an anti-statist "voluntarism"? this 
reflected bitter experience with anti-labour legislation 
and litigation37, and Gompers' personal feuds with socialist
• 38 • • •rivals. But Gompers rhetoric resonated with liberal, 
limited state mythology, as he promoted private collective 
bargaining as the best route to labour's goals. Gompers' 
death and the inadequacy of voluntary solutions to the 
vagaries of capitalism - particularly in the Great 
Depression - ensured evolution of American union ideas 
towards interventionist alternatives.39 The growth of 
industrial unions also helped radicalize union policy 
prescriptions40? the Congress of Industrial Organizations 
was successful in promoting union political action, with 
important consequences for depression era-politics.41
The Canadian labour movement which emerged by late 
nineteenth century was inspired by both American and 
British models.42 Diverse ideological preferences were 
expressed by different labour organizations, as 
international debates among reformers, radicals and 
revolutionaries were replicated in Canada.43 A regional 
division emerged between radical industrial unions, 
concentrated in resource industries in the west, craft 
unionism allied to the AFL in the industrial centre44 and 
anti-socialist catholic unions in Quebec.45 The “western 
unionists adopted a confrontational, political style,
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resulting in violent strikes before and after World War I,46 
often met by state coercion.47 Despite the maintenance of 
national industrial unionism in the All Canadian Congress 
of Labour48, the ultimate hegemony of the craft unions of 
the AFL affiliated Trades and Labour Congress ensured 
moderation of union policy. Canadian unions were inspired 
by British practice to support social insurance and 
independent political action.49 Unions were instrumental in 
creating and sustaining the social democratic CCF/NDP. But 
the rank and file worker has often pragmatically opted for 
the established parties, while the NDP itself has evolved 
away from its socialist roots.50 While the electoral system 
and political institutions permitted creation of this 
farmer-labour vehicle, American unionists have more 
astutely developed lobbying skills51, and have exerted 
comparable political influence around a similar policy 
agenda.52
d) Central Ideology
Despite the prominence of anti-statist rhetoric, 
American businessmen always demonstrated an ambiguous 
attitude towards state intervention in economic and social 
life. Businessmen in the 1800s often extolled the virtues 
of the limited state to limit government actions harmful to 
entrepreneurial independence and corporate profitability - 
to constrain government regulation of wages, child labour, 
working conditions or hours. But business leaders were 
"never reluctant to call in the political order to protect, 
promote, and insulate their interests"53; the American state 
provided subsidies, land grants, tariffs and transportation 
systems to generate expansion of the "free enterprise" 
economy. Government was also encouraged to use restrictive 
legislation, judicial sanction and police repression to 
prevent the development of a powerful labour movement.
After the turn of the century, progressive business 
leaders recognized the necessity for state social programs 
and regulations to offset the worst abuses of capitalism.54 
Organizations like the National Civic Federation urged 
business to cooperate in creating voluntary solutions to
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offset the potential for socialist agitation. State action 
was accepted to discipline irresponsible entrepreneurs.55 
Cooperation with the state in World War I persuaded some 
corporate moguls that the government could be a partner in 
the efficient management of economy and society: "Properly 
wed to economic interests, vigorous and expanding 
government may be praiseworthy".56 While the 1920s brought 
a return to laissez-faire, and promotion of private 
"welfare capitalism"57, the Great Depression reminded 
business that government must provide "intelligent 
direction" to the capitalist order. While business were 
divided and selective in supporting government expansion, 
these central interests profited from the post-war 
emergence of the welfare-warfare state.58 Business groups 
remain wary of extensive social spending while promoting 
the vast government underwriting of the modern capitalist 
system.59
Canadian business leaders shared a belief that 
"government was the one institution in society which could 
be relied on never to achieve anything of value".60 In the 
marginal conditions they confronted, Canadian businessmen 
were "determined to use the force of government to make 
themselves rich by policy".61 But while the demand for 
government action was greater in Canada, its nature 
differed little? land grants and subsidies to railways, 
high tariffs and other promotional devices resembled 
contemporary American policy.62 Only public corporations in 
railways, necessitated by the economic unviability of 
private alternatives in Canada, distinguished the two 
countries. In early twentieth century, business 
successfully advocated new promotional policies such as 
domestic mineral processing and nationalized electric 
utilities to ensure domestic development. However, it 
appears Canadian businessmen did not as quickly grasp the 
new roles and activities which the state must perform to 
sustain a modern economy and were hesitant to follow 
American progressive prescriptions.63 Business demanded a 
reduction in government activity after 1914, as 
conservative forces argued that the emergency provisions
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developed in the war were not desirable in peace; as many 
businessmen learned, "regulation produced a great deal of 
frustration”.64
Eventually, as Thomas Traves notes, "long-term changes 
in the structure of industrial capital in Canada created 
new problems and fresh demands for state intervention in 
the economy".65 Canadian business wanted government to 
absorb the risks of resource development, compensate for 
the debts of major industrial and transportation 
enterprises, provide the necessary educational and research 
facilities, rationalize product standards and develop 
scientific tariffs. Business also saw government as a 
device to offset damaging class conflict.66 Rapid economic 
expansion and continental integration induced increased 
experimentation with American-style welfare capitalism. 
While conservative voices were initially dominant, the 
great depression caused more business leaders to accept 
government involvement. Alvin Finkel argues that business 
supported creation of the welfare state, only to be 
thwarted by adverse court rulings.67 World War II augmented 
the nexus of business and the state and made government an 
accepted partner in a vital modern economy. Nonetheless,
free enterprise and the limited state still formed the
• 68 essential core of the Canadian business creed. The
Canadian Chamber of Commerce best expressed this view:
"only by allowing individual effort and initiative the
greatest possible freedom within the limits of the public
welfare, can we hope for the development of a fuller and
freer life for all Canadians."69
In both countries, a variety of business organizations 
emerged, based on different sectoral or regional divisions; 
these varied considerably in their attitudes towards the 
state per se, but expressed common concerns about the 
expansion of the state's presence in economy and society. 
The National Association of Manufacturers made anti-union 
and anti state propaganda its hallmark70; the increased 
influence of large versus small manufacturers in the 
organization barely moderated its positions.71 Organizations 
with broader membership, such as the Chamber of Commerce of
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the United States and the National Industrial Conference 
Board, sometimes displayed an outlook more tolerant of 
state action. These and numerous other organizations have 
emerged to resist strong government or to promote active 
government consistent with business requirements.72
Because of the continental interpenetration of 
business elites, Canadian business organizations were often 
patterned on American models.73 Initially, business 
leadership in Canada was exercised by the Board of Trade in 
various major cities, consisting of commercial concerns 
favouring free trade. Manufacturers, later to develop in 
this small economy,74 eventually formed their own national 
organizations, notably the Canadian Manufacturers' 
Association, to protect the tariff75 and to prevent trade 
union infringement on the employer's "inherent right to 
control the policy of his business”.76 the Canadian Banker's 
Association did articulate a desire for freer commercial 
trade?77 but there was no direct threat to domestic 
financial and commercial interests from the tariff, and 
other business sectors often let the manufacturers take the 
lead in promoting protectionism.78 Canada copied the United 
States in developing a Canadian Chamber of Commerce to 
represent all business interests and organizations for 
specific sectors. While these groups were often divided 
over the extent of desired government intervention, they 
were united in resisting any undue fiscal or regulatory 
intervention which would restrict their freedom of action; 
on the other hand, they recognized that a weak economy 
necessitated both protection and state promotion to survive 
next to the American economic colossus.79
In the case of health insurance, the medical 
profession in each country became major protagonists. The 
American Medical Association was formed in the mid-1800s to 
enforce professional standards and monopoly. Comprised in 
the main by general practitioners, it emphasized many of 
their values of individualism, professional self- 
government, freedom of choice for doctors and patients and 
high quality of professional care and training. The AMA 
assumed elements of a political lobby group by the turn of
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the century, establishing machinery to scrutinize all 
relevant congressional and state legislative activity; the 
sophistication of the AMA effort improved over the years. 
The principal emphasis involved preservation of
professional monopoly, independence and incomes in the face
• • • 80 of rapidly changing political and social circumstances.
The Canadian Medical Association adopted its early 
organizational and ideological characteristics from the 
American model. It too desired preservation of professional 
authority and autonomy, of free choice, quality of care and 
education; it also favoured largely voluntary measures to 
deal with medical care costs.81 The CMA did show greater 
willingness to cooperate with government to establish 
programs for the needy to supplement any private 
arrangements, if these fell short of universal coverage. 
Blishen emphasizes that this distinctive acknowledgement of 
state responsibility may reflect the unique political 
tradition in Canada, which was more tolerant of government 
activity.82 However, this study will show that CMA views 
approximated American voluntarism at times, and that any 
ultimate difference in policy preference reflected the 
political context of minority government and provincial 
experimentation, which made a comprehensive national plan 
seem a certainty. This, plus the limited inroads of 
voluntary insurance plans in this smaller, less advanced 
market, made state action of a limited sort tolerable, if 
not welcome, to doctors.
e) Public Ideology
Possessing similar interests and facing similar 
demands from society, state elites in Canada and the United 
States adopted a pragmatic mixture of reform liberal and 
social democratic policies. The building of the new 
American economy involved considerable outlays of public 
funds and lands, as well as the stimulus of tariffs, 
immigration, and infrastructure development; those who 
claim Canada has been exceptional in this regard are 
ignoring the considerable evidence to the contrary. In 
addition, the emergence of a complex industrial society
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stimulated the creation of an expanded national state 
complete with a modern central administrative apparatus.83 
The American progressive movement of early century prompted 
an extension of the state into new fields still under 
private auspices in Canada. Government regulation of wages, 
hours and working conditions, prohibition on child labour, 
safety regulations, product quality standards, and 
workmen's compensation are examples of polices first 
adopted in the United States. Progressives were divided in 
their economic prescriptions: some, such as Theodore
Roosevelt, sought to tolerate and regulate large 
corporations; others, like Woodrow Wilson, preferred
ftA.stronger anti-trust provisions to restore competition. 
However, the Progressives were united in affirming "the 
necessity of active intervention in economic life by the 
state" to "meet the power of business by expanding the 
power of government".85
While business conservatives induced a retreat from
• • • g X  .progressive state intervention in the 1920s, this 
retrenchment was an aberration; social and economic 
evolution made an active state increasingly indispensable. 
This was confirmed by the depression, although the initial 
federal response was unimaginative.87 Eventually, the New 
Deal sought cautiously to make "an individualistic
capitalistic society more stable, more egalitarian and more
88 • • • • • humane". The Roosevelt administration's policies have been
praised by mainstream historians as enlightened, pragmatic
« • • • • 89 •reform which "democratized" American capitalism. Radical 
analysts have criticized the New Deal as an opportunistic
• • • • 90program to confirm business dominance of the community by 
reinforcing the capitalist economy91 through selective 
welfare concessions.92 While these reforms did seek to 
reinforce the capitalist economic order, and did not 
indicate a move to socialist principles93, they did break 
from the limited state conceptions of past practice. New 
Deal policies led to the "greatest peacetime centralization 
of federal authority that the country had ever known".94 
American innovations in such fields as labour relations, 
unemployment insurance and old age security went far beyond
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Canadian practice at the time.
The world leadership role of America since 1945 
precluded any retreat to the limited federal authority of 
the past, with federal leaders accepting responsibility for 
military preparedness, economic stability, and social 
harmony. In domestic policy, there have been periodic 
oscillations in policy. The principle Democratic 
initiatives - the Fair Deal of Truman, the New Frontier of * 
Kennedy and the Great Society of Johnson - have been 
followed in turn by the retrenchment of Republicans - 
Eisenhower, Nixon and Reagan. In economic affairs, the 
American federal state has become the established partner 
of private enterprise in its search for expansion. But in 
those policies realms more relevant to less powerful social 
segments - social welfare, civil rights -the appropriate/ 
role of government remains in contention. This has been 
compounded by the separation of powers. While American 
policy in social matters moved in the directions of the 
Europeans in some fields, conservative congressional forced- 
have impeded implementation of such key reforms as health 
insurance, and limited the liberalization of other 
programs, despite Presidential endorsement. Hence, if the 
laissez-faire reputation of American policy is not entirely 
deserved, the strength of such sentiments must also not be 
underestimated.
The Canadian state did assume an interventionist 
approach to economic development in the nineteenth century. 
The National Policy tariffs, alongside state development 
and ownership of transportation infrastructure did play a 
prominent role in the building of this new nation.95 But the 
Canadian state did not seem disposed to pursue a wider 
range of intervention in social and economic affairs? 
business promotionalism remained the primary focus of state 
action until well into this century. Although the emergence 
of industrial society and settlement of the west had begun 
to generate new groups with different conceptions of the 
state's role, their political influence remained marginal 
and political leaders did not face serious pressures for
• • • 96 •new policy directions. Potential class based electoral
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cleavages were effectively defused through the established 
parties' emphasis on linguistic, religious and regional 
cleavages; election campaigns were dominated by issues such 
as minority education, military conscription, and language 
rights, which effectively masked class divisions.97 As a 
result, Canadian political debate and public policy lacked 
the innovative, interventionist elements of European and
• • 98even American examples in the years before World War I. 
The concerns of progressive industrialists and urban 
workers gained minimal attention.
By the early 1920s, progressive ideas appeared to gain 
force in Canadian political life. Responding to agrarian 
radicalism, labour unrest, and the demands of returning 
soldiers, the Liberal party adopted a progressive platform 
at its 1919 convention, based on the theories of its new
• • • • 99 •leader, William Lyon Mackenzie King . Despite the strong 
showing of agrarian radicals in the election of 1921100, the 
King government of these years did not live up to the 
leaders' progressive creed?101 policy still reflected the
dominance of the mercantilist interests of central
102 •Canada. The farmer members of parliament eventually
reunited with the Liberals and accepted their conventional
policies.103 Later in the decade, the small "Ginger Group"
of radical labour and farmer members of parliament did
manage to pressure the minority Liberal government into
adopting an Old Age Pension programme.104 But the success of
other reform planks was limited. Canada entered the Great
Depression of the 1930s with a social policy which trailed
Europe and even the United States in provision for the
needs of the modern worker.
During this crisis, Canadian state intervention fell 
even further behind the Americans in progressive content. 
Canadian provincial and federal states retained preference 
for traditional remedies, like local charity and relief, in 
the face of an unprecedented need for assistance. Even the 
desparation move to emulate the New Deal by R.B. Bennett 
met with reversal in the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council. The League for Social Reconstruction injected 
European social democratic tendencies into political
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discourse during the depression decade.105 Keynesian 
alternatives to laissez-faire also received attention from 
Canadian decisionmakers,106 although the impact on policy 
was limited until after World War II.107 The Royal 
Commission on Dominion Provincial Relations of 1938 
recommended a stronger federal role in social policy, 
notably unemployment insurance. But the King government 
remained cautious? only during the war, when social 
stability became essential, and CCF gains threatened 
Liberal tenure, did King finally expand the welfare state, 
out of pragmatic political calculation, not ideological
• • 1no • • # • •conviction . Cold war anti-socialism and provincial 
resistance impeded expansion of Canadian welfare programs.
By the 1960s, the development of elaborate 
bureaucracies in federal and provincial capitals created a 
class of state decisionmakers who favoured expanded 
government. Social transformation in Quebec produced new 
demands for intervention, in place of longstanding anti- 
statism. (This contrasted with persistant conservatism in 
the American South, suggesting a possible social source of 
recent policy divergence.) The CCF/NDP - whose creation 
was facilitated by the parliamentary system - injected an
• * • • • • • • 109interventionist ethos, via provincial experimentation ,
• • • • • 1 1 0  and national coalition politics. Such pressures and the
flexibility afforded to governments in the parliamentary
system permitted Canadian decisionmakers to adopt measures
-notably health insurance- previously proposed in the
United States, but foiled by the byzantine complexity of
Congressional politics.
Thus, any interventionist bias in Canadian public 
ideology is a recent development, and not a reflection of 
an enduring ideological tradition. Moreover, Canada does 
not seem entirely distinct as compared to other liberal
democracies, in which the growth of government at varying
rates was a universal phenomenon until the 1970s. The NDP's 
transition from protest movement to pragmatic political 
party has limited its distinctive contribution to political 
debate.111 The influence of labour and liberals in the
American Democratic party seems of comparable importance.
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Recent retrenchment in Canada, with privatization of major 
government companies, and cut backs in social programs, 
indicates that similar overall pressures are evident in 
these two countries; reforms engendered by popular pressure
inevitably run into objections as their fiscal and
• • 112 regulatory burden takes its toll on central interests.
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II INCOME SECURITY CASE STUDIES
3 Earlv Income Security Policies
a) Earlv British Influences
Income security policy covers a variety of programmes 
designed to protect individuals against contingencies which 
undermine their earning potential or their income. These 
include old age, illness, medical care bills, work-place 
injury, and unemployment. Income security policy may take 
several forms, from private charity and local relief, to 
public assistance (paid for from general tax revenues) and 
social insurance (financed by recipients1 contributions). 
Such policies are often cited as examples of Canada*s 
traditional support for a broad role for the state in 
social affairs. Canada is said to have developed more 
generous programmes than the Americans to assist the aged, 
needy, sick and unemployed, and to have been closer to the 
Europeans in the evolution of policy in this sphere. 
However, an examination of early income security policies 
casts doubt on whether traditional precepts underlie policy 
differences. For initial American and Canadian approaches 
reveal considerable similarities. Until well into this 
century, both Canada and the United States maintained a 
policy of voluntarism, emphasizing individual and family 
responsibility and private charity and minimizing state 
action.
Both countries drew inspiration from a British 
inheritance which combined the state paternalism of the 
Elizabethan poor laws with the liberal re-emphasis on 
individual self-reliance of the industrial revolution.1 
These "poor laws acknowledged - through compulsory taxation 
- a public responsibility to the destitute”.2 This system 
provided public assistance for the deserving poor, through 
institutional care for the aged infirm and disabled, and 
so-called "outdoor” care for the able-bodied, who were 
assigned such rudimentary labour tasks as the community 
deemed appropriate. Care was entrusted to local 
authorities, and the criteria for assistance varied
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considerably from place to place. Although the relief 
system became harsher, with the expansion and 
depersonalization of society, some state assistance was 
hence a part of American as well as Canadian tradition in 
this field. But both countries also were influenced by the 
poor law reform of 1834, which sought to reduce the 
economic burden on municipalities and to decrease the 
disincentive to work? by ensuring that the employable could 
receive only institutional care in work houses, or minimal, 
subsistence outdoor relief, the cheap labour needed by 
modern industry was preserved.3
b) Earlv American Policy
The example of the poor law and the Puritan stress on
community solidarity introduced an element of public
responsibility into American welfare policy. H.S. Tishler
argues: "for all the harshness and continuity of our
approach to welfare in the preceding 200 years, self-
reliance had neither ... absolute nor fixed meaning”.
Certain kinds of public assistance were considered
consistent with a stress on self-reliance. In addition:
in responding to poverty with its traditional 
weapons of charity, however inadequate and 
inappropriate they may have been, American 
society tempered its individualism with the 
belief that the community had an obligation to 
care for those who could not care for themselves. 
Public relief, though believed to be fraught with 
dangers to the spirit of self-reliance was 
nonetheless justified on the grounds that helping 
the weak was nobler than letting them starve on 
the altar of individual responsibility, or that 
an act of altruism, while temporarily doing 
violence to self-reliance, might ultimately 
create a stronger individual.4
Nonetheless, like the British, Americans also espoused 
a liberal ethos of self-reliance which militated against 
development of generous state-sponsored welfare programmes. 
The prevailing assessment of poverty, preached endlessly 
"from the press, politicians and the pulpit [held] that 
wealth was the product of individual initiative, hard work 
and thrift, and that poverty, except as a temporary 
incentive, was the hell to which moral and mental
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defectives were consigned”.5 Social Darwinism eventually 
reinforced the belief that the deserving and enterprising 
succeeded and the undeserving and indolent failed; with 
this mixture of "scientific” and religious sanction for 
voluntarism, the prospects for community or political 
acceptance of extensive public welfare were limited.
As a result, the "fabric of social welfare in the pre- 
Great Depression years was private voluntary care, 
supplemented by local public relief and guided by a 
philosophy of self-reliance. ... Both the amount, type, 
conditions of eligibility and the highly decentralized 
nature of relief ... revealed a limited and cautious 
acceptance of government in a realm of activity mostly 
noted for voluntarism".6 While the emergence of social work 
as a profession revealed the humanitarian ethos existing 
in society, this was manifested in private channels and did 
not entail a desire for state action. "The humanitarianism 
which has been an important element in our American 
traditions stopped short with an individualistic approach 
to the problem of poverty" and was "little concerned with 
the possibility of dealing with insecurity in a more 
comprehensive manner".7
American practice was also influenced by Britain's 
poor law reforms of the early 19th century. Amendments to 
relief programmes ensured that outdoor relief was set at a 
level far lower than any available wages. Outdoor relief 
was virtually abolished, and the destitute required to 
accept the degradation and deprivations of the poorhouse 
to qualify for any assistance in most communities. Low 
wages plus the stigma of institutionalized care would 
ensure that no able-bodied person was encouraged to seek 
the dole instead of gainful employment. The assumption that 
work was available for any man who looked was exaggerated 
in American thinking by the boundless opportunity 
apparently available to all in this expanding new nation.8
c) Earlv Canadian Policy
Canadian law was no less affected by this laissez- 
faire approach. Indeed Canadian welfare programmes, like
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the Americans1, lagged far behind European developments up
to the end of World War I.9 The lower level of economic
development in this country was partly responsible for 
• • • 10inattention to social concerns ; the demand for welfare
programmes was lower than in more advanced urban,
industrial societies.11 Family, neighbours, and church were
considered the appropriate sources of assistance for the
impoverished.12 However, as studies of this period
demonstrate, there was widespread urban poverty in Canada
by the late 19th century, extensive enough to necessitate
new policies.13 Ideology and frontier opportunity
discouraged policy innovation. As Grauer observed:
The optimistic faith of a new country with vast 
natural resources in its future plus the stimulus 
of individualistic thought from the United States 
tended to keep political and business thought in 
Canada away from social insurance.14
Fear that generous public assistance would reduce thrift
and initiative among workers was deeply ingrained in
Canada.15 Hockin suggests that a rather "reactionary"
variant of individualism, emphasizing family solidarity and
responsibility for welfare provision retarded growth of
welfare services:
It was essentially the experience of individuals, 
together with the support of their family, 
prevailing against the harsh natural environment 
of Canada. A conviction about the value of this 
way of life, and the later arrival of the 
industrial revolution, may have helped sustain a 
belief in this type of self-reliant
individualism.16
The political ascendance of farmers limited expansion of
the state role in social services and welfare provision
until after the great depression.17 Bryden notes how a
"market ethos", based on possessive individualism,
inhibited creation of welfare, pension or social insurance
programmes for many decades in Canada.18
The primary emphasis of policy makers was on the
expansion of the economy and the creation of opportunity
for all. In Armitage's words:
The pages of Canadian government statements on 
social policy are filled with obeisance to the 
goal of economic growth, and with exhortations 
to the values of economic self-reliance and
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independence. These deeply-held values have the 
effect of placing social welfare in the position 
of being a secondary aim ... .19
As in the United States, the availability of land, and of
work opportunities in the expanding frontier reinforced the
belief that anyone found destitute in the cities was simply
unwilling to search for employment opportunities: the
"destitute were considered to be more in need of moral
• • • • 20 exhortation and uplift than material assistance".
Humane considerations, and the potential for violence
from the destitute necessitated some provision for their
material needs. Canada also seized upon the available
British examples. The Maritime provinces of Nova Scotia and
New Brunswick followed the British poor-law precedent of
municipal, institutional care? given the small populations,
paupers were often assigned to private concerns as cheap
labour, or even sold to the highest bidder to work in farms
or in the fishery. Ontario relied on private charity, with
the jails available to hold chronic paupers? Quebec
followed Catholic practice and assigned care of the
destitute to Church-sponsored charities aided by small
government grants.21
But there was no great paternalistic concern reflected
in Canadian policies? rather, the relief system was
designed to serve liberal economic purposes. The increased
burden of poor relief prompted efforts to minimize the
economic drain of high municipal taxes and the
demoralization of readily available relief? municipal
assistance was altered to feature unattractive
institutional conditions, to dissuade all but the truly
helpless and incapable from avoiding gainful employment.22
Struthers notes the Canadian acceptance of this principle
of "less eligibility" -the tendency to make the content and
renumeration of poor house labour less attractive than
alternative low-paid unskilled work, to dissuade
professional paupers from selecting public assistance over
work possibilities. In Struther’s words, "As in other
market societies, during the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, Canadian attitudes towards the unemployed [and
impoverished] were overwhelmingly conditioned by the
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cultural imperatives of enforcing a work ethic”.23 The "goal 
of such assistance, whether public or private, was to 
promote individual self-reliance by keeping relief 
discretionary, minimal, and degrading”.24 Applications for 
charity were viewed as evidence of thriftlessness and 
failure despite the fact that the harsh winter climate 
forced many out of work. Individuals were expected to save 
enough during summer employment to carry them through the 
winter layoff, however minimal their summer salaries.
d) Earlv Interest Group Attitudes
Canadian-American differences in interest group
reactions to public income security measures were evident
in early century. American labour voluntarism affected
union attitudes towards social security policy until the
great depression. Unionists bristled at the paternalistic
character of charitable organizations? they sought to
replace charity with wages of sufficient size, to permit
workers to save for their future and for unforeseen
contingencies like illness, injury, and unemployment. In
the more extreme formulations:
all charity was to be eliminated. It was pictured 
as a self-defeating palliative artificially 
supporting a faulty social structure, obviating 
the necessity of the employer to pay a living 
wage and indulging him in all the tendencies 
toward social ... irresponsibility.25
Some union leaders accepted the prevailing logic about
the detrimental impact of the dole on individual
character.26 AFL commentary consistently stressed the
benefits of individual self help as against any state
provision.27 But union leaders were also concerned lest
charity reduce the eagerness of workers to support union
efforts to secure a better deal via increased organization
• • 28 and bargaining strength. If wages could be increased
sufficiently through private collective bargaining, the
state role would be redundant, and undesirable foreign
schemes of compulsory government insurance would be
unnecessary.29 Unions would also avoid dependence on
gpvernment plans, which could be used as a weapon to reduce
union activity.30
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Canadian unionists, did not espouse this antipathy to 
state-sponsored welfare. Their rank and file and leadership 
elements were often drawn from British labourites, 
supportive of the emerging welfare ideology of democratic 
socialism. From an earlier date, they expressed a 
willingness to support a range of welfare schemes. 
Particularly when the British and other Commonwealth 
countries adopted social insurance and pension programmes 
after 1900, Canadian union activists had models upon which 
to base their demands. However, the union movement was much 
weaker and politically less significant in Canada, making 
its continued advocacy of state welfare less relevant to 
public policy.31 And the difference with the United States 
was not absolute. American labour voluntarism was not 
consistently a barrier to labour support for all programmes 
of public assistance. Thus, unionists were involved in the 
demand for workmen's compensation laws, which emerged in 
most parts of the United States before being developed in 
Canada.32
American business demonstrated an ideological 
resistance to public income security policies before 1914. 
Corporate leaders slowly acknowledged the moral 
untenability and political danger of economic insecurity 
in the capitalist system, made more acute by business 
cycles and technological change. However, business desired 
voluntary and private solutions to these difficulties. 
Encouraged by business progressives in such organizations 
as the National Civic Federation, business leaders began to 
introduce industrial pensions on a plant by plant basis to 
provide protection against unemployment, disability, 
sickness and old age to long serving employees as a reward 
for loyal service. State pension plans of any description 
would undermine the desirable moral values of work 
incentive and thrift.
Private schemes to encourage workers to save or to buy 
insurance were considered more desirable and "more 
American”. An insurance company officer declared to a 
National Civic Federation meeting in 1908: "A system which 
teaches these people how to protect themselves against this
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menace, [old age dependency] is more in harmony with the 
genius of our institutions, than a system which coerces 
them into action or a system which finally places the 
burden of their support and care upon general society”.33 
The alien social insurance proposals were rejected as "un- 
American and socialistic and unmistakably earmarked as the 
entering wedge of communist propaganda”.34
But Canadian businessmen were no more supportive of 
government action in social welfare. As Wallace observes, 
Canadian business exhibited a double standard. They 
clamoured for state assistance through tariffs, subsidies, 
transportation development, immigration, and other measures 
to promote expansion of the emerging economy. But they 
appeared as vocal exponents of laissez-faire in condemning 
state intervention to meet social welfare needs; government 
action in income security would be resisted by business for 
many decades.35 Poverty among the working population was 
attributed to individual failings: workers were often
"undisciplined, lazy, and inclined to dissipate their 
energy and wages, It was flaws in the character of 
workingmen - unwillingness to work or save or educate 
themselves - which held them back, not any failure of the 
system." Based on this "individualistic notion of self- 
help", business leaders believed a "sufficient prescription 
for the worker*s welfare was for him to be industrious, 
honest and thrifty... . "36
Canadian businessmen often held more conservative 
attitudes than the American business progressives of early 
century? they denied employer or public responsibility for 
workers* welfare and treated workplace relations as almost 
a feudal affair between master and servant. By the turn of 
the century, some Canadian firms began to create private 
company pension and benefit plans, to cement the good will 
of their employees and to forestall any demands for state 
action to set wages, regulate working conditions or provide 
welfare.37 But these plans did not spread as widely 
throughout industry as in the United States. In general, 
corporate leaders did not regard welfare provisions as 
essential. Economic growth, unfettered by state
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intervention or union demands, was held as the most 
satisfactory means to produce worker well-being: Canada's 
economic dynamism in early century made any consideration 
of social reform seem entirely unnecessary.38
e) American Innovation and Canadian Policy
Canadian business resistance helped delay social 
policy developments for many decades. Evidence suggests an 
earlier development of the American welfare system by early 
twentieth century. America acted before Canada to provide 
public pensions for army veterans39, despite strong 
criticism of the programme40, and reports of abuse.41 
Departing from their alleged patermalistic ethos, many 
Canadians included the soldiers' pension scheme as one 
example of the moral inferiority and corrupt character of 
the American popular democracy: "In a list of democratic 
excesses, the 'pension evil* would rank with Tammany Hall 
and elected judges".42 Canadian commentators often aligned 
themselves with the most reactionary American critics of 
pensions; ideological tradition did not apparently alter 
Canadian attitudes towards government action in relief of 
the aged or poor. Evidence from studies conducted at the 
time and since suggest the Canadian system of provision for 
the destitute and aged was no more humane and generous than 
the American system.43 The desperate condition of workers 
in new industries and in working class communities has been 
well documented.44 Examples of appalling conditions in 
municipal poor houses and other institutions abound.
Canadians eventually took their cue from the Americans 
in many areas, patterning social work and child welfare 
organizations after American models.45 The successful 
movement for provincial mothers' allowances, had studied 
and copied from American models.46 Canadian provinces copied 
the Americans practice respecting work-related accidents, 
holding workers responsible for having assumed known risks 
or sharing responsibility via "contributory negligence". 
Quebec did act before most American jurisdictions to create 
a workmen's compensation system to provide payments to 
those disabled and unable to work. But outside this
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province, businessmen refused to pay for insurance to cover 
worker*s "carelessness”; provinces such as Ontario did not 
act until after the movement made legislative gains in 
various states south of the border. Canadian plans 
eventually copied American precedents of public insurance, 
to reduce employers* liability for legal redress via civil 
actions.47 While Canada eventually went further in extending 
the welfare state into such fields as health insurance, the 
following cases confirm that the United States often set 
precedents later copied, extended or modified in Canada.
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4 Emergence of Old Age Pensions in America
a) Emergence of the Old Age Pension Issue
Industrialization and urbanization, and the growth in 
numbers of aged citizens, gradually increased interest in 
the plight of the indigent elderly in America. As 
industrial mechanization and specialization made it 
increasingly difficult for aged workers to retain 
employment, and as families ceased to be a reliable source 
of support, more people and organizations advocated some 
systematic way of ensuring adequate income for senior 
citizens. Disparity had emerged between those privileged 
few - veterans, government employees, and those in good 
private pensions schemes - and the majority of the 
impoverished elderly. Private corporate pension schemes 
emerged after the turn of the century, and spread to 
include many large concerns, such as major railways, food 
processing and manufacturing companies. However, the number 
of employees covered by such schemes remained small.1 The 
vast majority remained without adequate means of support in 
old age, and often were forced to seek shelter in community 
poorhouses, with minimal care and appalling conditions, 
alongside mental defectives, the infirm, and disreputable 
paupers.
Stimulated by overseas debate and legislation, state 
governments began to appoint commissions to investigate the 
conditions of the elderly and consider alternative means of 
providing for their needs. Massachusetts proceeded first, 
but its commission recommended against any form of state- 
run compulsory pension system: "The idea itself is
essentially distasteful to Americans ... in view of the 
prejudice against compulsion.1,2 But the untenability of 
individual savings and familial support caused more 
organizations to challenge the dogma of individual 
responsibility. Collective, systematized solutions gained 
acceptance. Debate increasingly focussed on whether 
compulsion under government auspices was preferable to 
private voluntary collective schemes, managed by employers, 
unions or charitable societies. And controversy also
60
remained over contributory versus non-contributory schemes, 
and the impact on individual thrift and self reliance.3
b) Evolution of Union Attitudes
American unionists initially disapproved of public 
pensions as part of their overall voluntarist critique of 
state-sponsored social security. At the convention of 1902, 
the Resolutions Committee rejected a fairly conservative 
proposal for old age pensions of $12 per month restricted 
to US citizens of 21 years residence earning under $1000 
per year. The advocates had suggested that pensions should 
be awarded to workers, as the creators of economic 
"values", since it was impossible under the current system 
for workers to accumulate sufficient savings and property 
to sustain themselves in their declining years. Pensions 
were seen as consistent with "the prime objective of the 
trade union movement to improve and elevate the standard of 
living of the working class everywhere and in every way 
possible".4
However, the voluntarists prevailed, asserting that 
workers should not have to bear the cost of pensions via 
taxes. John Lennon, leading the attack, declared: " Working 
people do not want charity from the government - they want 
justice .... [in the form of] less government by the people 
and more government by the unions."5 Union rejection of 
public pensions reflected more than a reflex ideological 
preference for voluntarist solutions? it also reflected the 
self-interest of union organizers. Private union-sponsored 
pension plans, promoted with increased vigour by the first 
world war, were an important device for attracting and 
retaining members; this was of no small concern to a union 
movement accustomed to drastic decreases in membership 
during depression years.6 Compulsory state pension schemes 
would undermine this desirable device and would require 
ceding of union authority at the expense of increased state 
power.7
Union leaders believed increased wages would allow 
workers sufficent savings to permit self sufficiency in old 
age. They demanded increased bargaining power to achieve
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this objective, and feared higher pensions would dull the 
crusade. Their position was easy to sell to workers who 
could see little logic in trading the tangible sacrifice of 
increased taxes in the present for uncertain future 
pensions benefits.8
When increased incomes failed to offset old age 
destitution, AFL conventions grew increasingly divided on 
this issue9. Many AFL leaders now realized "that the 
development of industrial conditions, in their ever- 
increasing concentration, weakens the efforts of the 
workers to remain self-reliant".10 AFL conventions endorsed 
federal old age pension,, in principle? in particular, 
pensions for federal government employees were advocated.11 
Although maintaining his overall hostility to state social 
insurance, Gompers seemed to make an exception in 1916 for 
workmen*s compensation and old age pensions.12
However, the vigour with which Gompers and the 
leadership acted on the convention resolutions has been 
questioned; and the support for pension legislation was not 
consistently maintained.13 From 1921 onward, stalling 
tactics, such as executive council investigations and 
references to constitutional uncertainty, were employed to 
avoid a definitive commitment.14 Charges circulated that, 
despite the public acceptance of the principle, AFL leaders 
acted covertly to oppose any move toward public pensions, 
in concert with employer interests like the National Civic 
Federation.15
In 1929, a full-fledged effort to devise draft
legislation for consideration by the states ended this
prolonged procrastination.16 As state labour federations
had done previously17, the AFL finally acknowledged that
a living wage sufficient to permit saving for old age was
not attainable in the foreseeable future.18 As Edward
McGrady, American Federation of Labor Legislative
Representative declared:
the American Federation of Labor asks the 
Congress of the United States, the People*s 
Parliament, to enact legislation giving to our 
superannuated working men and women an adequate 
pension so that these people, who by their toil 
and skill helped to make this the most prosperous
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nation that the world has ever dreamed of, may be 
relieved of the dread of poverty degradation, of 
dependency, of hunger, and of taking that heart­
breaking, soul-searing march over the hill to the 
poorhouse.19
The AFL condemned management discrimination against the 
aged, in its search for technological sophistication and 
increased worker productivity, which made use of younger 
workers more advantageous. The AFL declared: "This cynical 
waste and repudiation of obligations on the part of
business, shifts the responsibility to the community.
• 20 Society cannot leave men and women to starve”.
All voluntary approaches were now considered flawed. 
Low wages, private insurance and pension contributions, 
accidents, sickness and other demands on worker income made 
saving for old age an impossibility; family care was 
"unfeasible” and institutional care "inadequate".21 Company 
pensions contributed to the redundancy of the aged since 
many employers were reluctant to carry the high premiums 
required for older workers. These plans were also 
criticized for binding workers to a single firm and 
requiring faithful service (including repudiation of
strikes) for workers to qualify, thereby acting as a device 
to control workers to the detriment of union organization.22 
Many cases were reported of workers being dismissed by
employers just before they qualified for pensions to
preclude necessity to pay them.23 Since employer pensions 
were not a reliable source of support, and union plans were 
not economically viable, the AFL now claimed that only 
pensions provided by government were capable of providing 
adequately for old age.
In a clear departure from earlier AFL concern
respecting thrift, the federation also advocated non­
contributory pensions, funded by progressive income taxes.24 
It was considered "much cheaper, simpler and safer to take 
the money necessary to care for the old directly out of the 
national income by an income tax" than to build up a fund 
from employer, worker and state contributions; proponents 
of an actuarially sound fund merely sought to make public 
pensions ineffective through a spurious emulation of
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private sector methods.25 Initially, for largely
constitutional reasons, the AFL suggested the states should 
be left to determine if they chose to participate in the 
pension scheme.26 Inadequacy of local and state fiscal 
resources made it imperative that the federal government 
provide funding27. Existing state pensions were increasingly 
criticized, principally for their discrimination between 
the extravagant pensions for the well-paid state employee 
and the "pittance” offered to poor or ordinary workers. 
The AFL aim thus became a uniform national system, 
introduced by federal funding incentives to the states or 
direct federal action, to provide equal treatment for all 
persons irrespective of prior income. Such a scheme would 
be more democratic, more conducive to labour mobility and 
simpler to administer28.
c) Business Community Resistance
Most business leaders consistently opposed state old
age pensions from the earliest proposals. Arguments centred
principally on the defence of thrift and initiative, which
would be undermined by state pensions. Particularly odious
were non-contributory pensions, based on public taxation,
supplying support as a right? this approach was seen as the
most detrimental to the values of thrift essential to
economic prosperity.29 An NAM spokesman is representative:
"Public old age pensions, in common with other 
forms of paternalistic social insurance, health 
unemployment, etc. tend to impair those 
individual virtues of initiative, thrift, 
forethought and self-reliance upon which any 
lasting public prosperity and social well-being 
must rely. Why save if the state will provide for 
us from the public treasury?"30
America was considered exceptional as compared to 
European nations: pensions overseas were required because 
of the "inequality of opportunity abroad which
theoretically differentiates our social structure from that 
of Europe".31 Although a stable income for the aged was 
desirable, a National Association of Manufacturers report 
of 1917 suggested that it was "a fundamental American 
principle that every one in the United States has an
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opportunity" to provide for their retirement? "It is fair 
to state ... that every able-bodied man who is reasonably 
intelligent and industrious should, through his own efforts 
on reaching the age of sixty-five, have this provision 
available", perhaps with supplements from his children.32 
Americans should not copy foreign models but should "reject 
such paternalistic legislation with its resultant 
bureaucratic control of individual life".33 Instead, 
Americans should look to voluntary institutions, like 
private industrial pensions, individual savings and 
insurance, and group plans to cover any post-retirement 
needs.34 Insurance company executives praised private 
insurance as an institution based on American values, which 
contributed to economic growth through the accumulation of 
funds for private investment; these benefits would be lost 
if state pensions were adopted, since these "would 
undermine the thrift function at every period of life".35
Business at times suggested the problem of old age 
dependency was exaggerated by pension advocates. Thus a 
National Civic Federation report stated that the clamour 
for old age pensions was based on sentiment, not on fact? 
scientific information was needed to counter "political 
propaganda ... [and] extravagant exaggerations about the 
prevalence of poverty among the aged".36 The study claimed 
"a much better financial condition among aged persons than 
has been realized generally", with some relying on 
relatives, but most having sufficient savings, earnings or 
property "to provide for themselves at least for some 
years".37 Criticism of the poorhouse, a venerable American 
institution, was also considered exaggerated, since 
improvements in administration could solve most major 
problems? it was misleading to suggest pensions could ever 
displace institutional care, since a sizeable proportion of 
the aged - enfeebled, incompetent and dependent - would 
always need supervision and care.38 Public pensions were no 
less degrading than the poorhouse39? but they could worsen 
the problem by providing "a subsidy or reward for 
shiftlessness and incompetence".40 Even business leaders 
willing to support state health and accident insurance
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rejected pensions as "less valuable socially” since, unlike
these programmes, they did not contribute to labour
productivity.41
However, at times the problem was acknowledged, but
welcomed as a desirable incentive.
At stake was the future of the nation and race.
The fearsome prospect of old age dependency was 
the 'most powerful incentive which makes for 
character and growth in a democracy.'Abolish it 
for the 'vast majority of the thrifty and 
industrious members of society' and an 
irreparable blow would be struck against the 
'root of national life and character'. Progress 
was synonymous with struggle, but the national 
'capacity for suffering, self-sacrifice, and 
self-denial' was already on the decline, and 
pensions would hasten the deterioration.42
Given "the importance of preserving the best quality of
citizenship for the United States”, pensions were rejected
and employers encouraged to "assist and inspire
employes [sic] with the importance and necessity of ways
and means for making provision for the contingencies of
life - including old age."43 Demoralization and high cost
could be avoided by improving private instruments for care
of the aged, such as employee savings plans, stock
ownership, life insurance, profit-sharing, and contributory
private pensions.44
Businessmen were also concerned lest pensions be used
as a first step leading to a comprehensive, expensive and
socially demoralizing social insurance system.45 Leaders of
the pension movement, like Abraham Epstein were cited to
indicate the sweeping ambitions of pension advocates, who
hoped to use pensions laws "as an entering wedge to secure
adoption of other legislation which ... could not be
secured by a frontal effort".46 Noel Sargent of the NAM
warned: "A complete public social insurance system is
socially unwise because it lessens reliance of the
individual on his own efforts. It is economically unwise
because the costs steadily mount? industrial efficiency is
impaired and the competitive ability of nations is
seriously affected".47 The development of such a system
would involve a drastic alteration in the economic and
social system: "instead of providing protection of
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opportunity. [our laws] would provide protection for 
opportunity plus assurance of realization”.48 The spectre 
of subversion and communism were raised at times; the NAM 
viewed all social insurance proposals as "seemingly 
coordinated in a sweeping programme designed to lead 
eventually to complete socialization.1,49 Furthermore, 
"complete social insurance or services must eventually lead 
to rigid government control of all industry" since national 
insurance required an "ordered industrialism".50
Behind the rhetoric, the basic complaint remained - 
fear that the high costs of pensions would fall upon 
American business. The National Industrial Conference Board 
pointed out that the "cost of supporting those [aged] who 
do not produce anything and who do not render any useful 
service must fall upon the producers, because national 
income is the result of productive effort".51 The NAM 
complained that "industry, which pays a large proportion of 
the taxes in the country, is being constantly and 
unnecessarily restricted by social and legislative 
encroachments that make it increasingly difficult to do 
business".52 In the case of old age pensions, the burden 
would fall upon the young and productive, both workers and 
managers, who would see their purchasing power drained off 
to the improvident at the expense of overall economic 
activity.53 Despite efforts to devise an actuarially sound 
pension fund to preclude future drain upon public revenues, 
business feared the inevitable pressures to liberalize 
beneficiary qualifications and increase pension stipends 
would eventually create a massive expenditure and economic 
drain. The experience of England54 and Europe were cited to 
support this position.55
Not all business organizations consistently rejected 
any form of public pension. The Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States felt that public pensions, "when properly 
safeguarded by rigid eligibility requirements and 
restricted to the relief of the indigent, serve a valid 
social purpose and are not detrimental to the interests of 
American business"56 or to thrift.57 The Chamber saw the need 
for a better system which "reduces the degradation of the
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poorhouse, and permits unfortunate aged citizens to 
maintain their self-respect at a decent level of 
subsistence”.58 Since old age dependence was beyond 
individual remedy59, and private pensions were inadequate60, 
modest programmes of compulsory public pensions were 
acceptable61 if they were not prohibitively expensive, 
could coexist with established industrial plans, and were 
left to the option of the states.62 Retailers were more 
supportive of federal action, seeing the problem as 
national in scope.63
But most business concerns continued to advocate 
strictly voluntary solutions, preferably some form of 
industrial pension under employer control. The National 
Civic Federation conducted a crusade for employer 
pensions64, or annuities, financed out of the wages of the 
work force and not the profits of industry.65 The NCF 
suggested that such plans be made contractual and 
actuarially sound? but they still believed employers should 
control pensions, which should be given as a reward for 
meritorious and continuous service.66 Even those willing to 
provide guaranteed pensions for all employees, still 
insisted that private plans, tailored to the needs of 
individual firms, were more desirable.67 Industry itself 
could cope with any problem of old age indigence? 
businessmen had both the moral conviction and economic 
incentive69 to introduce effective pension programmes.70
d) Depression Era Pension Debates
Predictably, reactions to the Roosevelt 
administration's proposed Social Security Act in the mid 
1930s reflected these established positions. Business 
continued to resist the establishment of a comprehensive 
federal programme, and sought to minimize their tax burdens 
in the event a programme was established. The Farrell- 
Birmingham Company attacked the act for its dictatorial 
interference in capital markets and investment, its 
inevitably inefficient administration, and its threat to 
economic well-being, which would eventually produce "social 
insecurity"71.
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Business was particularly concerned about the method 
of financing the plan? instead of a compulsory savings plan 
for workers, based on premiums charged only to employees, 
the act envisioned a payroll tax, paid by employers, based 
on the size of their workforce. The added cost was seen as 
a crippling burden to industry at a time when revenues were 
needed for reinvestment and recovery72. Business warned of 
the "distortion in price and wage relationships, and hence 
the interference with industrial production, arising from 
the inevitably higher labour costs compelled by the payroll 
tax”73. Winthrop A. Aldrich, of the Chase Bank, warned that 
the "nature and incidence of the payroll tax ... may so 
disrupt or dislocate the processes of production that, 
instead of taking from A to help B, it will directly or 
indirectly hurt both A and B and help no one"74. Even the 
business sympathizers were sceptical of the taxing 
provisions75, and urged cautious design of a system which 
would not prove economically unsound.76
Many business leaders were resigned to the eventual 
enactment of the old age security provisions, given the 
political climate of the times? particularly after the 
election of 1934 returned a liberal Congress, the Chamber 
of Commerce of the United States demonstrated a willingness 
to cooperate with the administration77. But the Chamber 
advocated independent state old age assistance and 
annuities, with federal grants-in aid, limited tax 
burdens, shared by employers and employees, exemption of 
needy agricultural and domestic workers, and other measures 
to limit the economic burden of the programme78. Aldrich of 
the Chase National Bank, insisted that the plan should 
provide assistance only to the needy aged79. There was also 
a desire to safeguard existing company pensions, which had 
built up invested reserves and generated good will for
80 • • t • •management ? exemptions from social security contributions 
were advocated for companies with sound private pensions.81 
The insurance industry was willing to support the social 
security law if it complemented private plans and did not 
displace them82. But the cost and disruptive effect of the 
federal social security plan remained a consistent concern,
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even for those more favourably disposed.83
Labour leaders were at once detached and divided in 
their attitude to the old age assistance plan. Organized 
labour was most interested in unemployment insurance, and 
took little role in development of the old age security 
provisions84. Eventually the AFL leadership indicated its 
support to key congressmen85. Commentary in labour 
publications demonstrated support for the comprehensive 
national scheme of old age pensions incorporated in the 
Social Security Act? AFL spokespersons called on the 
Congress not only to pass the act, but to employ its powers
to reorganize the numbers on the Supreme Court, if
• • • • 86 • necessary, to prevent judicial interference . Voluntarists
influence still lingered in the AFL, making support for the
programme partial and lukewarm87. Labour leaders recognized
that doubts persisted, but called upon supporters of old
• • • • 88 age security to rally around the administration .
Pressure for federal action was great in the desperate 
years of the depression. Many in the public supported 
radical proposals for generous, non-contributory, non-means 
tested pensions, with generous benefits. The so-called 
Townsend plan was particularly appealing, as a measure to 
stimulate consumption by requiring that pensions of $200 
per month be spent immediately. The high cost of this plan 
was disturbing to business and political leaders, who 
feared its success could undermine the free economy by 
bringing a high percentage of the national income into 
social security. But while the impracticability of the plan 
prevented adoption, the popular support for it, and the 
high expectations aroused, reduced opposition to old age
t • • * • t * 89pensions in the administration and the business community. 
The pressure on conservatives to accept some form of social 
security for the aged was intensified by more radical 
proposals for the redistribution of wealth, which received
• • • • • 90consideration in Congress, and increasing popular support. 
Bipartisan support, union endorsement and progressive 
business conversion ensured passage of the old age pension 
legislation. Pensions were carefully designed to provide 
consumer stimulus, to remove of the aged from the depressed
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job market, and to reduce the burden of family support 
while avoiding undue burden on the private economy.91
e) The Social Security Act. 1935
The Presidents' Committee on Economic Security 
reported in favour of a two-part programme to provide 
comprehensive coverage to the aged92. Old age assistance 
was to be available to those in need, over age sixty-five, 
on a means tested basis, to be paid out of general tax 
revenues. The federal government would provide matching 
grants to states which established means-tested assistance 
meeting federal requirements. Old age insurance was to be 
available to all as a right upon reaching age sixty-five, 
paid for out of a fund accumulated from employee and 
employer contributions, via a payroll tax.93 The 
administration, fiscally conservative in this depression 
era, insisted upon this regressive financing, to ensure the 
programme would not become a fiscal drain.94 The American 
programme hence exceeded the comprehensiveness of the 
Canadian pensions of 1927, albeit funded by regressive 
payroll taxes. Despite pressure from more radical elements, 
and opponents of social insurance, Congress opted for the 
administration's middle path, and adopted the programme in
95 • • 961935 , with some minor amendments.
The act did not fully satisfy the major lobby groups. 
The split between industrial and trade unionists erupted 
into the open shortly after the adoption of the measure. 
The new Congress of Industrial Organizations adopted a more 
radical position, and rejected the levy of a tax on 
employees' wages as part of the financing arrangement. The 
CIO advocated unification of the contributory old age 
security and non-contributory old age assistance for the 
needy, into a single programme, financed by progressive 
taxation on wealth and incomes. Pensions could then act as 
a tool to correct the existing "mal-distribution of 
income", a goal far different from the administration 
plan97. Union positions merged during the war, after the 
enrolment of mass membership radicalized the AFL, and anti­
communist pressures and wartime patriotism deradicalized
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the CIO. Ironically, positions were somewhat reversed, with 
the CIO somewhat wary that large federal social security 
benefits would undermine union ability to win pension
• • • • 98benefits for members through collective bargaining ? the 
AFL, which had traditionally shared this concern, abandoned 
it since its affiliates, less able to win concessions in 
bargaining, relied more on federal pension assistance than 
the CIO.99 But the unified union central after 1955 acted in 
concert with elements within the social security 
administration to advance proposals for a more 
comprehensive and generous social security system. Even 
radical elements such as the UAW came to accept the 
contributory social insurance system and abandon preference 
for universal, non-contributory pensions.100
Business leaders continued to express reservations 
about the high costs of the programme and its disincentive 
effects. The size of the accumulated social security fund 
was criticized for removing capital from the control of 
private investors; payment of pensions from current 
revenues could allow more adequate evaluation of needs and 
avoid over accumulation of resources in the hands of the 
state. The tax on payrolls was also economically 
disastrous, since it allegedly induced price increases, 
wage decreases and increased unemployment, as employers 
sought to pass on the costs or avoid payment. A pension 
plan, paid out of general revenues and limited to cases of 
need could help reduce these burdens.101 Private insurance 
companies also rejected the programme as "economically 
preposterous and legally indefensible”.102
Despite such reservations, many corporate leaders 
accepted the existence of the programme, and did not 
consider its repeal a viable alternative, especially after 
the Republican Alf Landon's overwhelming defeat on this 
platform in the 1936 Presidential election. After the 
Supreme Court validation of the Social Security Act in 
1937, the legitimacy of the state's role in this field was 
no longer contested. Addition of dependants and survivors 
benefits in 1939 also met little business opposition. This 
absence of intransigence, and retreat from voluntarist
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alternatives indicated that business associations did not 
find the programme threatening to their interests once it 
was in operation. One perceived advantage of public 
pensions was the dampening effect these had on union 
demands for more generous private pensions through
• • • 103 •collective bargaining. However, the expansion of the 
social security system, in both the scale of benefits and 
the scope of coverage, was generally resisted.
Nonetheless, as pension opponents had predicted, 
political pressures inevitably led to increased generosity 
in the American social security system. Business critics 
were not able to forestall an increase in benefit levels 
nor to prevent erosion of its insurance character. In the 
early years, the old age assistance plan covered far more 
pensioners than the insurance portion, since few had 
accumulated the necessary contributions until the 1950s. As 
more became eligible for old age insurance, the Congress 
retreated from the actuarial basis of the original plan, 
providing subsidies from general revenues to supplement the 
fund. This helped to offset the regressive financing of the 
social security programme. At the same time, benefit levels 
were boosted above original predictions. This pattern of 
expansion was to continue for almost 40 years: "The
convergence of a growing economy and a still-maturing 
program allowed for an almost painless procession of rising 
benefits that only later would take on a sorcerer's 
apprentice image of uncontrollability".104 The departure 
from insurance principles increasingly threatened the 
solvency of the social security fund, and ultimately the 
survival of the programme. Nonetheless, this practice of 
conceding to political demand would continue unabated 
through the economic boom years of the 1960s. It would only 
be the fiscal crisis of the 1970s and the Reagan New Right 
agenda of the 1980s which would slow the expansion of the 
American social security system.
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5 Canadian Old Age Pensions
a) Early Canadian Voluntarism
By the end of the nineteenth century, changing 
economic and social circumstances also forced Canadians to 
reconsider the financial plight of senior citizens.1 The 
municipal systems of provision often condemned the aged to 
a place in a poorhouse alongside the infirm or mentally 
ill? where such Elizabethan institutions were not 
developed, the indigent poor were often consigned to the 
jailhouse.2 As such injustices became more widespread, it 
was acknowledged that many deserving individuals could not 
make enough to provide for their future after retirement, 
and that government should take responsibility for their 
needs.3 While Canadians did not approach the Europeans in 
attachment to state solutions, "there was apparent a 
growing disinclination to limit the sphere of government to 
its traditional functions"? "the government should 
intervene to prevent men and women from dying of hunger in 
the street whether or not the destitution were their own 
fault".4
Federal and provincial decisionmakers received 
increasing pressure from segments of the public to adopt 
new approaches. Prominent among the proponents were major 
trade unions, which did not follow American voluntarism and 
accepted the necessity for public pensions. Union 
conventions from the late 1890s onward urged a national 
pension programme modelled after European practice. Despite 
this mounting concern, verified by government 
investigations of the abject conditions of the indigent 
elderly, procrastination was the practice.5 Government 
officials denied the problem, or insisted there was no 
widespread demand for action. The ideology of the time 
suggested that individual frugality and thrift were the 
routes to avoidance of the poorhouse.6 Thus, the Royal 
Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital, 
reporting in 1889, urged the government to facilitate the 
prospects for individual savings to prevent destitution and 
dependency in old age.7 Pensions were regarded only as
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rewards for faithful service, to be dispensed solely on the 
whim of private employers.8
In addition, politicians feared the adverse views 
which potential foreign investors and immigrants would 
develop if Canada, through the adoption of a pension 
system, admitted poverty was a widespread problem. The 
federal government initially pursued an approach which was 
consistent with the individualistic ideology. Habits of 
thrift were encouraged by the development of government and 
post-office savings banks, to act as the repository for 
individual savings. Despite the presence of high profile 
labourites in the Liberal caucus, government leaders 
continued to resist a public pension, which would reward 
the improvident at the expense of the frugal. In 1907, the 
Liberal regime of Wilfrid Laurier introduced a system of 
government annuities, to be sold to the public for a 
minimal outlay, and extended on the basis of irregular 
payments. The individual would thereby be encouraged to put 
more of his money into savings for the future, and the 
thrifty would receive larger payments upon retirement than 
the spendthrift.9
Trade unionists quickly condemned the plan as 
inadequate, since many workers could not afford to buy 
annuities. Spurred on by the adoption of pension schemes in 
Britain, Germany, Australia and New Zealand, unions 
advocated a government programme, financed from general 
revenues or from sale of crown land.10 The Trades and Labour 
Congress of Canada noted that, since government gave 
generous incentives and grants to industry, ”it should not 
be difficult to find the necessary funds to take care of 
the soldiers of toil who, after a lifetime of good 
citizenship, find themselves helpless in old age11.11 A good 
pension system was essential to draw skilled workers from 
Britain and those European countries which had adopted such 
plans. Union pressure was heightened as federal and 
provincial governments developed more generous pension 
schemes to aid their own employees and railway workers. The 
inequity of excluding organized and unorganized workers in 
private industry from such plans added to the appeal of
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comprehensive pensions.
Nonetheless, politicians continued to express concerns 
about the social impact of such a programme, citing the 
potential deterioration of thrift and savings. Government 
spokesmen made much of the difficulties of separating the 
deserving from the undeserving aged, of distinguishing 
which indigents had at least attempted to provide for 
themselves, and which had merely accepted state relief 
after a wasteful life. "Reward for service" as a principle 
made this possible since each employer could independently 
assess the merits of a claimant? hence the state should 
provide retirement pensions only for public sector 
employees, as was the existing practice. In debates in the 
House of Commons, this voluntarist approach was justified 
by appeals to the vast opportunity available to Canadians 
in a wealthy, expanding young economy. "There is enough for 
all, and none need suffer except for want of effort" 
remained the appealing creed.12
Pensions were raised repeatedly in the House of 
Commons in the years prior to World War I. A Parliamentary 
commission collected submissions from numerous labour, 
business, charitable and municipal organizations? a high 
degree of public support for pensions was uncovered.13 
Nonetheless, encouraged by business opposition,14 the 
proposal was ignored by the government of the day. The high 
cost of a national programme would potentially exact a 
heavy price on the young economy. Governments concentrated 
their attention on improving economic performance, and 
increasing the size of the Canadian economy. Growth and 
prosperity would enable increasing numbers of workmen to 
provide for their own future, through savings or annuities, 
public and private.
While the war enhanced the federal governments 
authority and financial resources, it also distracted 
politicians from the pension issue? the reconstruction 
emphasis on return to private initiative and federal fiscal 
frugality also inhibited serious consideration of such a 
costly innovative programme. Despite recommendations in 
favour of old age pensions from both the Royal Commission
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on Industrial Relations and the Industrial Conference of 
September, 1919, the Conservative government of Robert 
Borden accepted the employers1 position in favour of 
government retrenchment and balanced budgets.15 And, 
notwithstanding the commitment at the 1919 Liberal 
leadership convention, the Liberal government of Mackenzie 
King in the early 1920s also allowed the prosperous times 
to deflect it from consideration of pensions.
b) The Emergence of Old Age Pensions. 1927
Led by labour and progressive members, Canada's 
Parliament made several inconclusive investigations of 
pensions after World War I. Finally, a Special Committee of 
the House was established to consider an old age pensions 
system for Canada. In its 1924 report, the Committee 
recommended a system of pensions for the needy over age 70, 
who were British subjects with a long history of residence 
in Canada. Pensions of $20 per month were to be available, 
but were reduced if pensioners received other income. 
Pensions were to be financed on a cost-shared basis with 
the federal government to pay 50% of the costs, and the 
provinces the other 50%. Cooperation with the provinces was 
considered desirable, since constitutional jurisdiction for 
old age pensions was undetermined.16 The King administration 
hesitated, citing constitutional uncertainty; it was 
induced to act when a pension system was demanded as the 
price of support by the labourite "Ginger Group", which 
held the balance of power in Parliament in 1925. On the 
advice of the Department of Justice, Mackenzie King offered 
federal assistance to any province which voluntarily set up 
its own pension system conforming to federal standards.
Labour welcomed the initiatives in Parliament, but 
applied pressure for more generous terms. The Parliamentary 
Committee was criticized for treating pensions as a matter 
of "business" rather than of "brotherhood". The Toronto 
District Labour Council advocated a scheme of universally 
available pensions at a rate of $30 per month? individuals 
should not have to wait until they are "on the brink of
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starvation" to qualify for pensions.17 The Trades and Labour
Congress of Canada argued that "[mjodern industry is
willing only to use the most efficient workers and this
makes it difficult for thousands of aged workers to earn
sufficient to keep them in the necessities of life. Neglect
and indifference on the part of the Government of Canada to
fulfil its duties to this class of citizens is 
• 18 • • •inexcusable". The TLC criticized the disqualification for 
individuals with high savings as discriminatory and
unacceptable.19 A national pension system, fully funded by
20 • • • • Ottawa, was also preferred , to avoid variations m
provincial standards of pensions and ensure "equality of
treatment".21 While welcoming the introduction of a
precedent for state social security,22 and expressing
support for the government's programme as a first step23,
the TLC continued to press for amendments to make the plan
j /  j p
more comprehensive and generous. The TLC was quick to
condemn the failure by the Senate to pass the old age
pension bill once approved by parliament; the TLC went so 
far as to advocate curtailment of the authority of this 
appointed body, to ensure the triumph of the people's 
will.26.
Private pensions were not seen as an alternative 
because they discouraged hiring of older workers,
restricted labour mobility, and served as a tool of 
employer coercion.27 Only a few unions, notably the Railway 
Brotherhoods, supported retention of private company
pensions28 which should be improved to act as a complement 
to any government pension plan.29 But their success must be 
made available to the community at large; the railwaymen 
declared "the desirability and the crying need of an old 
age pension system for all Canada".30 The Senate was 
denounced as an "obstruction to social justice".31
Business leaders resisted the move to state provision 
for social security. The Monetary Times argued that while 
"progress is being made in the struggle of the people to 
break the increasing hold the government has been taking in 
their private affairs, the idea that it is a function of
government to interfere on behalf of the economically weak
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persists". Such policies inevitably meant that productive 
elements of society must be expected to support 
unproductive groups, an approach which would threaten the 
economic foundation of society, and the spirit of 
independence of the citizens.32 Old age pensions on a 
national scale were resisted as a dole33, although 
provincial schemes not conforming to rigid federal 
standards were considered less objectionable.34 Concerns 
were raised over the costs of a non-contributory system, 
which was viewed as potentially a significant economic 
drain. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association took a 
prominent role in rejecting pensions, citing foreign 
experience with such programmes, which allegedly created 
massively inflated tax burdens, and resultant economic 
drain; any initial cost estimates could be dismissed as 
"inevitably much lower than what is proved in the event".35 
Business resistance to increased expenditures, and its 
demands for lower taxes and balanced budgets may have been 
important in inducing government caution and delay.36
Despite these objections, political developments 
eventually dictated adoption of public pensions.37 After 
defeat of the bill in the Senate, and an election 
precipitated by the constitutional crisis of 1926, the 
pension issue remained at the top of the political agenda? 
the new majority government of Mackenzie King was committed 
to the re introduction and passage of the plan.38 Canadians 
only slowly reaped the benefits, as some provinces took 
another half decade to subscribe. After the Conservatives 
altered their position, and actually increased the federal 
contribution to 75% in the 1930s, reluctant premiers and 
the fiscally weak provinces were able to participate, and 
the means-tested, non-contributory model came into effect.
Business response to pensions remained critical. The 
Canadian Manufacturers' Association convention of 1929 
argued that Canada was going against trends in adopting a 
non-contributory system, which could only put "a premium on 
thriftlessness and fraud". A contributory pension programme 
would be both less costly and less of a drain on the moral 
strength of workers.39 The present system was repeatedly
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condemned for its disastrous economic impact, and pressure 
for reform remained constant in subsequent years.40 The CMA 
remained in the forefront, at one point even suggesting an 
amendment to require close relatives to support senior 
citizens to save money.41 In a more constructive vein, the 
CMA advocated a conversion to a universal contributory 
system; this would reduce the tax burden, and remove 
barriers to thrift created by the existing limits on
/ j
additional savings and earnings.
In contrast, labour spokesmen suggested the programme 
was insufficiently generous,43 and demanded a lower 
eligibility age, and a larger monthly payment.44 Claiming 
that workers wore out at an early age in a modern economy, 
various union locals called upon the government to adopt a 
more generous programme.45 The plan was also criticized for 
its provision for government takeover of deeds to 
pensioners' homes upon their death as a means of recouping 
the cost of the pensions, which was an infringement on the 
rights of descendants.46 Farmers' organizations joined in 
the demands.47 Others were concerned to improve portability 
of pensions among the provinces, to assist mobility of 
labour.48 Municipalities concerned about their growing 
relief roles joined in demands for a lowering in age for 
pension eligibility to reduce their liability.49
Despite serious concerns, the largest union central, 
the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada supported the new 
programme. Unionists took an active role in encouraging all 
the provinces to participate in the pension scheme, no easy 
accomplishment in the depression years which followed. 
Unionists used the argument that, since national taxes were 
used to pay the federal portion of the programme, unionists 
in non-participating provinces were being asked to pay for 
a service they could not receive.50
c) Reforms and Debates in the 1950s
The 1927 act remained on the statute books for the 
next 24 years. It received increasing criticism on a number 
of fronts. Reform groups and labour organizations attacked
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the programme for its small benefits, high eligibility age, 
and degrading means test.51 Inconsistencies between 
provincial programmes and the long residency requirements 
were also condemned by labour as inequitable, and 
restrictive of labour mobility. Labour was particularly 
keen to lower the pensionable age during the great 
depression, to increase job opportunities for younger 
workers.52 Business groups continued their criticism of the 
high cost and economic disincentives of the plan.53 Press 
commentary urged changes to make the programme more 
adequate in the expensive post-war economy.54 It was not 
until serious post-war inflation in the late 1940s that the 
federal government considered major alterations to the 
pension programme. An increase in the benefit size to $40 
per month in 1947 was followed by comprehensive 
reassessment of the programme by a special parliamentary 
committee in the early 1950s.55
Business organizations resisted expansion of 
"government guaranteed security", which limited individual 
freedom, and reduced personal responsibility.56 C.C. 
Thackray, President of Dominion Rubber Company argued:
People need protection against old age, unemployment 
and disability ... but this protection should come 
first of all from the thrift of the individual, from 
his own efforts and self-reliance. Government benefits 
should come last and should be held down to a minimum. 
When the government takes the lead in developing human 
aid a nation's walk down the road to socialism turns 
into a gallop.57
Stockholders' organizations argued that high taxes on
owners and investors, Canadian and foreign, would
inevitably prove costly to the economy; the electorate
should not be duped into "a piecemeal institution of
socialism [which] ... is exactly what would happen if
pensions were paid to 'have-nots' by money taken from
'haves'".58 The Chamber of Commerce held to traditional
conceptions of individual thrift and responsibility as the
route to economic growth, upon which all security must
ultimately rest. "So-called social security provided by the
state, ... grows by what it feeds on and destroys the
incentives which lead to a real social security".59 The
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Chamber warned of a need "to guard against building an
edifice of fixed expenditures which, if dark days should
come upon us, our economy could not possibly carry".60 There
was considerable concern, lest any increase in benefit
levels, reduction in the age limit, or elimination of the
means test61 should make an already expensive programme
prohibitively burdensome.62
In its brief to the Parliamentary Committee, the
Chamber of Commerce accepted the political inevitability of
a broadening of the pension system , and concentrated on
securing the least economically and morally damaging
alternative. Warning, in this cold war period, that
generous social programmes might prove incompatible with
adequate military security, the Chamber called for a
pension limited to $30 per month, payable to long-term
residents over age 70, and advocated elimination of the
means test to avoid disincentives63? the public pension was
considered only a bare minimum to prevent destitution.64
Financing by universal contributions was also suggested, to
spread the burden as widely as possible, and to discourage
increased benefits, by making more people feel the cost of
such generosity. "This should provide an automatic check on
demands for increased social welfare beyond the willingness
and capacity of the citizen to pay".65
The life insurance industry shared most of the Chamber
of Commerce positions, calling for limited benefits, strict
eligibility requirements, and contributory financing.
Careful design of the programme was crucial to avoid
disincentives and economic drain. In particular, the
pension should be a bare minimum which would not discourage
continued productive effort by the aged:
During the past half century there has been a 
substantial increase in longevity and a marked 
improvement in the general level of health, and 
in most occupations working conditions have 
become less onerous and hours of work much 
shorter. The result is that people should now be 
able to continue some form of employment longer 
than was previously the case.66
Benefits should be paid on a flat rate basis to all, and 
not linked to previous earnings, to keep down the cost of
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both benefits and record-keeping. Contributions should also 
not be progressive with increasing income, but should be on 
a flat rate or set percentage of income, to avoid impinging 
on private savings, pension contributions or insurance 
premiums. A pay-as-you-go system out of current 
contributions was preferred to an actuarial fund, as the 
latter would require costly administration; contributions 
should only be charged to individuals, the future 
recipients of pensions, and should not be levied on 
employers.67
Albeit grudgingly , manufacturers saw the benefits of 
a pension programme financed by worker contributions as a
* 69less costly, and more responsible system. The CMA 
acknowledged the inadequacy of private pensions, and no 
doubt welcomed the reduced pension burden on industry after 
the establishment of a government pension programme. Public 
pensions were lauded for lessening inflation, since they 
"reduce[d] the danger of ‘pie-in-the-sky' demands by 
unions".70 Since demands for protection would inevitably 
increase, the Association preferred a move away from the 
current costly non-contributory system, with its 
disincentives from the means tests. The CMA argued that 
"considerations of coverage, equity, the avoidance of 
costly and discriminatory relief or charity payments and 
the protection of the economy of our country and the aged 
in our population, all argue for the inauguration of an 
over-all, contributory old age pension plan on a reasonably 
adequate basis".71 The CMA also favoured a graded benefit 
scheme, to ensure larger pensions to those whose efforts 
had reaped larger incomes in the working years? this was 
considered an additional incentive to effort by workers.72 
The CMA still urged retention high age and residency 
requirements, and cautioned that the programme must be 
self-financing to avoid undue tax burdens.73
The labour movement had become more fragmented by 
1950, and this prompted a more diverse range of positions 
towards pension reform. The Quebec-based Confederation des 
Travailleurs Catholique maintained its concerns respecting 
Quebec's autonomy in social policy matters.74 However, this
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union strongly supported a more adequate system of 
pensions: "The worker, who has, for the advantage of his 
community, devoted all of his life to the practice of a 
trade or a profession is entitled to demand that the 
community look after his subsistence when he has reached 
retirement age",75 The CTCC argued that government should 
first encourage expansion of private pension programmes, 
while providing a complementary public pension as a 
"minimum under which one could not decently go"? the CTCC 
also called for a lower age of eligibility, to relieve 
pressures on the job market.76 Elimination of the 
"humiliating" means test and provision of more generous 
benefits were also advocated as well within the means of a 
rich and expanding country like Canada.77 But any new 
programme should conform to the "excellent ... present 
system of concurrent legislation based on federal- 
provincial co-operation" to avoid erosion of Quebec's 
social policy jurisdiction.78 The Union Catholique des 
Cultivateurs recommended increased benefits, reduced 
qualifying age, cost of living adjustments, a more flexible 
means test, and voluntary annuities beyond the basic 
pension; it likewise maintained the Quebec preference that 
"the provinces remain the administrators of the programme, 
each one attempting in its own jurisdiction to adapt it to 
the mentality and the economic and social conditions of its 
environment".79
The Trades and Labour Congress of Canada, impatient at
• 80 • , the lack of government action , resisted the contributory
principle for many years, favouring a more generous state-
sponsored programme for the needy. However, by the 1950s
the TLC had accepted the contributory, all-inclusive model,
as part of a comprehensive social security package81. The
Congress was concerned lest the inability of many to
receive government pensions would induce greater reliance
on private pension plans82 which promoted inequities and
gaps in coverage (such as for seasonal workers) labour
market immobility, and employer preference for younger
workers.83 The TLC plan would include a universally
available contributory pension from age 65 without means
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test, with generous benefits and relaxed residency
p/
requirements. Contributions should be progressive, levied 
on incomes. Federal financing and administration were also 
advocated, to ensure a uniform national standard, and 
elimination of provincial residency requirements to 
facilitate mobility.85 The pension plan should be integrated 
into a comprehensive social security package, to ensure 
that "a thriving country, capable of providing a high 
standard of living for its population, shall at no time 
number among its citizens persons who, through no fault of 
their own, find themselves without financial means to 
purchase their own food, clothing, shelter, and a share of 
the good things of life".86 Generous public pensions were 
also considered prudent, since communism, the principal 
enemy of democracy, thrived on the discontent of the 
impoverished.87
The Canadian Congress of Labour, composed of 
industrial unions, adopted a more radical position. Current 
provisions for the aged were soundly condemned as 
inadequate: "[i]t might be far more humane to club our aged 
to death ... than to condemn them to the barren existence 
of miserable back rooms, shabby clothing, bad food, and
• • fiA # ,indifferent care". Noting the more generous pension 
systems of many Western nations, including the United 
States, the Congress called for a basic non-contributory 
pension, paid for by the federal government, available to 
all over age 65 as a matter of right, at a rate of $50 per 
month. This should be supplemented by a contributory 
pension plan for those able to accumulate sufficient 
contributions, with graduated premiums and benefits. For 
those too old or otherwise unable to accumulate pension 
rights, an additional old age assistance programme should 
pay extra benefits from federal funds. Pensions should be 
increased yearly to match rising living costs, with a 2% 
productivity bonus. These elaborate policies could be 
financed by increased corporate taxes and progressive
• 89 • •income tax. Such revisions would prevent the Canadian 
pension plan from remaining "a modern equivalent of the old
90 • •poor laws". In addition, the means test should be
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abolished so that pensioners could receive additional 
benefits from industrial pensions obtained via collective 
bargaining.91 A simpler call for generous, non-contributory 
pensions, payable at age 60, was advanced by the United 
Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of America. High 
pensions would act as an economic stimulus to promote full- 
employment, and could be financed by reduced military 
spending.92
The Committee ultimately recommended a two-tier 
programme, with contributory pensions (old age security) 
available to all over the age of 70, at a rate of $40 per 
month, administered federally, and a supplementary means- 
tested, non-contributory old age assistance plan available 
to individuals between 65-69 years of age, administered by 
the provinces on a cost-shared basis. With the appropriate 
constitutional amendment, and the passage of two
complementary bills, this political compromise package was 
implemented in 1951.93 Naturally the protagonists were not 
entirely satisfied, and appeals for revisions were 
forthcoming94. However, there was sufficient cause for 
satisfaction with the programme, at least as a first step95?
• • 96 •the new policy improved on the position of the aged , while 
redressing business concerns about the high costs of the 
current plan.97 Nonetheless, despite Liberal expression of 
strong support of state responsibility for welfare
• • 98 • •provision , the programme fell short of America's OASDI m
its scope, age limits and generosity. Only in 1958 did
Canada extend federal cost sharing to disability benefits, 
for example.99
d) Reforms and Debates in the 1960s
It was not until the mid-1960s that Canada 
rationalized and upgraded its pension system into a fully 
contributory plan, available to all over age 65. 
Conservative and reform pressures again pushed in similar 
directions. Business and bureaucrats joined together in 
their desire to end the flat-rate benefit and contribution 
system, which, it was claimed, would escalate costs and 
detract from incentive. On the other hand, those interested
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in improving benefit levels also believed contributory 
pensions would facilitate a more generous system which 
avoided the uncertainties and rigidities of private 
pensions. British and Swedish models of contributory 
pensions, with contributions and benefits based on 
earnings, served as the model for both reform factions.100
Business retained its cautious approach, demanding a 
programme designed to minimize interference in the 
economy.101 Both the Chamber of Commerce and the Life 
Insurance industry favoured government encouragement of 
private pensions and insurance schemes, and resisted
expansion of public pensions beyond the minimum floor
# • 102 •previously established. Actuaries feared the costs of the
programme, and felt private plans were both more efficient
and less expensive, while providing new capital for private
investment. They resorted to traditional rhetoric in
condemning Canadians' "excessive dependence on governmental
support and ... expectation of income totally unrelated to
the contribution the individual himself has made".103 The
Chamber of Commerce feared the size of the proposed fund,
which would drain capital from private investment,104 and
expand "the growth of government at the expense of private
development".105 Higher tax burdens to pay for the plan
would also hurt the international competitiveness of
Canadian business106; only a limited, flat rate benefit
could avoid this cost escalation.107 But other business
organizations accepted the overall desirability of the new
plan, despite specific criticisms.108
Unions were more enthusiastic about the potential for 
expansion of benefits to include such contingencies as 
disability and survivors needs, and provide full 
portability and wage related benefits, long features of 
U.S. pension policy. Unions were concerned to ensure that 
contributions and benefits worked in progressive fashion, 
to provide the minimum income necessary to support a 
healthy and decent retirement, including adjustments linked 
to the cost of living. Ultimately the government 
initiatives of the 1960s were considered worthy of
109 • • •support. Indeed, unions mounted a strong campaign m
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favour of contributory pensions, to counter Chamber and
• • 110 insurance industry attacks.
Hesitant in the face of business pressures, the
minority Liberal government of Lester Pearson was forced
into action in 1965 by the New Democratic Party, its social
democratic partner in the House. Inducement also came from
the well-developed Quebec plan, which that province
threatened to enact unilaterally. These diverse pressures,
and byzantine negotiations with the provinces, notably
Quebec, produced a compromise policy, which introduced a
contributory, portable, earnings-related pension on top of
the universal, flat rate pension. By 1970, pension benefits
under both schemes were gradually made available, without
means test, to all over age 65. Accumulation of a pension
reserve fund, available to provinces for investment in
securities, was part of an effort to control costs, and
ensure self-financing. Under pressure from Quebec, Ottawa
eventually accepted survivor, death and disability
provisions, bringing the Canadian programme closer to US
• 1 1 1  • • •  •practice. Thus, the American legislative accomplishment
of the 1930s was finally emulated in this country, ending
several decades in which Canadian pensioners received far
less extensive assistance. By the 1970s, beneficiaries
received somewhat similar payments in the two countries,
with the Americans still spending more per capita, if using
less progressive contribution and benefit scales. Fear of
constitutional complications had caused the Canadian plan
to evolve in several stages, as against the comprehensive
• • • • • 112 American initiative of the 1930s.
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6 American Unemployment Insurance
a) Earlv Consideration of Unemployment Insurance
Despite widespread joblessness in recession periods, 
Americans were slow to abandon the belief in individual 
responsibility for the destitution of unemployment. Poverty 
was considered a result of individual failings, not of lack 
of employment opportunity.1 The able-bodied employable were 
targets of public scorn, not sympathy2; any assistance to 
them should be administered by local, private agencies, 
able to distinguish the deserving unfortunate from the 
undeserving indolent.3 As the impact of economic 
fluctuations became more frequent and apparent, the belief 
in individual responsibility was increasingly questioned: 
more members of the community began "to grasp the truth 
that under modern industrial conditions great numbers of 
working men out of work are not personally blameworthy for 
their misfortunes", that opportunity was less readily 
available in an industrial society than it had been in 
frontier days.4 Nonetheless, the individualistic ideology 
ensured that progress towards new methods of addressing the 
unemployment problem was limited. Although the progressives 
of early century generated considerable support for new 
remedies the pace of reform was slow, "a laborious push 
against entrenched opposition".5
The movement for public unemployment insurance was led 
by the American Association for Labor Legislation, under 
the leadership of John R. Commons and John B. Andrews. 
Isolationist and nativistic sentiments meant that 
references to European precedents were unpopular with the 
American public. John Andrews explained that it was a 
mistake
"for us in this country to spend an undue amount 
of time discussing the British or any other 
system of European unemployment insurance. I 
think we can much more wisely build out of our 
own American experience with accident insurance 
a practical unemployment compensation system with 
much better prospects of enactment here.1,6
A compromise was sought, combining advantages of the
American philosophy of self-help and public unemployment
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insurance? the demoralizing European dole was not an 
appropriate model for America.7
Workmen*s compensation acts, which had promoted a 
decline in accident rates in American industry, were used 
as a model. Commons suggested that unemployment insurance 
should be designed to encourage employment stabilization 
in industry, to reduce the extent of unemployment.8 
"Unemployment prevention" became the platform of the AALL; 
its influence in Wisconsin led to the formulation of the 
Huber programme, of unemployment reserves, financed by 
employer contributions linked to industry and company 
performance in avoidance of unemployment.9 Levels of 
benefit were to be quite low, to avoid encouraging workers 
to reject low-paid employment.
While this initiative was rebuffed for many years, it
remained the most influential model for unemployment
• 10 • • compensation. High costs of European systems, high
employment levels in the expanding American economy11, and
ideological resistance combined to stall this legislation.
Up to the great depression, "progressive thought on the
subject regarded the regularization of industry and the
prevention of unemployment, rather than the alleviation of
its consequences, as the objective.1,12
b) Union Voluntarism and Unemployment Insurance
Samuel Gompers was concerned about the plight of the 
jobless and recognized the situation as a social problem, 
beyond the control of individual workers.13 Man possessed 
a basic "right to the opportunity to work", and when "that 
right is denied him, society does him and his [family] an 
injustice".14 With the spread of new machines and industrial 
restructuring and the use of low-paid apprentices, workers 
were in constant danger of the demoralizing "lay-off"? 
prolonged unemployment was socially costly since it 
diminished the worker*s familiarity with the discipline and 
skills of his trade.15
But Gompers was unwilling to support compulsory 
unemployment insurance. As he declared, the "American 
workman refuses to regard unemployment as a permanent evil
107
attending the industrial and economic forces of our 
country”16; it could be alleviated or eliminated through 
job-sharing and increased worker consuming power, which 
would stimulate demand and employment. Hence, the unions* 
struggles for increased wages and shorter hours were all 
that was needed? further gains in labour organization could 
help achieve these aims.17 Public works, and farsighted 
employer planning could reduce the tendency toward labour 
surplus.18 Compulsory unemployment insurance shared common 
evils with other types of social insurance: it would impose 
odious controls and inspections over workers' lives, 
restrict worker mobility, independence and self-reliance, 
and promote a class of labour expected to subsist on sub­
standard income.19 If any relief were needed, the AFL
preferred union unemployment funds, as an inducement to
• • * 2 0  worker organization and cohesion.
Technological displacement, business recessions and 
seasonal layoffs continued to besiege workers through the 
1920s. But the AFL and the independent railway unions 
continued to advocate non-governmental solutions.21 Private 
alternatives were pursued, like union and company plans.22 
American unions developed a variety of unemployment benefit 
funds, financed from members' contributions.23 But such 
measures were only remedial actions where unemployment 
could not be eliminated through shorter hours and better 
production decisions.
Towards the end of the 1920s, many unionists began to 
recognize the inadequacies of private options; while better 
paid than his European counterpart, the American worker was 
still unable to meet the costs of unemployment on his own.25 
Union efforts to provide unemployment funds were woefully 
inadequate during extended periods of joblessness.26 But
union ideology discouraged demands for state action27,
• • • 28 despite internal disagreements. Compulsory programmes,
which would deprive workers of independence, mobility and
self-respect, received constant condemnation from the AFL.29
c) Earlv Business Responses
Many business leaders felt public unemployment
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insurance was inevitable if labour and business failed to 
solve the problem on their own. Although some condemned it 
for contributing to labour turnover and a hobo lifestyle on 
the part of many workers30, other business associations 
sought to cooperate in designing the most effective public 
and private plans.31 A few even welcomed government 
initiatives of this sort as "necessary and salutary", if 
designed not to interfere with the basic incentives of the 
free enterprise system.32 But most resisted the 
inevitability of unemployment insurance and insisted that 
business, the insurance industry and labour could forestall 
a public plan through appropriate action.33 Any programme of 
compulsory unemployment insurance was condemned as 
"fundamentally repugnant to American ideas of social 
equality and justice"; Americans should not follow alien 
European practice by providing rewards to the idle.34
Responding to the severe and unpredictable 
fluctuations in the labour market, - and to the necessity 
of labour surpluses in many industries35 - American 
employers began to devise private solutions to the 
unemployment problem by the 1920s.36 Rejecting the British 
approach of public unemployment insurance37, progressive 
business leaders advocated creation of company funds to
38assist faithful employees in times of unemployment. 
Employers now accepted the need for more guarantees, both 
to protect their supply of labour and to forestall 
government action.39 The National Industrial Conference 
Board expressed optimism about these embryonic plans? while 
they covered too few workers, they demonstrated both the 
effectiveness and the flexibility required to relieve the 
unemployment problem.40 The Conference Board indicated 
considerable confidence that "there exists an increasing 
sense of the problem of unemployment as an industrial 
responsibility".41
d) Debates in the Great Depression
The massive dislocations of the Great Depression 
ensured considerable public attention to the plight of the 
unemployed. Many private unemployment insurance plans
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collapsed during this crisis, bringing the voluntary 
approach into doubt.42 But the preference for unemployment 
prevention remained influential among interest groups and 
decisionmakers.43 The initial response of the Hoover 
administration in 1930 was to promote private action to 
stabilize employment and reinvigorate the economy. These 
efforts proved futile and the level of unemployment 
increased; municipal relief was clearly inadequate to the 
task.
The AALL revived its proposals for unemployment
reserves geared to company performance, and initiated
legislative efforts in the states.44 In a modification of
the Huber model, its "American Plan” called for state-run,
individual employer or industry funds, with contributions
linked to unemployment levels.45 Critics charged that this
programme would provide benefits inadequate in both amount
and duration. The Ohio Commission on Unemployment Insurance
of 1932 advocated a British-style pooled fund, based on
flat rate employer and employee contributions to permit
more extensive benefits46; social responsibility for
unemployment was affirmed over that of the individual
company.47 Others experimented with variations of the two,
introducing such elements as extended waiting periods to
permit longer, larger benefits.48 Finally, radical activists
advocated more generous programmes of unemployment
assistance, with unlimited benefit duration, as part of a
comprehensive social insurance system, funded by
progressive income and corporate taxes. The Lundeen bill to
this effect drew extensive political support by 1933,
putting pressure on politicians, business, labour and
reformers to seriously consider less costly options.49
Despite the crisis, only a limited number of employers
recognised the need for federal action.50 Business feared
that the federal government would be forced by
circumstances to impose undesirable solutions. William
Procter of Procter and Gamble warned:
Recurring periods of unemployment are one of the 
great weaknesses - if not the greatest - in our 
present social system. ... The injustice is so 
great and so evident that industry must solve it, 
or the problem will be taken from her hands and
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placed in those of others not so competent for
its proper solution.51
Industry alone should not bear the burden; since society 
shared responsibility for the depression, some government 
action was necessary.52 For instance, many businesses 
supported public works through government contracts with 
private firms53. But government should not have license for 
undesirable interference in the economy, such as 
regulations for shorter hours, or public unemployment 
insurance.54
Ideological objections were also advanced. The 
National Association of Manufacturers feared unemployment 
insurance would be a first step toward a comprehensive 
social insurance system, with potentially disastrous 
consequences for the American way of life.55 Actuaries, 
condemned the proposal because it would fundamentally 
challenge the sacred American principle of property rights, 
establishing instead a policy of "levelling”.56 Unemployment 
insurance violated the principles of natural justice 
enshrined in the American constitution.57 It reflected an 
undesirable trend of looking to the government to solve all 
social and economic problems, which would undermine the 
self-reliance upon which the nation had been founded.58
Practical economic concerns reinforced business 
rejection of this "well-intentioned but unsound social 
legislation".59 Public unemployment insurance was especially 
feared for its disincentive effects; it would become a 
demoralizing dole encouraging idleness since it would be 
difficult to weed out malingerers.60 Liberalization of 
benefits due to political pressure would discourage workers 
from accepting low-paying jobs; the means tests would 
encourage idleness by disqualifying workers who earned 
extra income from employment.61 The NAM condemned 
compulsory unemployment insurance for its high costs, as 
evidenced by British experience. Unemployment insurance 
would impose high tax burdens detrimental to economic well­
being62 and provide generous benefits, stifling individual 
initiative63. It would diminish employers' flexibility in 
dismissing workers for valid reasons and provide financial
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reward to the ineffective and insubordinate.64 Some business 
associations also questioned whether unemployment was an 
insurable risk.65 The National Industrial Conference Board 
argued that a severe depression was a "catastrophic hazard, 
of "incalculable", "unpredictable" and "uninsurable" 
nature; the costs of an accumulated reserve were 
"prohibitive".66
The National Metal Trades Association believed that 
only individual reserves would provide against the 
contingency of unemployment without rewarding idleness and 
undermining the national economy.67 The NICB solution was 
for workers to provide as much as possible for their own
situation, aided by public relief paid for by the state out
68of general tax revenues. The NAM argued for private plans, 
supplemented by severance pay, public works, seasonal wages 
to encourage off-season hiring, and reduced taxation to
• 69 • •promote prosperity and employment. Private insurance 
companies, boasting of their record in other aspects of 
social insurance, believed they could meet the, current 
contingencies, if governments removed prohibitions on 
private unemployment insurance.70 While not all fotms of job 
loss were insurable on an actuarial basis, experiments with 
priivate plans were desirable.71 Individual worker insurance 
policies, underwritten by established insurance companies 
would avoid restrictions on mobility and preserve 
individual responsibility.72 The state should provide 
employment bureaus to assist job-seekers? relief in the 
form of charity, not insurance as a right, should be the 
means of addressing a prolonged depression.73
Employers boasted that private plans encouraged 
workers to save money from their wages to meet 
unemployment.74 For instance, textile industries were 
praised for their unemployment insurance programme, "which 
assures each worker safety from abject poverty through 
involuntary unemployment, without charity".75 Employer 
plans might provide benefits of limited duration and size. 
But these plans avoided the disincentive effects of a 
generous public dole such as Britain's, by "placfing] upon 
the worker the responsibility of surveying his own
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problem", while providing a brief cushion during which the 
unemployed could seek new work.76
Major business associations, like the Chamber of 
Commerce actively promoted sound company plans, to dampen 
demand for a national, compulsory system.77 Other companies, 
notably Procter and Gamble, suggested guaranteed employment 
periods, or work-sharing, as contributing to employee 
security and loyalty, employment stabilization and 
financial responsibility.78 By the early years of the great 
depression, many business establishments had implemented 
dismissal wages, unemployment reserves, work sharing, and 
other devices to ensure better provision for the
79 • • • 80unemployed , and better "public relations" for industry. 
Business spokesmen were buoyed by the support of AFL 
voluntarists, who shared these concerns and preferences.81
e) Union Conversion
Many union leaders doubted the good intentions of 
employers. Unless unions were in a strong bargaining 
position - which was not the case in a serious depression 
- it was unlikely that an adequate number of plans could 
be negotiated to ensure sufficient coverage.82 Union plans 
might be more desirable as a means of maintaining worker 
loyalty but were inadequate in times of low wages and high 
unemployment.83 AFL leaders expressed a concern with social 
stability: with expectations so sorely dashed by the
crisis, delay in enacting a comprehensive programme of 
insurance "increases the number who turn to radical
o/
movements and dangerous leaders". With revolution as the 
only other alternative, unionists were persuaded to 
consider seriously a government unemployment insurance 
programme.85
Union conversion on this issue was not obtained 
without considerable resistance from voluntarists. 
Delegates to AFL conventions, such as John Forseth of the 
Seamen, feared unemployment insurance would inevitably 
contribute to diminished independence for the worker, and
would place new powers in the hands of employers and the
86 • • • state. Sharing the ideological concerns of business
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conservatives, he declared that the AFL "should not play
recklessly with your human freedom":
the road you are travelling is the road that 
leads to the destruction of humanity and the 
destruction of the nation and of all other 
nations that can find no other way than to make 
out of a man a pleading beggar and a man who must 
go for his goods to others.87
A.F. Whitney, President of the Brotherhood of Railroad
Trainmen, suggested the undesirability of public
unemployment insurance, which would impose "an unbearable
load on the public treasury", and exert a bad effect on the
psychology of the worker.88 Commentary in union journals
still emphasized efforts to eliminate unemployment by
• • • • • 89eradicating fluctuations in the business cycle.
AFL leaders insisted that unemployment relief must be
• • 90 • • • •designed cautiously. The official AFL position was 
critical of the reporting requirements of unemployment 
insurance, which could serve as a new tool of employer 
control.91 State benefits could act as an excuse for 
layoffs, serving to perpetuate unemployment.92 Unionists 
maintained that the "best relief that can be offered an 
unemployed person is a job"93, and demanded a guaranteed 
"right to work".94 Any relief should involve direct 
government payments, not a contributory unemployment 
insurance system.95 Capital should be used for employment- 
generating investment instead of unproductive benefits to 
the idle.96
Widespread deprivation in the depression era caused
the AFL executive to finally admit the need for government
action. The executive committee report to the 1932
convention acknowledged this.
The economic facts arising out of the 
unemployment situation, the continued 
displacement of millions of working men through 
the mechanization of industry, and the 
substitution of power for human service, makes 
it absolutely necessary ... to develop and put 
into operation through the enactment of 
appropriate legislation, an unemployment 
insurance plan which will provide for the payment 
of weekly benefits to working men and women who 
are forced to suffer from unemployment.97
The AFL eventually became an outspoken advocate of public
114
unemployment insurance? its publications now argued that 
"mass unemployment is beyond the control of both workers
98 •and employers” and a permanent solution was required. 
Labour preferred "a national system of unemployment 
insurance” with national standards imposed on the states.99 
Since management was largely responsible for 
unemployment100, the AFL opposed compulsory worker 
contributions, and favoured employer financing.101 This 
moderate proposal prevailed, despite minority demands for
radical programmes of income redistribution via inheritance
• 102 and income taxes.
f) Unemployment Insurance and the Economic Security Act
The Democratic administration of Franklin Roosevelt 
initially employed conventional responses to the problem 
of unemployment. Policies were designed to get workers back 
on the job, and to assist local governments and charities 
with the provision of relief. Congressional action was slow 
to emerge, but eventually several measures were put 
forward, notably the Wagner-Lewis initiative of 1934. The 
President himself demonstrated a conservative orientation, 
preferring a strict application of insurance principles,
• • • • 103which included employee contributions.
Panicked by state programmes and by serious federal 
proposals, business executives took on a more urgent tone 
in their commentary and proposals. A few appeared to 
concede the potential benefits of a government-mandated 
unemployment reserves programme, managed by individual 
industries, designed to encourage employers to stabilize 
their employment levels, and to stabilize consumption in 
society.104 Most still advocated private, voluntary
• 105 • •solutions. Efforts to create private reserves and benefit 
funds were expedited, since failure to act voluntarily 
would make compulsory government action inevitable.106
Ultimately, the crisis proved too extensive and many 
firms found creation of an unemployment insurance programme 
an impossible burden. State governments were paralysed by 
lack of funds and fear that the imposition of unemployment 
insurance contributions on industry would prove a
115
disincentive to investment.107 Action by the national 
government became essential. Senator Robert Wagner took the 
lead by introducing a measure which would have imposed a 
payroll tax on all employers, to be refunded in states 
which levied a similar tax to pay for unemployment 
insurance systems. This bill was designed to eliminate the
disincentive to state action, and stimulate creation of
• 108 unemployment insurance plans. The Roosevelt
administration's Committee on Economic Security of 1934-35
considered this and other proposed methods of federal-state
cooperation. It eventually opted for a weakened version of
Wagner's proposal, with fewer prescribed standards for the
state plans; effectively, the committee avoided taking the
tough political decisions on the specific make-up of the
109 • • •plan , and passed the decisions on benefit levels and
duration and contribution method and scale on to state
legislatures.110 Politically, the state run programme was
the only viable alternative, as rival proposals received no
serious consideration in Congress.
As depression continued without respite, progressive
corporate leaders accepted that government action might be
needed to give business the incentive to adopt company
plans and stabilize employment levels.111 When legislation
was designed, business associations sought to minimize the
negative consequences. Lobbyists urged legislators to, at
the very least, leave room for private unemployment plans,
• • • 112if they adhered to minimum standards. Others proffered 
specific suggestions to lessen the perceived economic drain 
of such a scheme, notably by providing for a long waiting 
period for receipt of benefits and restricting insurance
• • • 113 •benefits to a true crisis. The burden on industry should 
be reduced by employee and state contributions to the fund 
and limitations on the size of any payroll tax.114 The 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States argued for 
administration of any mandatory insurance plan at the level 
of each enterprise, and not by either level of
115 •government. Federal enforcement of national standards on 
state programmes was attacked on constitutional grounds as 
an "unwarranted intrusion of the Federal Government into
116
matters previously considered ... to be subject exclusively
• • • • 116 to the jurisdiction of the states". But the more
progressive elements ultimately supported, or restrained
criticism of the Roosevelt administration's bill.117
The Economic Security Bill of 1935 opted for
unemployment insurance operated and funded by the states,
with the "role assigned to the national government ...
principally that of inducing the states to pass
unemployment compensation laws" through the excise tax
• • • • • 118rebate plan, and grants to assist m  administration. But
the absence of specific standards did not result in a
highly heterogeneous system. Despite some important
variations in state legislation, many important
similarities appeared, as legislators responded to the
models provided in the Social Security Act, and to the
practicalities of administration. Most states opted for a
pooled fund to improve the solvency and simplify
administration. But they followed the spirit of the
Wisconsin plan in including provision for merit or
experience rating of individual employers, to act as a
• * 1 1 9stimulus to unemployment prevention.
While first acknowledging the benefits of this 
flexible programme, business eventually became concerned 
about the financing of the state plans. Business sought to 
limit their burden by advocating matching employee 
contributions. Enamoured of the Wisconsin approach, which 
rewarded business for reducing unemployment in individual 
enterprises, business associations called for "experience 
rating" in determining contributions, to link the economic
burden to the level of success in employment
• • • 120 • • stabilization. This approach was favoured because the it
would induce employers to stabilize employment, encourage
employer policing of fraudulent claims, and ensure that the
social cost of unemployment was reflected in a company's
• 121 • • • • . tprices. The Social Security Act was criticized for its 
failure to be specific in this regard; a requirement that 
state plans introduce such a provision, or allow
continuation of private plans which were so devised, was
• • • * 1 2 2  made by business in appeals to Congressional committees.
117
Business leaders resented the intrusion into their 
affairs necessitated by the reporting requirements of the 
Social Security Act and the state unemployment insurance
123 # • • •acts. But, eventually, business succeeded m  influencing 
unemployment insurance legislation in desirable fashion. 
Changes in federal and state law by 1939 had simplified
reporting procedures and reduced the size of the payroll
tax.124 The Committee on Economic Security considered 
unemployment insurance to be only a "first line of defence” 
for employees, paying minimal benefits for a short period 
of time; more liberal benefit plans, as existed in other 
countries, or the Ohio or Lundeen models, were not urged
125 • •upon the states. Since the states followed this 
recommendation closely, decisionmakers seemed to accept
business concerns respecting the tax burden and the
126solvency of funds.
The Social Security Act did not specify national 
standards for benefits and contributions. This allowed 
business associations in each state to pressure legislators 
to adopt favourable provisions. Although the Social 
Security Act had been designed to end state competition for 
business investment by minimizing the burdens of
unemployment insurance contributions, the possibility for 
such manipulations remained. This paved the way for 
business to secure the desired move to experience rating. 
Business lobbyists were able to pressure states into 
adopting such a provision to maintain a favourable climate
* 127 • • • •for investment. Unions were critical of the Social 
Security Act for assigning such a weak role to the federal 
government. The AFL feared such a policy would lead to a 
weak, fragmented unemployment insurance programme. The lack 
of criteria for benefits and contributions would permit 
interstate rivalry for business investment to occur at the 
expense of an adequate unemployment compensation level. 
States might require employee contributions, imposing a 
double burden, since workers would effectively pay the 
employer*s share through higher prices.128 Unionists wanted 
a single national programme or strict standards to ensure
• • 129 •generous, equitable benefits. President Green argued for
118
a federal subsidy to the states, available only if strict
t • • • • • 130national criteria for financing and benefits were met. 
After the Social Security Act granted states considerable 
flexibility, the AFL sought more generous state programmes, 
backed by federal "reassurance grants" to preserve the 
solvency of state funds without benefit reductions.131 The 
CIO was more persistent in demanding that unemployment, a 
problem of national scope and origin, be addressed by a 
national programme with uniform taxes, benefits and other 
standards.132
Unions were particularly critical of experience 
rating, as a device to minimise employer contributions, 
which would threaten the quality of the unemployment 
insurance programme.133 Experience rating was blamed for 
encouraging interstate competition, and reducing benefit 
levels, by limiting fund growth in boom periods.134 In many 
states, numerous employers were not making any contribution 
to the fund? many employers "were slipping out of their 
responsibility through the escape hatch of experience
i
rating"135. This worked directly against the preference of 
unions for increased benefit levels, "to achieve a 
substantial replacement of wage loss due to involuntary 
unemployment".136 Faced with the inflationary pressures of 
the next decades, the union movement maintained its 
pressure for a more adequate means of financing, to provide 
larger benefits for a longer period.137
Unions did help promote a gradual broadening of the 
unemployment insurance system. Both the categories of 
insurable employment and the size and duration of benefits
• • 13fi m fwere extended in the following years. It was impossible 
to justify the initial limitations on eligibility, or to 
devise other means of providing for those who did not
• • • • 139qualify, or who had exhausted their benefit period. As 
the nation continued to experience fluctuations in 
employment, for seasonal, structural, technological and 
cyclical reasons, states bowed to political pressure and 
extended the system; occasional federal intervention 
hastened this process, in response to pronounced economic 
recession.140 Eventually, all major interest groups became
119
reconciled to the existence of an unemployment insurance 
system. But business and labour remained divided in their 
aims, as the latter induced increased generosity in state 
programmes while the former resisted greater contributions. 
These opposing tendencies created continuing controversy 
over the nature of the American system.
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7 Canadian Unemployment Insurance
a) Earlv Unemployment Relief Policy
Unemployment was not as acute in Canada as in the 
United States in the eighteenth century. Serious problems 
of surplus labour emerged later in this less-developed 
economy. Nonetheless, economic fluctuations did produce 
dislocations for workers. The poor law tradition, and 
Quebec's Catholic practices, ensured that municipal 
governments and private charities would be the agency for 
coping with those affected. The prevailing philosophy of 
"less eligibility" ensured that relief would be minimal, 
and offered in institutional settings so as not to be an 
attractive alternative to low-paid employment, and in 
particular to farm and other seasonal labour.1 Despite the 
pronounced depressions of the 1870s and 1913, little 
serious consideration was given to federal or provincial 
action to aid the unemployed before World War I .2
High levels of unemployment were feared in the 
aftermath of World War I as the economy readjusted to 
peacetime operations. Thousands of Canadians had abandoned 
rural life for employment in the armed forces, or in war- 
related factories? not all would find employment in 
peacetime industries. Drawing on foriegn precedents, the 
Royal Commission on Industrial Relations of 1919 
recommended an unemployment insurance system to placate 
workers insecure about post-war prospects.3 Canada supported 
moves at the International Labour Organization to encourage 
member nations to create unemployment insurance systems.4
Moreover, officials of the Department of Justice 
advised the federal government that it did have the 
constitutional authority to enact such a programme. At the 
Department of Labour, draft legislation was prepared.5 
Fearing social unrest and political unpopularity if many 
were left without assistance, the wartime Union coaltion 
government planned to resettle soldiers on agricultural 
land and to move the idle into new work through the 
federal-provincial employment offices; to assist those left 
jobless, federal revenue was provided for municipal relief
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and public works during the winters of 1920 and 192l.6 Many 
in the federal bureaucracy advocated unemployment insurance 
as a means to meet future crises.7
Labour also asked the government to consider a 
permanent programme of unemployment insurance, to cope with 
seasonal and structural variations in employment levels* 
The TLC played on the fears of the politicians and public■, 
warning that "the presence in our midst of great numbers of 
men forced out of employment and into involuntary poverty 
constitutes a grave menace to our national well-being". The 
TLC argued that a permanent scheme would be more efficient 
and economical than piecemeal emergency plans.8
However, these federal policies did not herald a 
permanent commitment. The relief and works assistance were 
explicitly termed emergency measures, and were dropped 
despite the continued severe seasonal unemployment of 
subsequent winters. The Canadian government retreated, even 
though renewed post-war immigration increased the rolls of 
the jobless. The employment service was rapidly emasculated 
by the King regime after 1921, since its agrarian partners 
in the minority parliaments of the 1920s blamed federal 
relief assistance and the employment service for siphoning 
cheap labour off the farm. The farmers' view of 
unemployment was simple? unemployment was a voluntary 
state. There was enough seasonal farm work to occupy all, 
if public works and relief in the cities was not made too 
attractive.9
Labour politicians were able to initiate a 
parliamentary committee investigation into the unemployment 
situation in 1924. But the King government adopted a 
cautious approach: despite the precedent for joint action 
in pensions, provincial jurisdiction was cited as the 
reason for procrastination. Fear of the expense, and of 
political opposition were important considerations.10 The 
political strength of provincial premiers and prarie 
farmers in the 1920s ensured that no serious consideration 
of unemployment insurance could occur.
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b) Earlv Interest Group Positions
Although Canadian unions did attempt to create union 
jobless benefits, their limited resources and lack of 
mobility rights made them inadequate.11 Therefore, 
throughout the 1920s the Trades and Labour Congress of 
Canada advocated a national unemployment insurance 
programme.12 Individual responsibility for joblessness was 
regarded as an anachronistic belief, since "every 
industrial worker is constantly exposed to the hazard of 
unemployment" and the "duration of a job may not depend on 
his efficiency, workmanship or loyalty but is often more 
dependent on the personnel, production, marketing and 
financial policies of business management".13 Unemployment 
prevention was the ideal, but an unemployment insurance 
plan was essential to care for those workers left jobless 
through no fault of their own.14 Submissions to the Commons 
Committee on Industrial and International Relations 
repeatedly urged a federal programme, to ensure a uniform 
response to a problem of national origin and scope.15 Low 
benefits and careful separation of the deserving jobless 
and the indolent idle could prevent high costs and 
disincentives? tripartite contributions of state, employer 
and employee were also accepted, to acknowledge the social, 
industrial and individual nature of the risk and to 
encourage all these parties to strive for reduced 
unemployment.16 This policy would reduce worker insecurity 
and labour unrest.17
The All Canadian Congress of Labour hesitated to 
support immediate reforms when replacement of capitalism 
was ultimately desirable18; a socialist system might provide 
employment for all able-bodied citizens.19 This union 
eventually also demanded unemployment insurance as a more 
practical objective. Since most joblessness resulted from 
business decisions respecting investment, technological
change and production levels, the plan should be financed
• • 20 by "a direct charge upon industry alone". The unemployed
were not "victims of their own indolence" and deserved "a
degree of support by the industries from which they are
involuntarily excluded".21 The Catholic Workers Union of
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Canada, based in Quebec, indicated support for a nationwide 
contributory system, implemented by the federal government 
unilaterally if consultation with the provinces failed.22 
The hostile political climate and low unemployment in the 
1920s limited the effectiveness of union advocacy.23
Before the 1930s, business commentary often seemed 
tentative and cautious.24 But the Canadian Manufacturers' 
Association noted that Canada could not afford to move 
ahead of the United States in social legislation? 
unemployment insurance would constitute an extra cost of 
production in Canada which would handicap Canadian 
manufacturers in both foreign and domestic markets. 
Unemployment occurred mostly in seasonal industries, and 
steady manufacturing enterprises should not be forced to 
contribute.25 The CMA representatives also denied there was 
a shortage of work for the jobless. Canada was an expanding 
economy with abundant opportunities. Canadians' mentality 
induced workers to seek new work when unemployed. It was 
"infinitely preferable that a man who is out of work should 
bestir himself and look for a new job rather than sit down 
and twirl his hands and look for unemployment relief".26
c) The Great Depression and Union Agitation
Union pressure for unemployment insurance gained new 
vigour during the depression years. The TLC adopted the 
most moderate platform. Unemployment insurance would 
increase buying power, and reduce unemployment; it would 
encourage employment stabilization, and reduce seasonal 
fluctuations? it would raise living standards and reduce 
industrial unrest? and it would avoid the inefficiencies 
of ad hoc relief plans. The TLC ideally envisioned a 
programme funded mainly by industry, with some government 
involvement? this would place the burden upon those most 
responsible, and also encourage employment stabilization. 
The TLC eventually accepted tripartite state, employer and 
worker contributions to an unemployment insurance fund.27
The All Canadian Congress of Labour was not willing 
to make such a concession: the "only fair scheme of
insurance should ... be of a non-contributory character so
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far as the workers are concerned”.28 Although more concerned 
to encourage federal-provincial consultation, the Quebec- 
based Federation of Catholic Workers of Canada also urged 
a uniform programme of national scope, through "common 
action” of all governments.29 In the existing crisis, the 
Railroad Brotherhoods saw the need for cooperation of 
federal, provincial, and municipal authorities to provide 
essential relief, and to devise a more permanent solution: 
a federal-provincial conference was demanded to consider 
how to implement unemployment insurance.30 Labour was 
gratified when the desperate Liberal government of 
Mackenzie King proposed unemployment insurance prior to the 
1930 general election.31
But the King government was defeated in the election, 
and the new government abandoned any consideration of an 
insurance programme. As the Depression dramatically 
multiplied the ranks of the unemployed, Canada remained 
unprepared to meet the crisis. The ideology of individual 
responsibility and local relief left Canada without the 
expertise or policies needed to cope with the massive 
dislocations of this era. The Conservative administration 
of R.B. Bennett from 1930-1935 relied primarily on 
traditional policies. Relief for the unemployed was still 
seen as a local responsibility, although the federal 
government made emergency assistance available. A programme 
of public works was initiated, but then withdrawn, as 
concern for the deficit and restoration of investor 
confidence took precedence. Finally, the government moved 
to end its relief contributions to reduce its deficit. This 
left a system of inadequate, inequitable municipal relief, 
with built-in disincentives to labour mobility and 
frugality.32
Unions condemned the Bennett government responses to 
depression as inadequate. Noting the inability of municipal 
and provincial governments to enact adequate relief 
programmes, the Railroad Brotherhoods called for federal 
action to introduce a national unemployment insurance 
system.33 These brotherhoods saw relief work as only a 
temporary solution, which did not address the profound
136
structural causes of unemployment, notably technological 
change, and irregular seasonal employment; a broader 
programme was needed to address the human misery of the 
Great Depression and provide a "remedy for ... industrial 
and economic ills".34 The TLC was sharply critical of 
constitutional delaying tactics, and called for 
constitutional change to enable the federal state to 
undertake the necessary national social programmes; 
otherwise, the expectations of workers would be dashed and 
the prospects of dangerous unrest would be increased.35
d) Business Concerns
Canadian business welcomed the change of government. 
Business had denounced King's unemployment insurance 
proposal as a costly dole, not a panacea for the nation's 
ills.36 The Bank of Nova Scotia preferred the incentives of 
the present system. "So long as the worker cannot claim 
insurance benefit or any such subvention, he has the 
strongest motives for finding work". Establishment of 
unemployment insurance would merely swell the ranks of the 
unemployed, by causing people not to emigrate, or return to 
the land.37 The Canadian Manufacturers' Association declared 
the programme too costly for the nation, especially since 
direct relief would still be needed to deal with those many 
workers in unsteady jobs who would not qualify for an 
"actuarially sound" insurance plan.38 Hugh Wolfenden, an 
actuarial specialist working for the Canadian Life 
Insurance Officers Association, argued that unemployment 
insurance did not share the sound principles of workmen's 
compensation plans, with their stimulus to prevention. 
There was;
no "proper justification for removing the onus 
of providing against ... contingencies [like 
unemployment] from the shoulders of the 
individual himself .... the philosophy of self- 
help is abandoned, and ... in its place appears 
a theory which ... invites social 
irresponsibility".
Only a system devised to place the cost upon the
beneficiaries would preserve "personal initiative, ambition
and self-reliance".39
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However, business heeded government warnings that, if 
the private sector did not devise solutions, "the state 
must step in”.40 Canadian employers, particularly branch 
plants of American firms, adopted voluntary unemployment 
plans to offset pressures for government action.41 
Businessmen began to recognize the profound cost of direct 
relief, and the economic burdens of municipal bankruptcy; 
this caused business leaders, like Charles Gordon of the 
Bank of Montreal, to suggest that a well-developed, self- 
financing system of unemployment insurance had to be 
superior to the existing costly chaos.42 Despite CMA 
hostility, some manufacturers condemned the disincentives 
of relief, and favoured unemployment insurance as a less 
demoralizing, punitive system.43 Business leaders made 
proposals to keep the cost of such a plan low by limiting 
the size and duration of benefit, restricting coverage to 
good risks, and extending waiting periods.44
e) The Bennett New Deal
As the Depression dragged on, the political position 
of the Bennett regime became increasingly precarious. 
Finally, the government considered a major change of 
course, emulating the American New Deal.45 In January, 1935, 
Prime Minister Bennett, proclaiming the "end of laissez- 
faire",46 announced a sweeping reform package which included 
a contributory unemployment insurance plan.47 The policy 
change has been seen as ideological conversion from laissez 
faire to interventionism48? certainly, the Prime Minister's 
rhetoric was geared to generate visions of conversion and 
acceptance of federal responsibility for the unemployed.49 
But the government was simultaneously withdrawing from 
direct relief; since the policy as devised was clearly 
unconstitutional, as an invasion of provincial 
jurisdiction, the whole New Deal plan may have been a 
diversionary tactic to seek electoral gain.50 Nonetheless, 
interest groups took the proposal seriously, and debate on 
the matter was enlivened.
Employers criticised the new initiative. Merchants 
termed the unemployment insurance contributions a new tax,
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which would force employers to cut back in other areas, 
notably off-season employment? the net effect would be an 
increase in unemployment and a decrease in employee income 
and self-respect.51 The direct cost of the contribution and 
the indirect costs and burden of administration and record­
keeping were also targets of employer vitriol.52 The 
Canadian Chamber of Commerce preferred tried and true 
methods of direct relief, administered locally, with 
federal financial aid. The depressed economy and tax base 
of the 1930s did not offer propitious conditions for the 
initiation of such an ambitious programme: "no unemployment 
insurance initiated today could offer any substantial 
prospects of assisting in the relief of need in the near 
future".53 The high cost of the plan was inconsistent with 
the need for balanced budgets to promote economic recovery. 
Nor would a national plan be sufficiently sensitive to 
regional and local variations in availability of work, or 
prevailing wage levels.54 A balance should be reached 
between federal supervision of relief, to prevent 
corruption, abuse, patronage and waste, with the necessary 
local alertness to fraudulent claims.55
Business sought the same amendments as were promoted 
in the United States. Many companies, notably banks and 
large retailers, sought exclusion from unemployment 
insurance contributions on the grounds that their employees 
did not face layoffs.56 The retailers objected to "the 
increased cost imposed upon a character of business which 
we do not feel is exposed to the need of unemployment 
insurance".57 Similar sentiments were expressed by 
representatives of the banks, insurance companies, and 
phone companies, all of whom claimed to provide virtually 
guaranteed employment to all clerical workers.58 This 
position drew criticism from the manufacturers, who 
believed the fund could not remain solvent if the good 
risks were all excluded. Nonetheless, the Canadian 
Manufacturers' Association argued for merit rating, so that 
industries could be rated according to their hazards of 
unemployment.59 This differentiation was needed to induce 
business to stabilize employment levels and to reward those
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who succeeded. As A.L. Code, representing the small 
manufacturers of Perth, Ontario, declared: "We do not
believe that good risks should be asked to assume equal 
obligations with the bad, who, in many cases, have shown 
little or no ability or willingness to ameliorate .,. 
conditions.1,60
Labour also had reservations about the 1935 measure. 
Some workers remained distrustful of the whole process and 
expressed concern that employers would use the plan as an 
excuse for layoffs, and for wage reductions in seasonal 
industries.61 The ACCL gave it only reluctant support.62 This 
union central criticized the bill for its conservatism, 
since it stressed actuarial soundness over adequate 
benefits, and left too many workers out of its coverage.63 
A non-contributory system was still the first preference, 
but if contributions were to be required these should be 
imposed across as many occupational categories as 
possible.64 The Trades and Labour Congress of Canada was 
willing to accept the contributory system; actuarial 
conservatism was needed to spread the risk and ensure a 
workable programme. But the TLC sought the widest possible 
coverage, to prevent the need for higher premiums.65 Private 
insurance was not an alternative due to its prohibitive 
costs and potential abuses.66 The TLC accepted the Bennett 
bill despite its shortcomings, as "a basis on which we 
might build for the future".67
The Employment and Social Insurance Act was ill-fated. 
It was reported out of the Senate in 1935 in a fashion 
favourable to labour, with the exemptions for banks and 
insurance companies removed. However, the defeat of the 
Bennett government and the jurisdictional caution of the 
new King administration ensured the bill's demise. King 
objected to the unilateral action of Bennett, and promised 
the provinces a more conciliatory, consultative approach to 
social policy. While claiming not to challenge the "social 
justification" of the unemployment insurance legislation, 
but rather its "constitutional validity"68, King had the 
entire plan referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council in London. In early 1937, the Act was ruled ultra
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• • • • • • AOvires the jurisdiction of the federal Parliament. But King 
continued the federal government's retreat from direct 
relief, despite the deprivation of depression. Policy still 
emphasized local relief, and return of the jobless to farm 
employment.70 Hence, while the United States had moved to a 
comprehensive unemployment insurance and assistance 
programme by 1935, Canada continued with an underfunded 
municipal relief system for the entire duration of the 
Depression.
In the late 1930s, business grew more divided on the 
advantages of an insurance programme. Canadian
Manufacturers' Association spokesmen continued to criticize 
the insurance approach as inappropriate in the Depression, 
as government would still have to bear a great burden of 
direct relief.71 The continued high costs of the Depression, 
human and financial, convinced the Toronto Board of Trade, 
of the advantages of a uniform federal unemployment 
insurance policy? this would eliminate differing local and 
provincial tax burdens and create a more uniform,
competitive position for business.72 Unions were unanimous 
in support of the policy while divided on the method of 
financing.73 Unions were as one in condemning the use of 
federal-provincial jurisdictional squabbles as a reason for 
delay. This position received credibility with the report 
of the National Employment Commission recommending federal 
action to aid the unemployed.74 Meanwhile, the government 
continued to exhibit jurisdictional caution, while claiming 
the depth of depression was not an opportune time to permit 
development of a solvent unemployment insurance fund.
Federal efforts to introduce a programme after the court
decisions of 1937 were stalled by disagreement with the 
strong provincial premiers of these years.75
f) The Adoption of Unemployment Insurance
The outbreak of World War II removed the employment 
crisis, and generated the prosperity needed to initiate a 
programme. It strengthened the federal power versus the 
provinces? and it created an urgent need to maintain labour 
peace and political stability. Concern about post-war
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depression and readjustment added to the sense of urgency. 
1940 also witnessed the report of the Royal Commission on 
Dominion Provincial Relations, which favoured 
constitutional change to allow federal control over 
unemployment insurance; the defeat of the nationalist 
Quebec government of Maurice Duplessis removed a major 
obstacle to such constitutional alteration.76 Hence, the 
King government secured provincial support, and proceeded 
with a national unemployment insurance programme.
A bill was introduced into Parliament which resembled 
the Bennett bill of 1935 in its contributory nature and its 
exclusion of seasonal workers. However, it recommended 
graded benefits and contributions having "regard for the 
normal standard of living of the insured worker”77. It 
reduced the number of qualifying weeks from 40 to 30, while 
increasing coverage of the workforce from 66% to 75%; this 
reflected the change in the occupational makeup of the 
labour force more than greater inclusiveness of policy.78
The Canadian Manufacturers' Association remained the 
staunchest opponent. High seasonal unemployment, labour 
mobility and vast geographic distances would make a British 
style national pool very costly to administer.79 The CMA 
asked the Special Commons Committee on Unemployment 
Insurance to delay passage of the bill for a year to permit 
consideration of alternatives. It continued to advocate a 
voluntary, company reserve plan as the ideal, but was 
willing to consider compulsory individual savings or joint 
employee-employer savings schemes. These would leave more 
public money for the war effort, limit employer
contributions for any employee to a set maximum, and could
• 80 • be abandoned later if proved too costly. Government policy
should avoid interference with existing private plans and
permit employers with adequate plans to "opt out".81
Industries with low unemployment rates should be given
lower premiums as good risks, as in private insurance. And
an unemployment assistance programme, providing minimal
relief for those in unsteady employment should also be
created to prevent a drain on the unemployment insurance
fund.82
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The Canadian Chamber of Commerce also resisted a 
public unemployment insurance system. "Business has already 
demonstrated through its many individual company benefit 
plans that it is sympathetic to social security for wage 
earners". Introduction of a programme which would absorb so 
many financial and administrative resources was resisted at 
a time when the war effort was already straining the 
administrative and economic capacity of the country?83 "a 
company savings plan might fill the bill better and with 
less expense"84. Concern for the international 
competitiveness of Canadian manufacturers, caused the
q c  or
Montreal and Toronto Boards of Trade to request 
postponement of the proposal until after the end of the 
global conflict. Exemptions from contributions, on the 
basis of employment stability, were again requested by
07 # 00 # # on
bankers , insurance companies and major retailers : 
"inclusion of [their] employees within the operation of the 
act would amount to nothing more nor less than the 
imposition of a tax on them for the benefit of other
• • 90industries".
The TLC expressed relief that constitutional barriers 
had been removed and sought swift passage of Bill 987 
rejecting the CMA*s delaying tactics.91 The 1940 measure 
was accepted by the TLC as a "good start" which did not go 
too far ahead of public opinion.92 It improved on the 1935 
Act by linking benefit to income, facilitating
administration and reducing inequities and anomalies.
Limits on the scope of coverage were still considered 
objectionable and unnecessary? but extensions of coverage 
must be made with caution to preserve the actuarial
soundness of the bill. The TLC leadership pledged to seek 
amendment after careful assessment based on experience with 
implementation of the Act.93 The Confederation des
Tavailleurs Catholique du Canada also supported the 
contributory, national fund to supplement voluntary 
savings. This Quebec union also sought broader coverage to 
include seasonal workers like longshoremen but would also 
seek amendment after the programme was in place.94
The All Canadian Congress of Labour also responded to
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business delaying tactics by supporting the government, to 
ensure early adoption of the programme despite its 
shortcomings.95 A wartime period of full employment and 
prosperity was considered an opportune moment to introduce 
the programme, to ensure accumulation of a healthy fund for 
the anticipated high unemployment of the reconversion 
period in peacetime.96 The Congress still maintained that 
individual workers were not responsible for unemployment, 
and thus should not contribute; but its leaders recognized 
that industry would not accept this, and so acquiesced, 
even though contributions would "impose a hardship upon 
low-paid workers".97 C.H. Millard, Secretary of the Canadian 
Committee on Industrial Organization admitted that - some 
workers in good risk industries would pay for benefits they 
would rarely if ever need? but such good risks would 
support contributions to a programme beneficial to society 
and to labour as a class.98 The Railroad Brotherhoods would 
also benefit little despite extensive contributions, but 
supported the act "without hesitation because they believe 
that it is in the interest of all workers" according to the 
maxim "Bear ye one another's burdens".99
After adoption, business criticised the complexity of 
administrative and record-keeping requirements, and sought 
simplification.100 Business eventually acknowledged the 
usefulness of social insurance programmes to prevent a 
slump in consumption during post-war reconstruction.101 But 
while acceptingg an adequate minimum, business leaders 
remained vigilant about the size of the tax burden,
especially when actuarial guidelines were neglected and
• • • 102 direct relief drawn from the insurance fund. The Chamber
of Commerce declared it necessary to ensure that social
programmes did not outrun the fiscal resources and economic
capacity of the country: unemployment insurance violated
• • • • 103 •this condition by the mid- 1960s. In representations to 
government commissions, the CMA urged elimination of claims 
from the seasonally unemployed, and reduction of abuses to 
restore the actuarial health of the programme.104 Corporate 
leaders also sought to retain a lengthy qualifying period 
of employment, low benefit increases, limited number of
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benefit weeks, etc. Business associations divided over the 
usefulness of experience rating, depending on their 
unemployment records,105 but invariably welcomed proposals 
to limit the possibilities for abuse and reduce costs.106
While concerned about abuse107, unions continued to 
defend the existing unemployment insurance programme
against its many critics, claiming both humanitarian and
• 108 • •economic advantages. Their efforts were directed at
# • 109reducing the numbers of excluded occupations. They also 
sought to increase the scale of benefits to ensure more 
complete replacement of lost earnings in jobless periods110; 
any resulting shortfall in the fund should be recovered
from general government revenues, financed by progressive
, 1 1 1  , ,
taxation. The Catholic unions of Quebec demanded larger
payments to aid the heads of Quebec’s large, Catholic
• • 112 • • families. In the 1970s, unions continued these efforts,
seeking reduced qualifying and waiting periods,
preservation of seasonal benefits, and so forth.113
The evolution of unemployment insurance policy has
reflected an attempt to balance these competing demands for
liberalization and financial responsibility.114 As in the
United States, political pressures ensured some government
responsiveness to labour demands for use of the programme
• 1 1 5 * •for social ends ? increased benefits and coverage" were 
steadily introduced to the early 1970s. High costs of this 
generous system rapidly led to restrictions to reduce 
potential for abuse; fiscal concerns caused the* government 
favour contraction of the programme.116 The complexities^ of 
the programme's evolution in these decades precludes 
detailed consideration here. Nonetheless, the basic pattern 
of group reactions in recent years resembles American group 
attitudes. But the policy itself differed from the American 
practice of employer funding, since it included employee 
and state contributions In that respect, it revealed a 
lower responsiveness to labour’s initial demands, while 
limiting the programme's usefulness in promoting employment 
stabilization and monitoring of abuse.
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8 Health Insurance Debates in the United States
a) Earlv Interest in Health Insurance
Inspired by European experiments, American reformers 
promoted compulsory health insurance during World War I. 
Voluntary health insurance could not offset the mounting 
toll in lost wages, and the ruination which major illnesses 
brought to workers ? government health insurance on the 
German model was proffered as an essential remedy.1 In 1914, 
the American Association for Labor Legislation drafted a 
model health insurance bill, to provide health insurance 
for the poorest members of society, under local 
administration, with employee, employer and state 
contributions.2 Despite its conservative character, the 
proposal was thwarted in many states.3 Although initially 
claiming support from employer, labour and medical 
associations, the AALL became a lone voice for many years.4
The American medical profession was not initially 
hostile towards compulsory health insurance.5 While no 
official stance was taken for some years, many American 
Medical Association spokesmen expressed open support for 
the AALL plan6. The AMA "had established no precedents of 
unalterable antagonism for compulsory health insurance and 
had formulated no doctrinaire position that precluded 
consideration of new approaches to the problem of meeting 
the costs of medical care".7 Other association positions 
at the time suggest support for state action to promote the 
distribution of preventative and remedial health services.
While discussing its shortcomings, the Journal of the 
American Medical Association, contained favourable articles 
and enthusiatic commentary.8 Many doctors supported 
government insurance both for humanitarian reasons and to 
insure protection against defaults by the poor on medical
9 10care debts. Furthermore, the success of European measures 
meant that health insurance was certain to receive serious 
attention from American legislators11;the AMA ought to 
ensure its input so that health insurance would be as 
acceptable as possible to doctors.12
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b) Professional. Business and Union Opposition
Critics of the proposal came to the fore in the 
organization and the Journal by 1917. There was concern 
that compulsory government health insurance would reduce 
doctors to the level of salaried state employees, and 
increase government regulation of the health care system. 
This perceived threat to the income and independence of the 
profession soon convinced many doctors to back off from 
support for government insurance schemes.13 The medical 
profession's position did not involve an unquestioning 
anti-statism, since some medical critics advocated state 
action to improve the health and ability to pay of the
14poor .
However, the rhetoric employed eventually did resemble 
an anti-statist philosophy. Organized medicine seized upon 
the patriotic sentiments of Americans during the World War 
I to condemn health insurance as a product of an alien 
German ideology hostile to American democratic traditions. 
The interests of the profession rather than ideological 
purity was uppermost in the minds of the critics. In 
Lubove's words, "Health insurance challenged the 
profession's corporate autonomy and power. The objectives 
of compulsory insurance conflicted with the tradition of 
entrepreneurial, solo practice which the profession equated 
with its status, economic interests, and standards of 
medical care".15 This fear of lost autonomy, income and 
status was reflected in editorial comment at the time: 
doctors insisted that the spread of "socialized medicine" 
"has become a major menace to medical men in their 
standing, ideals and progress. If we do not destroy 
socialism in medicine, it will destroy us".16 The tone of 
comment often took on elitist, nativistic17 and even racist18 
overtones, as medical practitioners protested against the 
vagaries of democratic politics. Any programme perceived as 
a precedent for comprehensive state intervention was 
opposed.19
But the war and other sources of opposition had 
already undermined the vigour of the compulsory health
• 2 0  tinsurance movement. Health insurance faced strong
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opposition from the major business organizations. Partly, 
the rejection was nativistic21 and ideological: health
insurance was simply "un-American”, "undemocratic" and 
"bureaucratic", however organized and financed.22 Others 
denied that the problem of access to medical care was 
widespread and in need of state remedy.23 Most gainfully 
employed workers were quite capable of providing for their 
own health care needs; any programme should be confined to 
the needy and should not become a financial drain on 
workers and owners.24 Health conditions of Americans were 
said to be superior to those of European nations having 
such compulsory programmes.25
Even business leaders who saw health insurance as a 
potentially useful means of increasing worker productivity 
and reducing man days lost to illness and injury26 were
concerned about the cost.27 Corporate leaders resisted the
• • • • 28 imposition of taxes on the healthy to support the sick and
feared its contribution to wage pressures.29 The probability
that employees would feign illness once covered by such a
scheme was also considered a drawback30; reformers should
concern themselves with improving workers' habits of thrift
and workplace commitment, since idleness, intemperance and
sheer indolence were a greater drain on workers' health and
purse.31 Any problem of medical care access was best
addressed by private employer managed health schemes, or
mutual benefit societies.32 Some businesses suggested it
was a plot by physicians to increase the economic advantage
of their monopoly professional position.33
Led by Gompers, American unionists challenged the AALL
proposal as paternalistic interference.34 Government health
insurance threatened the union's ability to deliver
exclusive benefits to their membership, through wage
increases and union insurance plans.35 In Gompers' words:
The efforts of trade unions are directed at ... 
secur[ing] to all workers a living wage that will 
enable them to have sanitary homes, conditions of 
living that are conducive to good health, 
adequate clothing, nourishing food and other 
things that are essential to the maintenance of 
good health. ... In attacking the health problem 
from the preventative and constructive side they 
are doing infinitely more than any health
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insurance law could do which provides only for 
relief in case of sickness and yet the compulsory 
law would undermine the trade union activity.36
Unionists argued that, ,f[i]nstead of trying to bail out a 
leaky boat, we should stop the leaks - begin at the other 
end and pay a living wage".37 Unions were making great 
progress in establishing insurance schemes to meet the 
contingencies of illness. Despite this, workers would be 
asked to contribute an additional amount to a public 
insurance system.38 Unionists also saw the scheme as a plot 
to undermine the unity and strength of unions39 or as a plan 
to benefit doctors at the expense of workers, business and 
taxpayers.40
The problems of high medical costs were not entirely
ignored. A minority in the AFL warned of the inadequacy
of union and employer insurance.43 Most leaders emphasized
the primacy of freedom; as Hamilton declared:
With the workers, ... it is a question of the 
right to freedom .... We may prematurely - and 
do unnecessarily - lose ... a large number of our 
fellows by reason of ill health; but it is even 
of greater concern to all the working people of 
our country that under no guise, however well- 
intentioned, shall they lose their liberties.44
Under public health insurance, workers would be subjected
to bureaucratization of medical services, intrusive
inspections, and other interference with private life45;
administrative agencies would increase their authority at
the expense of the unions.46
c) Depression-Era Problems and Debates
This concerted opposition from professionals and major 
interest associations ensured that the health insurance 
proposal did not make significant headway. Medical 
associations assumed the issue had been permanently 
addressed, and could confidently ignore the problems raised 
by the Committee on the Costs of Medical Care in 1928. 
However, the ravages of the great depression "resurrected 
the spectre of socialized medicine".47 Compulsory health 
insurance proposals were again raised as part of the 
Roosevelt administration's comprehensive revision of social
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legislation.
The depression meant losses for many physicians forced 
to perform increased charitable work. Certain groups of 
dissident doctors did advocate national health insurance as 
the only solution to the problems of unequal access and 
declining income.48 Their activities only intensified the 
concern of the medical establishment, by lending 
credibility to the pro-insurance campaign, and magnifying 
the threat to the profession's independence.49 Despite the 
exaggerated problems of access to medical care, the AMA 
would only accept temporary federal assistance to state and 
local programmes for the indigent, to insure physicians 
received payment from charity cases.50 Federal intervention 
was feared as an intrusion on professional integrity51 and 
as an inevitable source of public dependency52? any 
discussion of compulsory health insurance as part of the 
Roosevelt administration's planning for social insurance, 
was vigorously condemned by the AMA. However, in response 
to the rapid growth of private hospital and health care 
insurance plans, the AMA dropped its former rejection of 
private insurance; out of fear of government action, the 
profession also began to create its own programmes of pre­
paid medical care.
Organized labour's shift from voluntarism was more 
gradual in the health insurance field. Despite the 
acknowledged problems of access, and the abuse of employer 
programmes as a device of labour discipline53, the AFL was 
reluctant to support54 or even investigate public health 
insurance.55 Editorials in the American Federationist 
indicated the leadership's preference for voluntary 
measures to address the problem, in cooperation with the 
medical profession.56 However, medical costs for American 
workers mounted57 in depression conditions58. And pressure 
from activists in industrial unions59 eventually altered the 
Federation' s attitude60.
Editorials first documented the extent of the 
problem61, and suggested that health insurance was a 
possibility, if solutions could not be found by the 
profession on its own.62 By 1935, the AFL urged an amendment
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to the Social Security Act to provide public health 
insurance63. Shunning the voluntarist ethos, the AFL 
declared that ”[s]ocial purpose and profitmaking have 
nothing in common” and therefore, private insurance 
companies and medical association schemes were 
inappropriate in this field;64 ”[s]ickness insurance ... is 
an important phase of social security which must be 
included as we broaden our program”.65 Frustrated by the 
inaction of Congress and the recalcitrance of employers, 
unions made health insurance plans a major focus of 
collective bargaining and political lobbying.66
Organized labour*s conversion was insufficient to 
convince the Roosevelt administration to move ahead with 
health insurance. Labour's emphasis on unemployment 
insurance to the exclusion of other topics in congressional 
hearings did nothing to impress upon Congress the political 
expediency of introducing a health insurance programme. The 
business community, although wavering on this aspect of 
social security67, also remained opposed to health 
insurance68. This, combined with the opposition of the 
medical profession, was influential in persuading Roosevelt 
to bypass health insurance in the Social Security Act of 
1935. The administration feared that opposition of the 
medical profession could lead to the defeat of the whole
• • i 69Social Security measure in Congress. AMA propaganda also 
caused Congress to back away70 despite subsequent depression 
era proposals for a National Health Program.71
d) Truman Administration and Health Insurance
While health insurance proposals retained exponents 
in Congress, serious consideration of the programme did not 
resume until the end of international conflict. First 
Roosevelt and then President Harry S. Truman planned to 
expand the social security system to include such a 
programme.72 The AMA dreaded the combined action of the 
President and powerful congressional allies73. Although both 
administrative planners74 and the Congressional sponsors75 
took care to address the medical profession's concerns 
about regimentation, interference in the doctor-patient
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relationship, and loss of professional independence, the 
medical profession attacked any such plan as "socialized 
medicine", verging on a "totalitarian" regime.76
American doctors were more divided, as several groups 
of medical practitioners became strong supporters of the 
public health insurance.77 This merely increased the 
stridency of opponents. The AMA's propaganda efforts were 
directed by professional public relations experts78, using 
editorials, pamphlets, newsletters79, surveys80, and 
congressional testimony to oppose the administration's 
health proposals. Both the motives of81 and the evidence 
employed by pro-insurance spokesmen82 were subjected to 
question.
National health insurance83 was attacked as a 
compulsory tax, and not as insurance in an actuarial sense. 
Eurpoean systems had an inferior record compared to the 
American free-enterprise approach84; standardization would 
diminish the quality and individual responsiveness of 
medical care.85 Public insurance would become an inducement 
to malingering and hypochondria86, resulting in exaggerated
demand and unnecessary service87. It would interfere with
• * • 88 • • the doctor-patient relationship , and impose regulations
of inexpert government officials on professional decisions.
Compulsory health insurance would also be inordinately
t 89 • • • •expensive and would create a giant, insensitive federal
on . . . qi
bureaucracy , and confining, confusing red tape . The 
President's plan would not rectify the lack of supply of 
existing medical services. Voluntary health insurance, the 
preference of the American public92, would allegedly avoid 
this litany of limitations93, if it conformed to AMA 
standards.94
The AMA received support from hospital 
administrators95, public health associations96 and other 
professional societies.97 It coordinated the opposition of 
civic, trade and business associations to defeat pro-
• • 98 • •insurance legislators. Employers and actuaries continued 
to be divided99, but largely critical of compulsory 
insurance.100 America's medical system had reached its 
current level of excellence through a combination of
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liberty and philanthropy? the coming of "political 
control", with the conversion of the medical profession 
into a "government-run machine", would prove disastrous.101 
If broad discretion was given to officials and inflexible 
rules were established, the flexibility and initiative
essential to experimentation and advance would be
• • 102 • eliminated. Many also feared the high cost of a
comprehensive health insurance system,103 dreading payroll
tax increases and the potential for abuse and overuse.104
Employers preferred increased government involvement in
• • • • 105 •preventative medicine, which would be less costly , while
still promoting a healthy work force. A preventative plan,
• • ■ 106 alongside private, employer sponsored health insurance
• • 107 • •and medical society plans would avoid both economic
• • 108 damage and bureaucratic control of society.
Organized labour solidified its position in favour of
compulsory national health insurance. Articles critical of
medical profession intransigence appeared in American
• • • 109 •Federation of Labor publications. Doctors sympathetic to 
the cause were frequent contributors to labour 
publications, citing the advantages of a well-designed 
health insurance programme.110 AFL spokesmen, notably Nelson
H. Cruikshank and William Green, articulated labour's 
support for President Truman's proposed insurance system.111 
The AFL moved far from its preceding voluntarism in
rejecting the Republican and AMA proposals for federal
• 112 assistance to state and voluntary plans :
The issue ... [is] whether we shall move forward 
by establishing a method for pooling both the 
risks of illness and the funds to meet the costs 
of illness by an extension of the insurance 
principle, or whether we shall go backward to the 
outworn concept of poor laws and provide such 
care on a charity basis, with the accompanying 
evils of the means test.
The AFL demanded a comprehensive national insurance scheme
which avoided constraints on doctor and patient freedom.114
CIO unions had secured many private medical care plans via
# • • 115 •collective bargaining. These piecemeal efforts were
• • 116 • considered inadequate : "the demand for health insurance
should be met by a comprehensive national health program
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... to fill the gap between where we are and where we could
• • 117be m  bringing the best in medical care to the people."
The Democratic administration, and its congressional
allies, continued to press for adoption of a national
health policy.118 Truman repeatedly urged congressional
action, to make the advances of medical science available
to all.119 Although his advocacy was criticized as
• 120insufficient and ineffective, he refused all attempts to
compromise and introduce a more limited programme, and
• • 121 conducted an ongoing battle with the AMA. Truman won a
surprise victory in the 1948 presidential campaign, while
making compulsory health insurance a major policy
commitment122? the Democrats remained committed to the full
national health programme into the 1950 midterm
elections.123 The proposal met rejection from the Republican
dominated Congress of these years.124 The AMA*s startling
success in defeating pro-insurance candidates in the
congressional campaigns of 1950 coupled with the onset of
the Korean conflict, finally served to deflect the
Democrats from this goal. The election of a Republican
administration in 1952 put any comprehensive reform efforts
on hold.125 Nonetheless, the highest elected officer in the
nation had come to espouse a proposal akin to the social
democratic reforms adopted in other western democracies.
Opponents of the measure did adopt an anti-statist 
ideology. Warning of the dangers of a decline into 
socialism, fascism, or both, critics spoke of the 
deleterious effects on American morale of the adoption of 
socialized medicine, "the keystone to the arch of the 
socialist state".126 Republican Senator Robert Taft declared 
American values at stake in the health insurance debate: 
"The fundamental issue is whether the Government shall look 
after the indigent or whether it shall look after the 
entire population. The first principle has always been 
embodied in the law of every free Anglo-Saxon people? the 
second is socialism".127 He contended: "I cannot conceive of 
a measure which will more greatly extend the power of the 
State or move further in one jump towards an all-powerful 
central government, than federal compulsory health
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• 128 • •insurance”. Spokesmen for voluntary hospital and medical
insurance plans suggested that Communist infiltration into 
the Social Security Administration might explain its
• • • • 129commitment to a socialistic health programme. The fact 
that communist and socialist organizations favoured 
compulsory health insurance was proof of its socialist 
character.130 The fear tactics contained the underlying 
warning: ”If the United States of America adopts political 
medicine ... it will have taken a long step toward state 
medicine as rigidly controlled as Russia's”;131 those other 
nations which had adopted compulsory insurance had a less
• 132sound commitment to democracy and freedom.
However, advocates of health insurance demonstrated 
attachment to communitarian action: a vital public service 
like medical treatment must be put on par with education 
and made available to all. Eveline Burns argued that 
private insurance would never provide complete coverage? in 
view of the massive public investment in hospitals and 
medical education, doctors should not be free to make 
decisions which might restrict availability of medical 
resources - "the general interest must prevail".133 Health 
insurance was a means to achieving the basic American 
rights of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.134 For 
the Physicians' Forum, compulsory health insurance was 
merely an extension of the reform liberal state acting to 
provide public utilities, services and social security; it 
did not constitute a threat to democracy, but an 
enhancement of it through accepted, limited state 
actions.135 Since voluntary insurance was inadequate to meet 
the needs of ordinary American workers, the Committee for 
the Nation's Health considered it the responsibility of the
136 • • • • • •federal government. While exhibiting "no doctrinaire 
bias" in favour of a government programme, union leaders 
saw voluntary and compulsory programmes as potentially 
compatible? government action should aid voluntary plans, 
but also introduce a compulsory national scheme to fill 
gaps for the unemployed, aged and indigent.137
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e) The Compromise of Medicare
In subsequent years, administration and congressional 
advocates reduced their ambitions, proposing partial
schemes to extend health coverage to the needy and the 
aged. Proponents adjusted to the political the political 
muscle exhibited by the medical profession and private 
insurance carriers. After a hiatus during the Eisenhower 
administration, the 1958 Forand proposals for national 
health insurance for the aged revived the issue in 
Congress. From this time to the mid 1960s, the issue was 
rejoined and the protagonists again active.
Organized labour remained committed to a comprehensive 
national insurance plan as the only solution, since many 
younger and employed workers could not find complete 
insurance coverage nor afford the costs of medical
emergencies.138 Despite success in securing private 
insurance coverage in collective bargaining, and a
willingness to give medicine and private insurance a chance
139 • • •to solve the problem the major union centrals continued 
to suggest a national plan as an alternative in the 
subsequent decades140 to "fill the gaps which remain in the 
wake of private health insurance plans".141
The Chamber of Commerce advocating only limited, 
state-run programmes142 to assist those who could not pay
1 A3for private insurance ? any broader plan was too costly, 
bureaucratic and less efficient.144 Insurance companies 
resisted even "piecemeal" moves towards socialization of 
medicine.145 Manufacturers feared that assistance to the 
indigent would be the first step towards a comprehensive 
system of compulsion and mediocre conformity; while state 
plans might be tolerated, the "proper federal role in 
health care is a simple one: encourage the continued
expansion of voluntary health insurance by abandoning the 
field to private effort".146 The health care field was too 
complex to be effectively managed by the central 
government? decentralization and competition were crucial, 
but might be lost if private insurance was not made more 
effective to forestall the demands of reformers.147
The medical profession maintained its opposition and
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escalated the sophistication of its lobbying techniques. 
Having originated as a professional organization, the AMA 
now developed into a political organ of considerable 
efficiency. Its lobbying arm, the American Medical 
Political Action Committee (AMPAC) conducted letter-writing 
campaigns, and concerted efforts to defeat liberal 
congressmen and senators, through financial and 
organizational means.148 It brought opponents of government 
action into a united front, coordinating lobby activity. 
All proposals for health insurance, even if limited to the 
indigent and aged, were condemned as "socialized medicine”. 
The profession simply denied that the aged had significant
• • 1AOproblems of health or of ability to pay ; all gaps could 
be filled by charity work, by voluntary plans, or by state 
subsidies for private insurance premiums of the needy.150
Fearing political defeat, the AMA eventually accepted 
federal aid to state programmes for the aged poor; the 
determination of congressional and adminstration advocates 
made this a tactical necessity to forestall a bolder 
action. Thus the AMA acquiesced in the Kerr-Mills act of 
I960.151 Nonetheless, the AMA continued to oppose vehemently 
the addition of health insurance to federal social 
security.
The 1964 Democratic party sweep of the presidential 
and congressional elections made federal action possible. 
For the first time, the House of Representatives, the 
principal conservative force in previous years, had a 
liberal Democratic majority, able to to defeat the 
conservative coalition of Republican and Southern Democrats
• 152and to move the proposal out of committee. In 1965, an 
amendment to the Social Security Act introduced a Medicare 
programme for all Americans over the age of 65. The AMA 
seemed to have suffered a setback; but most doctors 
benefitted financially from Medicare, which compensated for 
market deficiencies while allowing a largely private system 
to continue.153 Opponents had managed to limit the measure 
to coverage for hospital and related expenses; proponents 
were only able to obtain provision for a voluntary 
supplementary plan to pay for physicians' care and other
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medical and health care requirements.154 A similar programme 
was adopted for the poor in 1968155; in subsequent years, a 
piecemeal expansion has been pursued, to include 
"catastrophic” health care benefits. But no comprehensive 
national insurance system has emerged although some state 
plans have since been ratified.
The absence of national action has been attributed to 
the influence of opposition lobbyists, and the conservative 
coalitions dominant in congressional committees.156 Both 
congressional actors responding to political lobbying and 
campaign tactics, and administrative actors anticipating 
group criticism157, have readjusted their ambitions and 
accepted a more limited scheme than was adopted in 
Canada.158 Continuous bureaucratic and administration
• 159 •attachment to a broader policy did not produce 
legislative action, as it would have in a parliamentary 
system, since congressional politics provided many openings 
for delay by interest groups and conservative politicians.
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9 The Evolution of Canadian Health Insurance.
a) Earlv Resistance to Health Insurance
Canada's comprehensive public health insurance is 
often cited as evidence of its distinctive attachment to 
interventionist social policy. Nonetheless, serious 
consideration of this policy occurred later in Canada; few 
private organizations or public actors seriously studied 
or advocated health insurance before World War I. 
Eventually, British adoption of health insurance and the 
lively American debate of the Great War years did initiate 
Canadian consideration.1
These early discussions showed considerable similarity 
to American debates. The Canadian medical profession shared 
close ties to organized medicine in the United States. The 
Canadian Medical Association2 adapted its initial 
professional code from the Americans, and as a result 
shared many of the AMA's ideological preferences.3 Canadian 
doctors shared the ambiguous attitudes of American 
practitioners towards health insurance. Concerns were 
expressed about the British precedent; the conservative Dr. 
Andrew MacPhail feared that, under public health insurance, 
"the spirit of charity would be replaced by a cold, 
official atmosphere which is not congenial to a member of 
a free profession".4 But many doctors saw the financial 
advantages of public payment for the medical bills of the 
indigent.5 The wartime spirit of patriotism encouraged many 
doctors to support a study of health insurance; the CMA 
should "seize the initiative" in policy development "to 
safeguard the true interests of the profession"6. Canadian 
doctors wanted a health insurance system which would 
safeguard incomes and professional autonomy while avoiding 
the dangers of lay control, and contract practice.
Doctors' interest in health insurance waned after the 
armistice in Europe. Individualist, laissez-faire views 
reasserted themselves within professional ranks. The 
radical ethos infusing western Canadian politics at this 
time did prompt serious consideration of a plan in British 
Columbia; but professional opposition, high cost, and
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constitutional uncertainty caused the provincial regime to 
postpone its adoption.7 The conservative ethos of the 1920s, 
and high doctors' incomes dissuaded experimentation.8
However, trade union advocacy gained in force, with 
the TLC constantly urging federal government action.9 
Pressed by the labour faction in the minority parliaments 
of the day, a Commons committee considered health insurance 
as part of a larger review of social security matters in 
late decade; it advocated joint federal-provincial action.10 
The CMA resisted, despite pressures from Western Canadian 
practitioners.11 Doctors wanted to limit encroachments on 
their income and autonomy from contract and salaried 
practice.12
b) Union and Professional Advocacy in the Great Depression
Advocacy was intensified during the Depression. Large 
numbers of Canadians were left without adequate medical 
care. Unionists suggested that "a distinct social awakening 
and an increased appreciation of human values” made a 
national health insurance policy inevitable.13 The TLC 
advocated a contributory health insurance system to spread 
the burdens of illness among business, labour and the 
state? it would improve the "lot of thousands".14
The Depression also revived professional interest in 
health insurance. Doctors' incomes were undermined by the 
inability of much of the population to pay for medical 
attention. Particularly in Western Canada, many 
practitioners joined relief rolls or received payment in 
kind from impoverished farmers. Canadian doctors sought
government assistance with the medical bills of the
indigent, fully half the available practice in the worse- 
off regions.15 Some provincial governments did provide aid 
to indigent patients, although most provinces were too 
impoverished to act effectively.16 Doctors cooperated with 
provincial studies of health insurance in the Western
region, and resorted to strike action in Winnipeg when no
provincial assistance was provided for the medical bills 
of those on relief.17
The Canadian Medical Association also began preparing
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plans for government medical insurance to alleviate this 
crisis situation.18 In 1934, its Committee on Economics 
produced a report proposing a public plan to remove the 
burden of indigent care from the profession.19 Health 
insurance would be made available to low income workers and 
the unemployed. Those with higher incomes could participate 
only in voluntary hospital insurance, leaving general
practitioners free to charge well-off patients a market
• • • 20 • • price for their services. The CMA plan proposed provincial
health departments as the administrators of the insurance,
in preference to meddlesome, profit-minded private
companies; advisory committees representative of organized
medicine would play a central role. The insurance scheme
was to be contributory, with employee, employer and state
contributions. Doctors in each province were to choose the
method of payment, with contract, salaried practice limited
to rural areas where the small clientele limited earnings.21
Ottawa procrastinated, citing provincial jurisdiction? 
the fiscally weakened provinces maintained medical relief 
programmes, but of insufficient scope.22 The British 
Columbia health insurance plan, proposed in the late 1930s, 
excluded the unemployed and lowest paid; hence, the CMA 
turned critical of this initiative, which would not restore 
income levels.23 Despite the constitutional setback for the 
Employment and Social Insurance Act, the CMA chastised the 
federal government for its failure to provide a solution to 
the continued problem of indigent medical care.24 Rather 
than await government action, medical associations across 
the country began developing physician sponsored health 
insurance plans modelled on American Blue Cross.25
c) The Professions Retreat
World War II did not bring an immediate increase in 
doctors' incomes and fear persisted about renewed post war 
depression and wartime attrition of doctors' practices26. A 
1943 policy declaration confirmed CMA acceptance of the 
principle of health insurance "if such a plan be fair to 
both the insured and to all those rendering service"27. The 
CMA assertively sought to ensure the latter by helping the
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Department of Pensions and National Health devise a 
proposal conforming to most of the CMA demands.28 The 
profession was increasingly concerned with autonomy29 and 
income, and now insisted on administration of public 
insurance by an independent commission controlled by 
medical professionals30? restriction on participation by 
wealthier individuals was maintained and universal 
coverage rejected as "state medicine”.31
Although accepted by a special parliamentary 
committee, this proposal, was vetoed by the Department of 
Finance, which objected to such a costly undertaking in 
wartime, and so soon after the unemployment insurance 
programme of 1940. Despite continued support from allied 
professionals32, organized farmers33 and labour unions34, and 
pressure from the CCF, the federal government eventually 
opted for family allowances as its major post-war social^ 
policy.35 The provinces' rejected the federal government's, 
fiscal and programmatic proposals in the post-war Dominion- 
Provincial Conference on Reconstruction. Combined with 
business concerns over the economic burdens of new social 
security policies36, this opposition delayed consideration 
of national health insurance for two decades.37
This survey of attitudes to 1944 confirms that CMA 
enthusiasm for state action outlived that of American 
medical professionals. Observers like Shillington see the 
CMA proposals for health insurance as evidence that 
Canadian doctors shared a tolerance for government action 
absent in the American doctor's philosophy38. However, as 
Bothwell and English suggest, the doctors' support "was 
always very qualified ... and enthusiasm varied inversely' 
with the economic condition of the profession.”39 The CMA 
policy aimed at preservation of doctors incomes and 
reduction of the burden of charity work, and was never 
designed to address questions of universal access and 
adequate treatment. As the conflict dragged on, improvement 
in doctors' incomes and rancorous American debates prompted 
a change in CMA policy. Hostility to state action grew to 
the point that health insurance was compared to the 
"National Socialism" of Hitler's Germany.40
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d) Business and Professional Voluntarism
Business reaction to federal and provincial proposals
remained negative. Drug manufacturers feared health
insurance would reduce their business.41 Life insurance
executives praised the governments' farsightedness in
studying health insurance, and supported a contributory
insurance plan42; but they warned against a costly,
inflexible plan financed out of taxation. If not carefully
designed to preserve voluntary options, health insurance
would violate Canada's liberal principles and could come to
resemble totalitarianism:
I do not believe the medical profession would 
relish being socialized or dragooned ... Our 
ancestors came to this country because it offered 
a great opportunity to individual initiative and 
resourcefulness.... we will not accept either 
political or economic regimentation of our daily 
lives by any socialistic party. ... I am afraid 
... of the grand over all plans of those who 
assume that they have fallen heir to the Divine 
Right of Kings - to order us in every detail of 
our daily lives ... .43
Catholic hospital administrators, concentrated in Quebec,
also resisted federal involvement; a voluntary health
insurance system was "far more in line with our philosophy
of life" because it left primary responsibility for health
care in the family and preserved the freedom and
independence of Catholic hospitals.44
Professional resistance was also aroused by the
innovations of the social democratic CCF government in the
province of Saskatchewan. The Health Services Act of 1944
proposed a health insurance commission with no medical
association representation, promoting fears of lost
autonomy. Saskatchewan proposed health insurance with
universal coverage, which would reduce professional
autonomy in charging wealthy patients, striking a blow at
earning power.45 The financial position of the province
limited the programme to assistance for public welfare
recipients, and a province-wide hospital insurance
programme.46 However, doctors' fears mounted and the growth
of physician sponsored pre-paid medical care plans was
/ y  / a
expedited to forestall demands for government action.
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Subsequent developments would seem to refute Kurdle 
and Marmor's claim, that "Canadian doctors ... have a lower 
level of anxiety about the negative consequences of state 
action".49 Soon, Canadian medicine became no less vocal than 
American doctors, in rejecting compulsory, universal state 
health insurance. This change was precipitated at least in 
part by the rise of voluntary health insurance on the 
American model in Canada after World War II. In Blishen's 
words,
"[t]he Canadian Medical Association recognized 
the growth of voluntary and other forms of 
prepayment and changed its view concerning the 
necessity for collective action on medical care 
insurance by government. The Association, 
although recognizing such action was necessary 
to protect those unable to afford medical care 
premiums and costs, now affirmed its belief in 
the principle of voluntary action ... ."50
As voluntary plans proliferated, Canadian doctors began to
see a solution to the problems of prohibitive health care
costs through private group plans supplemented by state
subsidy for the poor.
The 1949 General Policy of the CMA advocated the
extension of voluntary pre-paid medicare plans, under
supervision of the profession, with state subsidy for those
unable to make premium payments. The profession now
rejected a comprehensive national plan.51 The CMA President
even welcomed the arrival of the Korean conflict as it
would delay consideration of federal government action in
the health care field.52 Fears of "regimentation, too much
[government control] and insufficient renumeration" ensured
continued resistance.53 The profession's voluntary,
nationwide prepaid medical care plan, called Trans-Canada
Medicare Plans, was its answer to public demand for health
insurance, to prevent "a completely socialized form of
medical care".54 Henceforth, the Canadian Medical
Association's policy was "energetically directed to the
finding of voluntary solutions that make further government
action unnecessary".55
Business leaders joined doctors in expressing
preference for voluntary solutions. In 1953, the Canadian
Chamber of Commerce declared that "the continued rapid
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growth of the various voluntary prepayment and insurance 
plans will soon result in the Canadian people being 
reasonably well covered against the costs of health 
services without sacrifice of individual responsibility".56 
The Chamber held that, "in a free society it is the 
responsibility of the individual to bear the cost of 
medical care for himself and his family".57 Drug 
manufacturers were also supporters of private insurance 
coverage and wary of complete "nationalization" of 
medicine.58 Manufacturers warned of the threat to the 
Canadian economy of such an ambitious and costly medical 
programme, which would raise the cost of Canadian 
industrial production and hurt international 
competitiveness. Private enterprise was needed for the 
enormous development requirements of this young economy and 
for the preservation of Canada's democratic life.59 
Editorial commentary in the Financial Post denounced state 
health insurance as "an unwarranted intrusion on the 
individual's freedom of choice and responsibility" which 
would prompt a "distinct lessening of bearable family 
responsibilities".60 This combination of pragmatic economic 
concern and ideological opposition remained central to 
business attitudes into the 1960s.
e) Movement Towards Government Action
Unions condemned arguments that cold war defence needs 
precluded ambitious social programmes, and asserted that 
domestic subversion and radicalism were likely to be 
fuelled by an inadequate social security system.61 The TLC 
called for a contributory, comprehensive health plan 
covering all citizens and medical contingencies, with 
government subsidizing individual premiums from an excess 
profits tax.62 Private plans could never provide adequate 
coverage; the federal government should stop "passing the 
buck" and assume leadership if the provinces would or could 
not act.63 The Canadian Congress of Labour showed a similar 
preference for a comprehensive, contributory plan? health 
insurance was made a major priority by the new Canadian 
Labour Congress after 1955.64 These demands were supported
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by numerous local and national labour bodies, notably the 
Railway Transportation Brotherhoods. Even the Canadian 
Catholic Confederation of Labour supported a constitutional 
amendment to permit unilateral federal action, if Quebec 
would not cooperate.65 For unions, there was a major gap in 
social security policy, which did not provide for the most 
basic of individual needs: good health.66
After World War II, the federal government gradually 
and cautiously extended its role in health services. In 
1948, the federal authorities began paying conditional 
grants to the provinces to assist in provision of medical 
care, ranging from hospital construction and medical 
education, to control of specific diseases. During the 
1950s, several provincial governments moved to establish 
hospital insurance plans to address the rising costs of 
modern medical care. After overcoming provincial 
resistance, the federal government introduced the Hospital 
and Diagnostic Services Act of 1957, providing federal 
financial assistance to provincial hospital insurance which 
featured universal access to hospital and diagnostic 
services.67
These initiatives drew cautious support from the 
medical profession. Although preferring a private, 
voluntary approach, the CMA bowed to public opinion and 
announced its cooperation with provincial authorities in
establishing the national hospital insurance system from
681957. But the profession insisted on exclusion of doctors*
• 69 • •care from coverage in the plan. Professional resistance 
ensured that a complete national health insurance plan, to 
cover the services of physicians and surgeons, would only 
emerge at a later date.70
Saskatchewan was the first province to introduce a 
comprehensive health insurance system in 1960. Although the 
CMA accepted the government*s popular mandate, rank and 
file doctors from this province expressed an intention to 
oppose implementation of health insurance. After passage of 
the programme in 1961, the College of Physicians and 
Surgeons of Saskatchewan refused to allow its members to 
participate in implementation or administration.
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Introduction of health insurance on July 1, 1962 sparked an 
almost complete withdrawal of all but emergency services by 
doctors during a three week strike. While doctors 
eventually agreed to cooperate with the plan, the depth of 
opposition to a comprehensive health insurance programme 
was revealed by this bitter confrontation.71
Meanwhile, the Conservative federal government of John 
Diefenbaker established the Royal Commission on Health 
Services to consider a national strategy. This commission, 
led by Emmett Hall, became a major focal point of interest 
group lobbying. While expressing impatience72, the Canadian 
Labour Congress urged the Hall Commission to recommend a 
comprehensive, national plan. Voluntary group plans were 
inadequate, inaccessible to many, and just as bureaucratic 
and inflexible as public insurance.73 Only government was 
seen as having the resources and authority to provide 
adequate coverage for all Canadians.74 Quebec's reorganized 
Confederation des Syndicats Nationaux preferred a fiscal 
readjustment to permit independent provincial health plans; 
but, pending this constitutional readjustment, a 
cooperative, federal-provincial model was acceptable, with 
provincial administration and standards.75 A compulsory 
national plan was also supported by the Canadian Federation 
of Agriculture and the Civil Service Federation.76
f) Business and Professional Resistance
At its annual convention in 1960, the CMA confirmed 
its desire for preservation of multiple, voluntary 
insurance carriers.77 In its submissions to the Royal 
Commission, the medical profession placed health insurance 
low on its agenda for government action. Advocates of 
comprehensive public insurance were "ideologically minded", 
and desirous of acquiring "control of medical practice and 
its practitioners by controlling their financial affairs"; 
the CMA asserted that Canadians did not desire such 
"political control" of medicine.78 Arguing that 
"[c]ompulsory participation for all citizens is an undue 
limitation of the rights of the public" the Association 
continued:
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we consider government intervention into the 
field of prepaid medical care to the point of 
becoming a monopolistic purchaser of medical 
services, to be a measure of civil conscription.
We would urge this Royal Commission to support 
our view that, exclusive of states of emergency, 
civil conscription of any segment of the Canadian 
population is contrary to our democratic 
philosophy.79
Claiming status as the pioneer in voluntary pre-paid
medical plans, the CMA chastised the government for forcing
80 • a compulsory system upon doctors. A programme creating
easy access to health services would increase abuse and
imagined illness.81 As an alternative, the CMA proposed
"selective aid" as "feasible, humanitarian [and]
• • • 82 appropriate to the state of Canada's economic position”.
A variety of private insurance programmes, featuring
"service", "indemnity", "reimbursement" or "refund",
preserved the public's and the profession's freedom of
choice.83 The CMA urged that "the role of government should
be to supplement existing voluntary medical care
programmes" by providing assistance for the aged or needy.84
The Quebec based Association des Medecins de la Langue
Francaise du Canada also advocated a plan retaining
voluntary options, with government assistance for the
premiums of indigents; Quebec doctors placed great stress
on provincial autonomy in the design and adminstration of
health insurance.85 The Quebec College of Physicians and
Surgeons advocated health insurance only if administered by
a board controlled by the profession? any mention of
government-run health insurance was regarded as akin to a
• • • • » 88 •socialistic, even Stalinist, proposal. Anaesthetists
feared that imposition of government direction over the 
medical profession would destroy doctor and patient 
freedom, and discourage new recruits to the profession; 
"the whole structure of medical care as we know it will 
eventually collapse"87.
The Canadian Manufacturers' Association similarly 
urged that private, voluntary policies be employed 
Voluntary measures, undertaken often by business, had met 
much of the public's needs; in addition, such plans were 
superior, since their disincentive fees would discourage
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overuse of medical facilities and keep costs down. Only the
aged, chronically ill and indigent, who could not afford or
qualify for private insurance coverage, should receive
assistance via a public plan, with appropriate means 
88tests. The Chamber of Commerce shared the manufacturers' 
fears of the economic burden of an expensive national plan, 
and its effect on Canada's competitiveness? these 
associations preferred the flexibility and freedom for
• • 89patients and doctors provided by voluntary arrangements.
The insurance industry, represented by the Canadian 
Health Insurance Association, had hardened its position 
since the 1940s, with the success of voluntary health 
insurance plans. It recommended widespread private
• 9 0 *insurance coverage, with public subsidization of insurance 
premiums of the needy.91 Voluntary insurance was lauded for 
preserving patient and practitioner freedom to choose the 
method of meeting medical care costs.92 It was said to be 
consonant with the free enterprise ethos of Canadians, and 
to preserve the advantages of market competition and 
efficiency. It also preserved individual liberty: "it does 
not compel everyone to accept exactly the same arrangements 
to provide for health care".93
g) Establishment of National Health Insurance
In its 1964 report, entitled "A Health Charter for 
Canadians", the Royal Commission on Health Services 
criticized the haphazard policies of voluntary and 
provincial agencies. It declared: "[a]s a nation, Canada 
should now take the necessary legislative, organizational, 
and financial decisions to make the fruits of all the 
health sciences available to all our residents without 
hindrance"94. Preservation and subsidy of private insurance 
would lead to incomplete coverage, duplication, 
administrative problems, and private profiteering from 
public funds. The Hall report called for a universal, 
comprehensive health care plan with federal funding and 
provincial adminstration. The programme should be supported 
by a provincial health services levy, but should have no 
user fees to discourage abuse, since these would be too
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onerous for the poor95.
Unions were quick to support these proposals. The 
CLC expressed impatience at intergovernmental consultations 
and delay97, and urged Ottawa to take the lead with the
• Oft , 9comprehensive, compulsory model. Provincial proposals for 
voluntary insurance and private insurance carriers were 
condemned as a "sell-out”.99 Public sector workers rejected 
private health insurance coverage as "costly, inefficient 
and incomplete”; adoption of the Hall recommendations was 
strongly urged.100
Organized medicine declared itself "definitely 
antagonistic to the recommendation of a health service that 
provides for a single and monopolistic source of funds to 
be in the hands ... of government".101 Medical men made use 
of democratic ideology in attacking the Hall Commission 
recommendations. The CMA executive declared that "policy 
should be consonant with those liberties which are the 
basic tenets of our democracy. ... [N]o citizen, be he
patient or physician, should be forced to conform to a
• # • * 1 0 2  pattern of medical care which is unacceptable to him".
Government support should only be given to those unable to
provide for their own medical needs.103 Above all,
"[g]overnment activity in the field of medical care should
not be exercised in such a way as to curtail individual
freedom or personal initiative".104 A physician's freedom to
opt out of any plan and to set his own fees were
inviolable.105
Provincial medical societies also rejected the Hall 
proposals as an unwarranted constraint on freedom of choice 
for doctors, as those not participating in the plan would 
suffer drastic erosion of income.106 While some medical 
academics in Canadian universities initially appeared open
• • 107to a national health insurance plan, they were largely
"opposed to the belief that the state knows better than the
• • • • 108 • • • • •individual what is best". Accepting the inevitability of
the government programme by 1965, the CMA still advocated
"freedom of choice" among a number of competing plans and
• • • 109preservation of private, voluntary alternatives.
Business leaders were alarmed by economist's
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predictions of dramatic tax increases to fund health
• 110 • insurance. The Chamber of Commerce feared the impact on
Canada's international competitiveness.111 The Chamber
declared: "if we are to maintain a satisfactory rate of
growth there must be more emphasis on increased savings,
capital investment and productivity and less on new welfare
112 • •  •programmes" . But individualist ideology contributed to
the objections:
When illness strikes, the role of the individual 
cannot be over-emphasized. Canadians have a 
desire, even a deep determination, to pay their 
own way and choose their own doctor. Financial 
assistance by the government should therefore be 
directed to assisting those to whom the expense 
of illness or medical protection is clearly 
beyond their means.113
Governments should not assume so much power as to limit
individual freedom.114 Voluntary health insurance was
preferred to the government plan proposed by Hall.115 The
Chamber preferred provincial programmes, with no federal
restrictions on the choice of private or public insurance
• 118 • • carriers. Chamber public statements warned Canadians that
• • • • 117medicare was not "free" since it would increase taxes.
Manufacturers also preferred voluntary insurance, 
supplemented by provincial plans tailored to local 
conditions. Universality was particularly objectionable,
since many could afford to pay: "Total coverage means the
• « • 118 • • loss of one more civil liberty". The insurance industry
also derided:
The idea of regimenting 100% of the public and 
100% of the medical profession to cope with the 
happily-small minority who run into heavy 
expenses in any single year is neither desirable 
nor logical nor economic.119
Pharmaceutical manufacturers feared the high costs would
• • 120 • prove economically disastrous. Adoption of the broad plan
conceived in the Hall report "could result in a wholesale
disruption of the present system of providing medical care
which has proven effective"; government insurance should be
limited to assisting indigents with costs of prescription
• • 121 medicine.
After the election of 1963, the new Liberal government 
of Lester Pearson came under strong pressure from the
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social democratic NDP party in the minority parliaments of 
the time to implement the recommendations of the Hall 
commission. Despite strong support in Cabinet, Pearson's 
government hesitated because of the high costs, and 
business and professional opposition. Some provincial 
governments were also critical: for instance, Premier
Manning of Alberta attacked the Hall plan as "a direct
• • • • • • • 122 challenge to individual liberty and responsibility".
Three provinces began preparations for a plan based on
• • • • • 123government subsidies of private insurance premiums.
In negotiations with the provinces, the federal 
government insisted on four conditions for cost-sharing of 
provincial health insurance programmes: comprehensive
coverage, interprovincial portability of benefits, non­
profit or government administration, and universal, uniform 
contributions and benefits. These conditions ruled out the 
subsidized, means-tested, private, options pushed by 
business and medical practitioners.124 Most of the provinces 
appeared willing to alter their plans to meet these 
conditions; after a delay for the 1965 election, the 
medicare plan was finally approved overwhelmingly by 
Parliament in late 1966, without major concessions to CMA 
demands.125
Canada's medicare system, which came into effect on 
July 1, 1968, involved federal subsidization of up to fifty
percent of the costs of provincially-run programmes
• 126 # confronting to federal standards. All provinces eventually
qualified for federal assistance by adopting universal
• • 127 •public medicare. As a final appeal, doctors sought to 
ensure their right to opt out without patients losing their
•  128 a •benefits. In Quebec, doctors went on strike in the early 
1970s, to protest introduction of a compatible medicare
a a 129 aprogramme in that province. Most doctors ultimately 
accepted the new funding system which boosted their incomes 
as Canadians took advantage of pre-paid care to use health
a •  a t  •  130facilities and doctors services at an increased level. 
Business concerns about costs remained, but Canadian 
enterprises may also have benefitted from reduced pressures 
for employer-sponsored plans and a healthier workforce.131
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As governments sought to limit cost increases in the 
1970s and to restrict growth of doctors incomes, the 
profession again resisted state control and asserted 
autonomy via efforts at extra-billing, to prevent doctors'
• 132 treduction to the status of state employees ? the passions 
of the past were revived with doctors even withdrawing 
services for a time in Ontario when the practice was 
outlawed in the 1980s. Fiscal constraints and business 
pressures for limited government spending, have also 
prompted governments to scale down their commitments to the 
health program, despite continued popular support.133
Thus, the compulsory, public health insurance 
programme which differentiates Canada from the United 
States was not adopted in a climate of ideological 
consensus. Rather, it emerged over a protracted period, 
with considerable controversy and acrimony. Many of the 
same ideological objections to state action, aired in 
American debates on the issue, received considerable 
support in this country. Preference for voluntary action 
by the profession and its business allies was pronounced 
and unequivocal. To be sure, the acceptance of a state role 
in providing coverage for the indigent and aged did 
distinguish Canadian doctors from the most extreme American 
critics? this could reflect an attenuated anti-statism in 
this country. But other factors were also at work: the 
heavy income losses of charity work to the profession in a 
smaller market, and a political system giving greater 
strength to administration advocates of comprehensive 
insurance. These factors will be discussed more thoroughly 
in the conclusions to this thesis.
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Ill INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS CASE STUDIES
10 Earlv Policy and Attitudes
a) Common Law and Frontier Conditions
Early labour policy in both Canada and the United 
States was derived from the practices and principles of 
British common law. Based initially on pre-industrial 
social conditions, the common law was originally a tool to 
ensure the maintenance of feudal relations by compelling 
workers to accept working conditions imposed by feudal 
lords; intervention on behalf of employers remained an 
element of legal tradition after industrialization. North 
American labour market conditions, with a marked shortage 
of skilled labour and many opportunities for mobility into 
untapped agricultural regions, reinforced the employers* 
desire to have judicial remedies available to require 
discipline and retain control over individual workers. This 
was particularly important given the small size of new 
industrial enterprises, which in a competitive system, 
with disparate and often small markets, could face fatal 
pressures from prolonged strikes or unbridled wage 
increases.1 Not surprisingly, employers in the early 1800s 
turned frequently to the state, especially the courts, to 
enforce their contracts with dissident labourers. Labour 
organization for collective promotion was alien to this 
common law regime. Hence the courts initially viewed unions 
as beyond the scope of legal association. A series of legal 
devices was employed in different states and provinces in 
different periods.
b) Judicial Intervention in America
American labour organizations were first dogged by 
the common law stigma of "conspiracy”. This doctrine was 
employed by the courts at the behest of business to 
prevent the joining together of workers in 
combinations to raise wages, shorten hours, or otherwise 
to improve working conditions. A series of notable court 
cases from the 1820s hindered the expansion of union
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organizations by outlawing any activities deemed to be 
disadvantageous to property. Cordwainers, tailors and 
others found themselves convicted for "perniciously and 
deceitfully forming an unlawful club and combination to 
govern themselves and ... to extort large sums of money by 
means thereof" while threatening the interests of masters 
and non-members.2
An appeal in a Massachusetts case, Commonwealth versus 
Hunt, in 1840 ended this practice by recognizing unions as 
legitimate voluntary organizations. However, efforts to 
enforce union rules in a workplace were still condemned in 
the courts as conspiratorial exercises infringing on the 
independence of free individuals.3 The enshrined practice 
to the late 19th century involved staunch judicial action 
to defend employers* property rights from the unwarranted 
interference of "dangerous" combinations of workmen, 
thereby quashing emergent labour unions and stopping 
recruitment drives. When conspiracy grounds were eventually 
limited by court rulings or by state statutes, ingenious 
employers and judges turned to the tactic of outlawing 
unions as combinations in restraint of trade. In addition, 
the courts employed injunctions and temporary restraining 
orders to restrict strike action and thereby undermine 
union recruitment and bargaining power. The right of 
employers to do business was defended under the 
constitution as a property right which could not be 
violated by union refusal to work when requested by the 
employers.4
Thus, the general tendency of judicial intervention
was to retard the emergence of effective union organization
even up to the 1920s. As Witte observed:
the power of the courts was invoked to assist in 
defeating most of the more important strikes ... 
to prevent the successful spreading of labour 
boycotts ... and ... to prevent organizing 
activities where the workers were engaged under 
individual nonunion or "yellow-dog" contracts. 5
Violations were punishable as contempt of court. Even the 
most peaceful forms of persuasion were enjoined by judicial 
action; the right to picket was severely limited and
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numbers of picketers closely controlled. Legislative 
attitudes varied from state to state, but at times included 
repressive anti-union legislation. Some states actively 
assisted judicial harassment through anti-union clauses in 
anti-trust laws, and measures limiting or outlawing 
picketing and boycotts. Executive actors often used their 
authority to confine union activities. At the request of 
employers, both state Governors and Presidents called in 
the National Guard or militia to repress union protests and 
strikes. Frequently, such episodes ended with significant 
casualties.6
Therefore, it is not surprising that the American 
labour movement developed a marked aversion to state action 
in respect of industrial relations and disputes 
settlement. Coupled with the failure of initial efforts at 
development of a working class political party, the harsh 
state approach of the time served to paint government as 
the enemy of labour advance.7 While recognizing the 
potential of certain legislation to assist the spread of 
labour organization and defend the rights of unions to 
bargain with employers, any assumption of strong powers in 
disputes settlement was feared; such concentrated 
government authority was as likely as not to be used to 
assist employers' resistance to union development and 
undermine workers' bargaining power. Anti-statist 
liberalism was consonant with the experience of labour 
leaders; organic and formal ideologies hence pointed in the 
same direction.
c) Canadian Judicial Intervention
In Canada the conspiracy doctrine also found 
employment as an anti-labour device, designed to preclude 
union efforts to dictate to management. Given the later 
development of an industrial economy and labour movement, 
it is perhaps not surprising that employers had recourse 
to this legal device at a later period. Thus, in the 
1850s, the conspiracy doctrine was invoked by the courts 
to convict tailors who resisted the spreading displacement 
of men by sewing machines and cheaper unskilled women
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operators8; as late as 1871, this tactic was successfully
initiated by iron founders against the moulders' union in
Brantford, Ontario. As Martin Robin summarizes;
Attempts at organized employee resistance through 
combinations were combatted by the legal system 
with its battery of sanctions. The early labour 
law in Canada, as elsewhere, was assumed to be at 
the service of the employers and was called into 
service for various offenses: breach of
contract, trade union organization, and rioting. 
Workmen's combinations were widely treated as 
criminal offenses. 9
Early Canadian unionists faced charges for illegal
conspiracy and restraint of trade, and were denied standing
in the courts to enforce their rights.10 Business leaders
sought to protect the prerogatives of management to hire
and fire at will, and rejected union efforts to interfere
in any manner with the property of the company as
"absolutely lawless".11
This position received ample support from the legal
establishment.
Legal thought was also dominated by the idea of 
individual freedom, that is the right of every 
person under the law to full freedom in disposing 
of his own labour or his own capital according to 
his own will. The common law knew nothing of the 
trade union movement or its particular objects.12
As in the United States, the courts shaped early state
responses to labour organizations and industrial relations
in an anti-union fashion in Canada:
It became public policy to regard the attempts 
of working people to bargain regarding hours, 
wages and conditions of employment as 
combinations whose objectives were to interfere 
with business undertakings in a fashion 
detrimental to the public interest.13
The law acted to secure the business position by "severely
inhibiting the development of employee organizations in
Canada"14 In addition, Canadian governments were not averse
to intervention using police or troops to thwart strike
action, even if employer abuse was evident.15
In a series of bitter strikes in the prinitng
industry, master printers found recourse to this legal
subterfuge. The most famous episode was the attempt by
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George Brown, Reform (later Liberal) party editor of the 
Toronto Globe, to charge striking printers with conspiracy, 
to undermine their resistance to increased mechanization. 
Employer expressions on this theme sounded reminiscent of 
American precedents of earlier decades. Thus, Brown argued:
Any attempt on the part of the Employees to 
dictate to [the employers], in what way, or to 
what extent they shall lawfully use their own 
resources is not only an unwarranted interference 
with the rights of others, but a very transparent 
attempt to introduce amongst us the Communistic 
system of levelling.16
The master printers in this dispute reflected a
dogmatic resistance to union growth which exactly matched
that of American employers. In Donald Creighton's words:
In the eyes of these master printers a 
combination of capitalists, united to impose a 
uniform set of hours and wages, was entirely 
lawful? but a combination of workmen, united to 
maintain another and slightly different system 
of hours and wages, was entirely 
illegitimate. 17
The episode starkly revealed the backward state of
Canadian legislation respecting trade unions at this
period. Rather than intervene paternalistically as
predicted, the Canadian state ignored labour problems,
leaving the common law unreformed despite earlier
alterations in England. Therefore,
"Canadian unions enjoyed no statutory protection 
at all ... [and] any union or society of workmen 
which went on strike ... was an illegal
combination. The working-class movement stood in 
a more vulnerable position in the Dominion than 
in either Great Britain or the United States. 
Canadian labour was governed by a set of 
antiquated common-law decisions."18
d) Earlv Canadian Legislation
As a result of the printers' dispute, the Canadian 
Parliament passed the Trades Union Act of 1872, which 
recognized the right of workers to form collective organ­
izations for the purpose of negotiation with employers. 
This law diminished use of the conspiracy doctrine to 
hinder labour organization. It was motivated in part by
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fear that without protection comparable to that offered 
to unions under new British statutes or under recent 
American judicial rulings, it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to attract skilled immigrant labour to Canada. 
It also reflected the political nervousness of the 
declining Macdonald administration, which felt the growing 
labour force might become an essential political 
constituency in the coming federal election19. While this 
statute's efficacy in promoting the growth of labour 
organizations has been challenged, there remains
considerable evidence that labour confidence in the
• • 20 • • federal Conservatives was heightened ; this bill was also
an important precedent for state action supportive of
labour interests.
However the favourable impact of the legislation for 
Canadian unions was limited because registration was 
required for unions to receive protection against civil 
actions by employers; the weak state of worker organization 
at the time meant few unions were in a position to take 
advantage of the clause. The act contained no recognition 
of the right to organization, no protection of activists 
from discriminatory dismissal or punishment, and no right 
of collective bargaining. And the Trade Union Act was 
accompanied by a Criminal Law Amendment Act, which 
prohibitted "intimidation” by labour, which referred to any 
use of mass picketing. Workplace militancy was still on 
occasion met by coercive force of armed police and militia. 
In later years, amendments to the Criminal Code limited the 
tools available for organizing drives and strikes, when 
virtually any form of picketing was enjoined under the 
proscription on "besetting and watching".21
e) Earlv Union Responses to the State
Still, the absence of anti-trust laws in Canada 
reduced one source of state harassment. The sporadic 
successes of working class politicians seeking office 
under the auspices of the established political parties 
also gave some semblance of labour influence on state 
actions and legislation, perhaps inducing the union
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leadership to take the prospects for supportive legislation 
that much more seriously.22 The Macdonald Conservatives 
forged a cross-class alliance of "producers” supportive of 
such National Policy planks as the high tariff and railway 
subsidies, which assisted the central Canadian worker while 
also aiding capital accumulation.23 By the turn of the 
century the Liberal Party had inherited this labour 
constituency? such prominent labour leaders as Ralph Smith 
and Alphonse Verville held seats in parliament as Liberal 
MPs. These links may have induced greater acceptance of 
political action, both through established parties or 
through class-based organizations, as a potentially 
important contributor to the advance of labour.
This was particularly so, given the weakness of 
Canadian labour organizations in private bargaining. The 
seasonal nature of much employment, the flood of immigrants 
and the hostile attitudes of employers combined to limit 
gains in membership within an industrial structure of 
scattered resource and transportation projects and limited 
urban industry. "Labour organization in nineteenth century 
Canada succeeded only when there was a durable labour 
scarcity".24 Particularly in depression years, such as the 
1870s, unions perceived the need for assistance from 
government to prevent their elimination by employers.25 
Experience as much as ideology had made Canadian trade 
unionists appreciative of the potential of legislative 
intervention by the turn of the century. The most visible 
difference between the two trade union movements was the 
Trades and Labour Congress of Canada support for compulsory 
arbitration, which the AFL, "badly burned by the 
experience", strongly opposed.26
But differences in attitudes between the two 
countries' labour movements should not be exaggerated. 
American unionists did not always reject disputes resolu­
tion under state auspices. The Knights of Labour, the most 
powerful union central in the early 1880s supported a 
provision for compulsory arbitration, reflecting the weaker 
standing of unions and their then lesser ability to secure 
concessions from management through private bargaining.
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Decisions enforced by government arbitrators were 
considered preferable to continued losses in costly strikes 
against unresponsive employers.27 Although abandonment of 
this position by the AFL occurred at an early date in the 
U.S., Canada's unions also moved away from their support by 
early century, with increased bargaining strength; thus the 
railway unions resisted the attempt to include compulsory 
arbitration provisions in the Railway Disputes Bill of 
19 02.28 And Canadian unions were as adamant in their 
determination to preserve the right to strike against any 
form of government intervention or regulation.29 The TLC 
convention of 1902 cemented this stance with affiliation to 
the AFL and acceptance of its policies.30 Any differences in 
the consistency and vehemence of union policy in the two 
countries seems more attributable to the perceived costs 
and benefits of government action - a function of union 
strength in private bargaining at any given time - than to 
profound differences in attitudes towards the state.
f) Earlv Business Attitudes
Employers in both countries considered a state 
presence in industrial relations desirable. While laissez- 
faire arguments were used to dissuade government action 
beneficial to labourers, such as regulations on women and 
child labour, factory conditions, hours or wages, or union 
rights, the industrialists of the day did not hesitate to 
call for the state to intervene, often in very coercive 
guise, to limit the gains of labour organizations. 
Business leaders in both countries actively encouraged the 
continuous intervention of state actors, particularly the 
courts, in the resolution of industrial disputes. The state 
was viewed as a tool with which to stifle the emergence of 
union activity and provide business with the stable economy 
and low wage workers required for maximum profit taking. 
Appeal to the public interest, in Hegelian terms, would be 
forthcoming where market conditions enabled labourers to 
exert effective pressure on industry, via strike action, to 
permit organization or increase wages. The 'national 
interest" superseded labour calls to class solidarity and
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the state should act to assure its ascendancy. Therefore, 
while legislation stimulating union organization was 
derided as "class legislation”, Canadian31 and American32 
business relied on the state to limit the spread of union 
organization and to lessen the impact of strikes; Canadian 
employers perhaps exceeded Americans in hostility to 
unions.33 Even in this classical period of liberalism, 
business was selective in its condemnations of state 
economic intervention.
g) The Imperative of Policy
However, after the turn of the century, government 
leaders in the two countries were forced to intervene with 
increasing frequency in industrial relations matters. Most 
urgent was state action to resolve industrial disputes 
particularly disruptive of economic life or threatening to 
public well-being. Subsequently continued strife, violence 
and confusion in industrial relations moved governments to 
put collective bargaining between labour and management on 
a more orderly footing. The increasing electoral strength 
of labour impelled greater recognition of union bargaining 
rights and more responsiveness to union demands for 
workplace reform. Abuses of authority within the union 
movement subsequently required regulation of internal union 
affairs to ensure unions represented workers and to protect 
the rights of rank and file members. How the two countries 
responded to such challenges at the national level 
constitutes the subject of the case studies in this 
section.
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11 Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. 1907
a) The Emergence of the Act
Concern over the impact of lengthy strikes in public
utilities and mines was first reflected in Canadian federal
legislation at the turn of the century. Measures for
voluntary investigation, conciliation and arbitration were
introduced in 1900, as the government sought means of
settling costly disputes1? in 1903, these measures were
extended to the railways.2 In 1907, the Canadian Parliament
consolidated and amended these provisions in the Industrial
Disputes Investigation Act. This measure, enacted in
response to the bitter strikes in the Alberta and British
Columbia mining camps in the winter of 1906-07, was
designed to enhance the role of the state in the resolution
of industrial disputes in fields of significant public
import. The measure was the brainchild of William Lyon
Mackenzie King, then Deputy Minister of Labour3, who, after
investigating the coal dispute, declared:
organized society alone makes possible the 
operation of mines to the mutual benefit of those 
engaged in the work of production [so] a 
recognition of the obligation due society by the 
parties is something which the State is justified 
in compelling if the parties are unwilling to 
concede it. In any civilized community private 
rights should cease when they become public 
wrongs. 4
But despite this strong rhetoric, King stopped short of 
compulsory arbitration, then in force elsewhere. Canadian 
labour had abandoned its traditional support for compulsory 
arbitration (owing to American influence and affiliation 
with the AFL in 1902)5. Union opposition dissuaded the 
government from enacting this provision.
Instead, King selected compulsory investigation in 
serious disputes in industries under federal jurisdiction.6 
The Industrial Disputes Investigation Act of 1907 required 
the parties to an impending dispute to call for a public 
investigation of the points of disagreement before 
resorting to the expedients of strike or lockout. Boards 
were set up consisting of one representative of each party,
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with a neutral chairman agreed on by the parties (or 
selected by the Minister of Labour in event of 
disagreement). Penalties were imposed on any party 
violating the temporary delay of strike or lockout. 
However, the report of the inquiry board was not binding on 
the parties, who were free to continue the dispute using 
strike or lockout as soon as the report was made public. 
King hoped public opinion would dissuade the parties from 
rejecting the boards recommendations; this would promote 
settlements without resort to damaging work stoppages.7
b) Initial Union Response
Labour unions were divided in their response. The 
Railroad Brotherhoods were sharply critical of the 
inclusion of Canada*s railways under this measure. They 
preferred the voluntary investigation and conciliation 
measure, the Railway Disputes Act of 1903, and objected to 
the new compulsory investigation and strike delay 
provisions. These would give employers time to prepare to 
defeat any strike through the employment of strike 
breakers, and other devices; the railways could also use 
the act to procrastinate in reaching a settlement.8 A 
leading spokesman for the railwaymen, John Hall, declared 
that the measure was designed to legislate unions out of 
existence and to enforce settlements on railwaymen.9 
Pressure from this quarter succeeded in forcing the 
government into a compromise, whereby the railroad 
brotherhoods could opt to employ the machinery of the 1903 
Act in preference to the new procedures, in exchange for 
accepting compulsory investigation.
The Trades and Labour Congress, headed at the time by
a Liberal M.P., Alphonse Verville, not surprisingly came
• 10 • • • out in favour of the measure. With many representatives m
the councils of government, this organization did not
distrust state action.11 The T.L.C. Convention of September
1907 endorsed the new law by a wide margin, declaring:
Organized labour does not want to strike to 
enforce its demands if the consideration of them 
can be attained without recourse to that 
remedy.... Nor is organized labour blind to the 
fact that in every great industrial struggle the
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public have a large interest as well in the 
result as in the means adopted to reach that re­
sult. The least the public are entitled to is a 
knowledge of the merits of the dispute.... 12
This resolution reflected the primary concern of
labour leaders. Lauding the "happy day when every labour
dispute can be settled by the parties meeting together in
the presence of an impartial tribunal to discuss their
differences”, the union executive complained: ”[o]ur
greatest difficulty in the past has been that we could not
get a hearing”13 The T.L.C. leadership was confident that
the new measure "assured a fair hearing of the demands of
the workers". One leader praised the law "because it gives
the workingman the opportunity of bringing his complaints
and his real situation before the general public.
Furthermore, the law has recognized the official existence
of labour organizations".14 Labour proponents believed the
bill could give labour publicity for its claims while still
ensuring the men an income from gainful employment during
the course of the investigation.15
Certainly, many unionists feared the loss of advantage
conceded by the limitation on strikes, since conditions
could be more likely improved by sudden work stoppages than
through dragged out negotiations and deferred strikes. The
neutrality of the state in the investigation and settlement
process was also questioned: among Canadian labour, noted
a contemporary observer, the "distrust of Government
intervention arises from a feeling that the intervening
authority has a class bias against labour"16 Some TLC
affiliates began to criticize the act, as implementation
affected them unfavourably. Considerable pressure soon
mounted within the T.L.C. for alteration of the law. At the
1908 convention, critics17 persuaded the Congress to seek
changes.18
When these concerns were met in part, through 
amendments passed by the Canadian Parliament in that same 
year, TLC criticism of the act receded. The Executive 
Council reported the satisfaction of most affiliates with 
the quality of the awards recommended by the investigating 
committees. Continuing, the executive officers noted
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the principle of compromise, so powerful a factor 
in society as it is constituted today, has been 
recognized, the duration of strikes has been 
reduced, large strike funds have become less 
important as a fighting weapon, and outside 
interference has not only become unnecessary, 
but even a cause of loss of public sympathy.19
Representatives of labour on investigating boards similarly 
expressed enthusiasm for the act, albeit noting shifts in
labour attitudes with variations in the nature of the
20 • • awards. And, despite some fears, most independent labour
leaders remained supportive of the government.21
c) Evolution of Labour Attitudes
The reactions of the railway men demonstrate the 
changing response of labour unions based on their most 
recent experience under the act. Railroad maintenance-of- 
way employees and railroad telegraphers, were 
consistently supportive after enactment of the act. Having 
had much experience of the benefits of the measure22, the 
railway workers resisted the growing discontent in the 
T.L.C. and broke from this body when repeal sentiment grew 
in 1912. By the World War I, these organizations contained 
some of the strongest supporters of the measure. Glowing 
praise emanated from the heads of the Order of Maintenance 
of Way Men and the Order of Railway Telegraphers who said 
"the act has been of distinct advantage to our 
organization. We have always secured favourable results by 
reference of disputes to boards”23 D. Campbell, third 
vice-president of the Order of Railway Telegraphers 
strongly defended it in a letter to Samuel Gompers. 
Campbell approved of the law "because it is not detrimental 
to the interests of wage earners, but rather a benefit 
in almost every particular". Rather than weakening labour 
"by partially grinding the edge off ... [the strike] 
weapon", exposure of the facts to the scrutiny of public 
opinion acted to increase public awareness of labour*s 
position and to enhance the chances of successful 
negotiations.24
Labour views continued to oscillate from one 
convention to the next. Thus while the 1915 convention
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rejected repeal demands25, by 1916 the T.L.C. favoured 
scrapping the act. Strong U.S. opposition to tentative 
Presidential and Congressional consideration of a similar 
measure as a wartime expedient, may have influenced the 
Canadian affiliates' position to some extent. However, the 
booming wartime economy, the shortage of skilled labour and
the essential need for maintenance of service in key
industries - all of which made strike action a potent 
weapon - may also have convinced Canadian unionists that 
there was more to be gained through confrontational 
contract negotiations in the private sphere than via state 
sponsored investigation and conciliation. This was 
especially so since the government, anxious to keep down 
the costs of the war effort, resisted demands for wage 
increases.
Extension of IDIA coverage to the private sector,
especially to munitions industries, may account for the
added hostility at that time. With the exception of the 
miners, it was unions not previously covered by the measure 
which led the opposition in the T.L.C. conventions. The 
labour movement remained divided however. Strong unions 
felt they had more to gain through unfettered strike 
action, while weak unions felt government sponsorship and 
enforcement of fair wage provisions was more advantageous.26
Even when repeal was supported at the 1916 convention, 
criticism did not extend to the strident anti-statism often 
expressed by Gompers and the A.F.L.. At no time did labour 
critics of I.D.I.A. express unqualified voluntarism or 
describe the state as a potential source of working class 
oppression; the desirability of state action in industrial 
affairs was never directly challenged.27 As Ben Selekman 
summarizes:
hardly any of the Canadian trade unionists 
advance the argument heard in this country 
against President Wilson's measure [proposed 
during World War One, based on Canada's 
investigation law] - that such a law means 
compulsory servitude for the wage earners. On the 
contrary, most of them approve the principle of 
the law and direct their criticism purely against 
administrative defects. 28
The equivocal, shifting response of labour seems
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understandable, given the ambiguous impact of the act, for, 
in Russell's words: "While state intervention did not
increase the chance of victory, it probably lessened the 
probability of total defeat for the labour movement ... 
particularly ... for the less powerful or unified unions".29 
It was only the strong unions who favoured repeal, and even 
these only when market conditions were favourable. In the 
post war period, when unionism was on the defensive and 
bargaining strength lessened, the TLC resumed support for 
the act? the union central was strongly in favour of 
restoring the law in some fashion after it was nullified by 
a ruling of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in 
1925.30
d) Business Responses to the IDIA
Initial business reaction to the IDIA was muted. This
resulted in part from the fact that the Act applied to
only limited categories of employers, in transportation,
and vital resource industries like coal mining. The
Canadian Manufacturers Association decided to make no
comments on the measure before it was adopted by
Parliament.31 Railway executives supported the act, which
was seen as a means of averting the costly strikes which
had loomed before 1900. If anything, they regarded the
measure as too mild, having previously advocated compulsory
arbitration.32 Business support broadened after
implementation of the new law. In an address to the
Canadian Manufacturers' Association meeting of September,
1909, the President, Mr. Robert Hobson, credited the
Lemieux Act with inducing a reduction in the number of
strikes "without unduly interfering with the rights of
either party".33
There was criticism of the enforcement of the act,
specifically the failure to penalize unionists who went on
strike before the prescribed period for an investigation.
However, as one employer opined
[notwithstanding the weaknesses I have referred 
to, I think the employers, even those who have 
seen their men violate the act, would be sorry to 
have it repealed. While the penalties may never 
be imposed, still they stand as a wholesome
221
preventive against rash conduct for the 
sober-minded man, who is generally in the 
majority, and so long as they exercise even this 
deterrent effort employers will regard the 
measure with favour.34
G.M. Murray, Secretary of the Canadian Manufacturers* 
Association noted that, despite violations by the "less 
intelligent class of working people", "the better classes 
respected the potential penalties under the act and had 
learned they had nothing to lose from submitting their 
grievances to public investigation, providing an impetus 
towards more reasoned negotiation of industrial disputes".35
Employers praised the use of non-binding reports and 
recommendations which avoided the pitfalls of compulsion 
while still inducing settlements under the pressure of 
public opinion. Certain businessmen preferred the direct 
meetings and discussions between the parties required by 
the act, (even though resistance to meeting the repre­
sentatives of labour had previously been high among the 
Canadian business class) ,36 However the postponement of 
strike action pending investigation and conciliation, was 
the most frequently cited advantage. Even if the 
differences seemed irreconcilable after the investigation 
was complete, the delay before strike or lockout provided 
an opportunity for the parties to cool down before taking 
drastic action.37 Labour* s new right to call for an 
investigation might be an invitation to a few dis­
gruntled employees to block or delay needed changes. But 
most businessmen felt this provision provided an excellent 
safety valve: "You cannot too strongly legislate upon the 
advisability of compulsory notice from the employee to 
employer of grievances and the absolute necessity of at 
once applying for a conciliation board. This keeps 
fomentation down and helps to keep the agitator from 
speechifying".38
Thus while employer criticism could occasionally be 
heard when boards ruled unfavourably, business generally 
recognized the important gains it had made in its ability 
to maintain production with the delay in strikes and 
invocation of investigation and conciliation. Business
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support ranged across the spectrum of industries affected 
directly by the provision, including public utilities, 
shipping, and railways.39 If anything, business leaders were 
critical of the failure to provide for compulsory 
arbitration, to end strikes considered "an unreasoning and 
irrational survival of the dark ages"; in this vein the 
Montreal Builders Exchange called upon legislators "to 
extend the principle of compulsory arbitration not only to 
disputes [affecting] public utilities, but to all trade 
disturbances of the industrial peace.40 Rather than condemn 
state intervention in private disputes resolution, 
employers lauded its beneficial effects, as settlements of 
disputes without strike action reached significant levels 
after the adoption of the act.
This favourable reaction may also have reflected the 
significant instances in which the investigating tribunal 
found in favour of the employers, and union resistance met 
with the condemnation of public opinion and the defeat of 
the strike.41
e) Impact of the Act on Industrial Relations
Revisionist and radical historians would hardly 
consider this business support surprising, since they 
interpret the act as a means of achieving industrial 
stability to the benefit of industry and the detriment of 
labour. For instance, Bradley Rudin feels King acted 
deliberately to "fashion a new liberalism, based on the 
supremacy of the large corporation and the power of the 
Federal state".42 The state was regarded as an ally of 
capital acting to ensure the continuity of production 
through the provision of mechanisms to regulate class 
conflict and ensure rapid settlements of disputes, by 
weakening labour's natural economic weaponry through the 
strike delay. King is viewed by Paul Craven as an organic 
intellectual of the dominant capitalist class, who 
countered the growing instability of Canadian capitalism 
through an interventionist policy which would enable the 
state to intervene to moderate the disruptive strikes 
produced by rapid social change43. Since the IDIA,
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Christopher Huxley argues, "the rights of unionization and 
free collective bargaining have been hedged around by, even 
embedded in a massive legal and penal structure" as the 
state restricted union activity.44 The IDIA is considered 
one element of a broader government strategy of aiding 
capital accumulation in a vulnerable resource economy.
Some non-Marxist critics agree that Canadian policy 
placed an emphasis on prevention of strikes which exceeded 
American concern for the maintenance of industrial 
production45. Data indicates that employers often did 
receive a better deal than employees from board rulings; 
strike delays could be turned to advantage, as evidenced by 
the poor employee record in legal strikes conducted after 
a board report had been rejected.46 Benefits to employers 
were mitigated somewhat by the legal recognition and 
assistance given to unions through compulsory inves­
tigations and the conciliators' emphasis on compromise, at 
times running against the bottom line demands of industry47. 
On the whole, however, the measure seemed consistent with 
industry interests, and did not interfere with the 
naturally stronger position of employers in collective 
negotiations with unions.
f) Public Sector Attitudes and American Influences
Public sector actors expressed a different ideological 
justification for the act.48 Its author, Mackenzie King, 
was following a progressive line respecting the right of 
the state to intervene to protect the public interest. 
Although sterner measures were operative at the time in 
Dominions like New Zealand, which had opted for compulsory 
arbitration, Canada's compulsory investigation measure 
was a departure from North American practice, since for the 
first time the state interposed itself in disputes to the 
extent of delaying the right to strike in the public 
interest.
But although this interventionist thrust 
differentiated it from contemporary American laws, this 
does not necessarily reflect ideological differences 
between the two countries. King was certainly aware of
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similar proposals which had been brought forward in the
United States by men like Charles F. Adams, his former
teacher Richard Ely, and N.P. Gilman. King had made a
careful study of American thought? the precedents of the
Erdman Act49 and President Theodore Roosevelt's proposals
for compulsory investigation were well known to him.50 The
similarity between King's measure and these proposals is
indeed striking.
Therefore, this may be an early example of an American
proposal, rejected in that country, which gained
legislative enactment in Canada. Unlike these thinkers,
King attained a position in the civil service from which
he was able to launch his initiative. The ideas were not
different, only the political influence of their exponents.
This may in fact demonstrate the importance of the large
role of bureaucrats and administrators, as against
legislators in the Canadian policymaking process. For the
IDIA does not seem the result of interest group pressure on
Parliament, but rather was an initiative introduced from
above by the Deputy Minister of Labour. As will be
considered later, there may be more scope for such
bureaucratic policymaking in the Canadian versus the
American system.
At the same time, political spokesmen in Canada did
not see the IDIA as a statist initiative in keeping with a
Canadian interventionist inheritance. Some Canadian
legislators clearly considered the act to be consistent
with a liberal political philosophy. A.C. Macdonnell
contended that the "liberty of the individual is conceded
only where the liberties of others are not infringed in
consequence"? strikes on public utilities in his opinion
constituted such an infringement. He elaborated:
it is perfectly clear that in all these cases [of 
utility and railway work stoppages] the liberties 
of a great many people are being infringed in 
consequence of too excessive liberty on the part 
of others. This measure proposes to restrict 
individual liberty only at a point where, if it 
is exercised at too great a length, the liberties 
of others are thereby infringed.
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Against critics who charged the proposed law would 
interfere with the freedom of contract he suggested it 
actually created the conditions for such freedom by 
equalizing the bargaining abilities of the two parties to 
a dispute.51 Thus state action was considered essential to 
maintain the conditions for both the traditional liberty 
of the individual and the emergent entrepreneurial liberal 
creed of freedom of contract, eminently consistent with 
American ideology.52
g) American Reaction to the IDIA
The I.D.I.A. is a rare instance of a Canadian Act 
which drew substantial attention and comment in the United 
States; this affords the opportunity to assess the 
reaction of American figures to this form of state 
intervention. It was studied within a year of enactment by 
an official of the U.S. Department of Labour, V.S. Clark, 
who presented the measure in a favourable light as a 
contribution to industrial peace, noting how it had 
effectively prevented costly public service strikes. Clark 
emphasized the conciliation aspect of the measure and 
downplayed its compulsory elements.53 Marcus M. Marks, 
speaking for the National Civic Federation, lauded the 
measure for preventing loss of service or wages, while 
avoiding the arousal of "evil passions” between the parties 
to a dispute. He continued: " [investigation under
conditions of employment and order is much more likely to 
proceed in the direction of equity and justice than if ... 
both parties ... are laboring under the excitement of the 
abnormal conditions consequent to an open breach 
between employer and employed”.54 Addressing labours' 
concerns, he noted no union should object to an 
investigation which contained the promise of a fair 
consideration of their grievances. He thus recommended the 
establishment of machinery on the Canadian model to act as 
an "industrial fire department" charged with putting out 
recurrent "labour conflagrations which threaten our 
prosperity". Private disputes settlement via strike or 
lockout were wasteful and should be supplanted by a
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legislative regime for peaceful resolution.55
Labour spokesmen in the U.S. were openly hostile to
the measure. From his voluntarist perspective, Samuel
Gompers saw no difference between compulsory arbitration
and investigation. Both required unions to concede their
vaunted right to strike at any moment, which lessened
their bargaining power. In Gompers' words:
As soon as the government steps in ... and says 
to the workingman ... : you must work under such 
conditions as are here stipulated; if you do not 
you will go to prison. At that moment slavery 
has been introduced ... call it by whatever name 
you please, compulsory arbitration or 
compulsory investigation, compulsory work pending 
the final determination of that investigation 
...[establishes] the system of slavery.56
A.B. Garretson, President of the Order of Railway 
Conductors of America, noted how the compulsory period of 
delay was frequently used by the employer "to reinforce 
himself against the efforts of his men to better their 
conditions". In effect, "the machinery of the law is to be 
utilized as a weapon to defeat the contentions of the men 
who labour, regardless of how just may be the claim which 
they put forward on their own behalf". He asserted this 
situation only reinforced the view that government agencies 
at all levels acted "in conjunction with" and "as an aid 
to" the employer.57
In general, American reaction revealed a clearer and 
more consistent division between business supporters and 
labour opponents of compulsory investigation with a delay 
of strikes and lockouts. However, these sentiments were 
not always shared by all American unions. An editorial 
in The Railroad Telegrapher of December, 1916, showed the 
Order of Railroad Telegraphers' ability to distinguish 
between investigation, with its beneficial application of 
public opinion to major disputes, and compulsory 
arbitration, which would never prove acceptable to American 
workers. These unionists had observed the favourable 
treatment sometimes accorded to their Canadian counterparts 
by the settlement procedures. Moreover, the railway union­
ists had previously supported American federal efforts to 
strengthen mediation machinery, which had been weakened by
227
business resistance and the absence of compulsion. Rather 
than adopt a purely voluntarist line, the railwaymen were 
able to assess the effects of state action on their 
situation, and express a pragmatic view of the Canadian law 
as they did towards certain American initiatives in railway 
disputes settlement.
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12 U.S. Railway Labour Legislation
a) Earlv Congressional Action
The first target of U.S. federal industrial relations 
law was the vital railway sector, where industrial disputes 
threatened to interfere with the flow of interstate 
commerce. The first tentative step followed costly strikes 
in the 1880s. The Railway Arbitration Act of 1888 allowed 
the President to set up a commission to report on railway 
labour disputes, and to appoint a board of arbitration 
where both parties accepted it. However, the act saw little 
use in the ten years it was in force; the lone report 
submitted under it, into the lengthy and bitter Pullman 
strike of 1894, did little to promote a settlement. The 
weak position of railway unions at that time lessened the 
prospects for success, as they were rarely sufficiently 
organized to request investigation or arbitration.1 
Investigation alone was seen as of little usefulness and 
the unwillingness of parties to accept arbitration led to 
demands for a more adequate legislative framework for 
disputes* settlement.
The response of Congress in 1898 was the Erdman Act, 
which established machinery for federal participation in 
disputes* settlement for the railways. While the right of 
unions to organize was not granted, the statute did outlaw 
discriminatory discharge for union activities and 
prohibited individual non-union (yellow dog) contracts. 
Procedures were established for the use of mediation and 
arbitration boards, composed of equal numbers of labour and 
management representatives, set up at the request of either 
party by the federal Commissioner of Labor and the Chairman 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. These mediators 
could not take the initiative, and the investigation and 
publication aspects of the former law were dropped. 
Arbitration was employed if both parties agreed, and the 
statute prevented any change in the status quo pending the 
arbitrators* award. Once an award was accepted any party 
seeking a change was enjoined to give thirty days* notice.2 
The Act was constitutional insofar as it provided for
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voluntary acceptance of the awards, since binding 
arbitration was held to be a violation of private property 
rights at that time.3
b) Union Responses to Federal Policy
Labour organizations were mixed in their reaction to 
the Act. The four Railway Brotherhoods, representing 
conductors, trainmen, engineers and firemen, "distinctly, 
if not enthusiastically, favoured this step toward 
government intervention. Some of their spokesmen went so 
far as to endorse compulsory arbitration".4 As with their 
Canadian counterparts, this position reflected the weak 
bargaining position of the brotherhoods in this early 
period. As Burnheim, Van Doren et. al. argue:
Arbitration is likely to be favoured by the 
weaker party to a dispute. The unions were 
clearly the weaker party during this early 
period, and felt that they had nothing to lose 
and much to gain from government intervention.5
Samuel Gompers attributed this support for state action to 
the fact these brotherhoods were "then weak organizations 
with little of the promise of their present [1920s] 
splendid strength".6
Gompers maintained his staunch opposition to 
compulsory arbitration which he termed "involuntary 
servitude". But the AFL was forced to study the measure 
when the railway brotherhoods took a supportive stand. A 
legal opinion obtained in early 1897 indicated dangers in 
the Act, since although penalties of imprisonment were 
excluded, unions or individuals undertaking strike action 
against the award of arbitrators could find themselves 
liable for sequestration of assets and civil suits. Despite 
the weak powers of the arbitrators respecting subpoenas of 
witnesses and evidence, the enforcement provisions were 
considered "dangerous to the very existence of labour 
organizations".7 Prohibition on the ability of a worker to 
leave employment within three months of an award, without 
giving thirty days notice was considered "restrictive of 
individual liberty ... of the grossest possible 
character".8 The measure could also be used by business to
235
delay settlements, since they could appeal arbitrators 
awards on grounds of "errors in law", thus allowing 
maintenance of existing conditions of employment, and 
weakening union ability to promote members' interests.9 The 
restriction on employer dismissals and union strikes and 
boycotts pending arbitration were considered inequitable, 
since the former was readily evaded and the latter so 
sweeping as to preclude strikes on grievances unrelated to 
the arbitration.10
These advisors' final assessment was that the Erdman 
Act was:
likely to prove prejudicial and even disastrous 
to labour organizations submitting themselves to 
its provisions. In addition it sanctions serious 
violations of the natural right of men to 
surrender distasteful employment and seek 
occupation elsewhere. We regard the bill as 
dangerous in its tendencies to the extreme.11
The AFL leadership considered the final bill "adroitly
drawn" so as to secure labour support "in forging their own
shackles".12 A special committee at the Cincinnati
convention of 1898 responded by recommending A.F.L.
rejection of the measure "on the ground that the proposed
law contained provisions for enforcing the award"13? the
committee declared: "Any law which will compel men to work
within these United States against their will is subversive
of the fundamental principles upon which the Republic is
founded"14.
The railwaymen sought competing legal advice to
confirm that the law would not require workers to work
against their will. Gompers was unmoved.
I saw in the proposal to establish arbitration 
carrying any degree of compulsion a blow at the 
fundamentals of voluntary institutions which to 
my thinking are the heart of freedom. I felt we 
had to keep open opportunities for freedom and 
initiative. All worth-while achievement is based 
on the progress of individuals.15
Initially the AFL leaders believed an entirely new bill 
would be required to meet their concerns, ensure equitable 
treatment of union and other organizations, and avoid 
infringing on the right to quit work. They hoped that new 
research as to its implications would persuade the Railway
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Brotherhoods to alter their opinion, and join in a united
effort to defeat the bill.16 The American Federation of
Labor inveighed against the act with strong rhetoric:
The Erdman Arbitration Bill ... is a piece of 
legislation destructive of the best interests of 
labour, ruinous to the liberties of our people? 
a step in the direction for the creation of an 
autocracy or an empire on the one side and a 
class of slaves or serfs on the other. Against 
such a condition of affairs the whole sentiment - 
the entire interest - of the wage workers should 
be directed.17
But the intransigent railway brotherhood's support for the 
Erdman provisions forced Gompers to compromise, as he was 
seeking to induce the railwaymen to affiliate with the AFL. 
Continued consultation and reflection produced a greater 
commonality in outlook, as the AFL leaders acknowledged the 
superiority of arbitration over strikes. After sounding the 
initial warning the AFL suspended its outright opposition 
and trusted the Brotherhoods would eventually acknowledge 
the error of supporting a flawed measure.18 Gompers 
concentrated on preventing the extension of the Erdman 
provisions to other transportation sectors, notably 
shipping.19
c) Business Responses
Railroad executives, sensing the advantages for unions
in securing a hearing via the arbitration provisions,
• • 20 resisted the adoption of the act . Although the roads had
frequently turned to the state for coercive assistance
against potentially successful union action in the past21,
state intervention was now rejected as an "intrusion on
their prerogative of determining what [a railroad] could
afford to pay its employees"22. The major roads resisted
efforts to apply the new law to demonstrate its impotence
without their cooperation. Since both parties had to agree
in order to bring the machinery into action, the railroads
could easily negate the law by refusing to cooperate; in
the early years, few disputes went to arbitration.
Prosperity led to a period with few strikes, during which
the railways could afford to pay workers well and forestall
disputes.
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Later, as the industrial balance of power shifted, the
employer attitude altered. In Risher's words:
Whereas, when the Act was passed the carriers 
refused to allow federal intervention, the steady 
growth of of the railroad brotherhoods convinced 
the industry that direct tests of strength were 
perhaps no longer the most advantageous method 
for settling disputes.
Railroads increasingly called for mediation and arbitration
if direct negotiations failed.23 In part, this resulted from
the railroad unions' virtual monopoly of skilled labour. It
also reflected a broader willingness of employers to accept
government mediation of industrial disputes, as advocated
by organizations like the National Civic Federation24.
However, some employers were dissatisfied with
American arbitration techniques and looked favourably upon
the Canadian model, especially the strike delay provisions
of the Lemieux Act.25 Others felt a more permanent board of
arbitration would be superior to the ad hoc committees
formed from representatives of the interested parties,
which could not demonstrate sufficient impartiality or
detachment from the particulars of the case in question.26
Distrust of the state as arbiter remained, especially given
its openness to popular influence, since unionists were a
more important electorate than railway management.27
Employers never accepted the anti-discrimination clauses
of the Erdman Act, which had made it an offence to use
28 • • • • • "yellow-dog" contracts , or to discriminate against union
activists in hiring and firing. These provisions were
resisted through the courts, where they were dismissed as
an unconstitutional violation of freedom of contract.29
d) Evolution of Group Attitudes
The railway unions' attitude towards the Erdman Act 
varied, like Canadian response to the IDIA, with their 
economic power30 and their experiences under this law. 
Unions showed strong support, owing to favourable rulings 
between 1907 and 1910. As union strength increased in later 
decades, the Act became a potential hindrance to their 
bargaining power.31 An adverse arbitration in the important 
engineer's strike of 1912 produced increased scepticism in
238
these brotherhoods32. The engineers' battle "provided the 
railroad unions with a test of their organized strength and 
led them to realize that the aid of government was
something to be sought only as a last resort".33 Scepticism 
had also been heightened by court rulings negating anti- 
discrimination clauses of the Act.34 When Congress 
considered a new act, the Newlands bill, the brotherhoods 
beleived many of the issues of wages and conditions
involved in labour disputes were matters of sharp class
division; a result agreeable to labour was unlikely to be 
achieved via arbitration, especially given the questionable 
objectivity of the supposedly neutral third parties. W.S. 
Carter, President of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Enginemen and Firemen, testified to the Congressional 
committee: "[a]fter years of experience under arbitration, 
I have reached the conclusion that a labour question is not 
arbitrable if the workingmen hope to secure justice in the 
results." 35
Although eventually joining the railroads in 
supporting the Newlands machinery - which allowed the 
larger mediation boards to act on their own initiative36 - 
the railway unions became increasingly dissatisfied with 
arbitration and challenged the supposed neutrality of the 
arbitrators. Discontent reached new levels when the 
railways refused to accept arbitration on the eight-hours 
controversy in 1916; entry into World War I, and the 
resultant strong bargaining position of transportation 
unions only reinforced this dissatisfaction. Meanwhile, the 
carriers, having accepted state action to lessen union 
pressure during successful strikes, steadfastly resisted 
government regulation of hours, conditions and minimum 
wages, which the unions increasingly sought. In this, they 
received the support of other employers' associations, such 
as the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
National Metal Trades Association, which saw state action 
on the railways as a disturbing precedent which could later 
be extended to other private industries.37
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e) Government Control and Labour Advances in World War I
The federal government took control of the railways 
to avoid labour unrest in the midst of international 
conflict. The greater role of the state in railroad labour 
matters during the war proved an important watershed. The 
U.S. Railroad Administration enforced standard wages, 
working conditions, and safety regulations, promoted 
settlement of disputes by boards of adjustment under 
government supervision, and ensured "the right of self 
organization of workers without discrimination"38. Union 
growth in the railway sector was dramatic and wage gains 
were made without recourse to frequent strikes. Naturally, 
this approach secured the support of railway unions and 
eroded, for the time being, their opposition to state 
action.
The question of the proper role of the state reemerged 
once the conflict was over. Railroad managements "resented 
what they conceived to be encroachments on their field of 
authority"39 and pushed for a return to private management, 
attacking the alleged inefficiencies of public 
stewardship.40 Labour resisted, declaring in favour of at 
least a temporary retention of government control. In an 
unprecedented move, the AFL expressed support for state 
ownership, and backed the Plumb Plan which would have 
extended federal ownership for a two year trial period.41 At 
successive annual conventions, the Federation adopted 
resolutions supportive of the railway brotherhoods' fight 
to retain beneficial state regulation; these were adopted 
after vigorous opposition from more traditional 
voluntarists in the federation.
f) Transportation Act. 1920
Congress proved responsive to business demands, and 
private ownership of railways was restored in the 
Transportation Act of 1920. The prevailing anti-labour 
attitudes of these years, fuelled by the "red scare" and 
business desire to roll back labour's wartime gains, 
influenced this legislation. The Act created the Railroad 
Labor Board, designed to adjudicate deadlocked disputes.
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This was antagonistic to labour, since it involved 
compulsory arbitration. Union anger was increased by what 
were seen as "anti-labour" appointees to this board under 
the Republican President, Warren Harding. Key rulings 
respecting non-union contractors, and company unions went 
against the unions. This culminated in the railway strike 
of 1922, in which the Board urged the use of 
strikebreakers, and condemned strikers as law-breakers. The 
Attorney General's use of an injunction prohibiting 
striking or its encouragement marked the low point in the 
Railroad Brotherhoods' relations with the federal state and 
encouraged increased union political activity.42
Union pressure was responsible for a review of the 
Railroad Labor Board and the introduction of legislation 
for its replacement in 1925. The attitude of business 
towards these proposed revisions is instructive. The 
purported anti-statism of such interests was absent in this 
case, since the existing Board had served the carriers 
well. Thus, the railroad executives generally wished to 
maintain and strengthen the Board, to offset the powerful 
bargaining position of the Railroad Brotherhoods. Alfred P. 
Thom, General Counsel for the Association of Railway 
Executives, stated this body's support for the Railroad 
Labor Board: "whatever is done in respect of a method of 
adjusting labour disputes, the propriety and necessity of 
giving to some public authority effective participation in 
reaching results should not be lost sight of"43 Although 
critical of intervention by the state in matters of railway 
mergers, line abandonment and other management 
prerogatives, these executives favoured strong state 
intervention (called public representation) via boards of 
adjustment to ensure that "coercion" would not be brought 
to bear on negotiations through strike action.44
g) The Railway Labor Disputes Act. 1926
Eventually, railroad managers recognized the loss of 
credibility of the existing Board and the need for changes. 
Daniel Willard, President of the Baltimore and Ohio 
Railroad, noted the Board could not gain the cooperation of
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the Brotherhoods and could not function adequately without 
it.45 And the Association of Railway Executives did 
cooperate with the Coolidge administration and the railway 
unions in drafting the Railway Labor Disputes Act of 192646. 
This seminal bill for the first time required that attempts 
to reach labour-management agreements in railway disputes 
must be made via collective bargaining between the two 
parties47. Employers were prevented from interfering in the 
selection of worker representatives. Unenforceable 
arbitration was replaced by government sponsored mediation; 
emergency boards ordered by the President were empowered to 
impose solutions in any deadlock threatening to cripple 
vital transportation services in any part of the country. 
New procedures to delay strike action for 30 days or more 
during investigation by a Presidential Commission 
introduced a government sponsored restriction on the right 
to strike which was accepted by labour representatives? 
American unions for the first time conceded the advantages 
of state intervention in disputes settlement reminiscent of 
the Canadian IDIA procedures.48
While many railway executives did not like the 
changes, the Association of Railway Executives did support 
adoption of the Act. Although it was not ideal, union 
willingness to exhaust peaceful remedies before strike 
action was considered a significant advantage. In exchange, 
the executives accepted the unions' right to be represented 
by negotiators of their own choosing and a guarantee of 
collective bargaining aimed at resolving disputes without 
strike action. The employers also accepted an overall 
reduction in the degree of state involvement in dispute 
resolution. Provisions called for voluntary boards of 
mediation and arbitration, if desired by the parties? only 
in event of deadlock in emergency could the President 
intervene to create a government board.49 This arrangement, 
and particularly government enforcement of a strike delay 
during emergency investigations, ensured the state a strong 
presence in the settlement of emergency disputes in this 
vital sector. However, the two parties essentially had 
negotiated a return to a more voluntarist approach to
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disputes' resolution, with settlements reached independent 
of the state (except for emergencies), until the binding 
enforcement of final agreements.50
Other business organizations like the National 
Association of Manufacturers and the National Farm Bureau 
Federation condemned the act, for its alleged failure to 
protect the public interest, since it eliminated the 
automatic intervention of the state via the Railway Labor 
Board. Naturally, these groups feared that a cooperative 
labour relations regime on the railways could lead to 
increased freight rates, as labour and management conspired 
to pass exorbitant wage hikes to shippers. James Emery of 
the NAM criticized the failure to give government 
commissions power to summon papers and witnesses or to 
overrule undesirable private wage settlements. An 
interventionist proposal was offered: "power should be
lodged somewhere to suspend and if necessary modify 
agreements reached by railroads and employees which might 
be considered prejudicial to the public interest".51 Where 
their own monetary interests were at stake, employers' 
associations were thus not hesitant about inviting the 
state to intervene; this position must be contrasted with 
the associations' opposition to state intervention in 
disputes in manufacturing industries.52
h) The Emergence of American Interventionism
Thus federal government responses to industrial 
relations problems on the American railways oscillated over 
time. This reflected in part the shifting political and 
economic strength of the Railway Brotherhoods. State 
responsiveness in the late nineteenth century after serious 
labour conflicts was succeeded by indifference, and 
possible anti-union bias in the administration of the 
Erdman act. Union strength in World War I led to the most 
sympathetic administration, as crisis conditions required 
measures to placate labour. After the war, as normalcy and 
the declining economic health of railroads undermined the 
union position, the state resumed a hostile role, 
facilitating privatization and the enforced reduction of
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wartime wages. After unions reacted with a political 
organizing drive, the Republicans' recognition of labour's 
new political strength served to ensure passage of the act 
of 1926. Hence the American federal government appeared to 
be following a pattern of crisis concessions to labour 
followed by retrenchment during more "normal" periods.
As depression deepened in the early 1930s, the 
principles pioneered in railway labour legislation were 
gradually broadened to cover more of American industry. The 
American state moved in advance of Canada to encourage the 
acceptance of independent unions and regularized collective 
bargaining. These measures, supported by enlightened 
employers, proved distasteful to the majority. Managers, 
secure in their ability to run the affairs of the modern 
firm, resisted any efforts to increase the say of labour 
over the operations of modern companies. The modern 
mangers, relying on doctrines of scientific, welfare and 
personnel management, attempted to create internal 
mechanisms to meet workers' welfare concerns, wage and hour 
demands and shop floor grievances? most managers believed 
union organization should remain on a plant basis, to avoid 
the interference of outsiders.53
Naturally, this approach was condemned by union 
leaders, who criticized the lack of independence of such 
employee representation committees or company unions, and 
sought to extend their own memberships. Gradually, the 
unions secured government sanction for their viewpoint. The 
Railway Labor Act was itself strengthened to prevent the 
use of company funds to support employer dominated company 
unions, a device used to exclude bona fide independent 
trade unions. In 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia Act moved to 
limit the use of injunctions as devices to hinder labour 
organizing, or to avoid reasonable efforts to settle a 
dispute.54 These enactments set the stage for the New Deal 
era, when the modern U.S. collective bargaining regime took 
shape.
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13 Depression and New Deal in the United States
a) Employer Resistance to Union Organization
Recognition of the right of workers to organize and 
bargain collectively, without fear of interference by 
management was therefore reflected in U.S. laws from the 
late 1920s. However, the measures devised to that point 
were not entirely effective in promoting independent
labour organization owing to the continued resistance of 
management to unionization. Some business leaders had moved 
away from the earlier adamant rejection of any form of 
collective bargaining1, and sought orderly agreements and 
grievance resolution. But few accepted government sanction 
of a worker's right to select representatives in 
independent trade unions. Most companies preferred to 
establish company unions to forestall independent labour 
organization and maintain manageable worker representation 
free of the radical influences of "outside agitators". 
Resistance to legislative interference remained high and 
employers used whatever legal devices, and economic 
coercion they could apply to limit the spread of 
independent trade unions.
b) National Industrial Recovery Act. 1933
Nonetheless, extension of union organization and 
bargaining rights was an important element in early New 
Deal legislation. The National Industrial Recovery Act of 
1933 contained a provision, Section 7(a), which ex­
plicitly reiterated workers' rights to independent 
representation and organization free of employer 
discrimination? the Act seemed to give government sanction 
to the spread of unions. Not surprisingly, the measure 
drew support from the AFL and other unionists, as a 
positive contribution to labour rights to organize and 
bargain collectively . This was particularly so after unions 
succeeded in securing amendements to prohibit company 
unions.3 Endorsement at AFL conventions was initially 
enthusiastic, and complaints centred not on government 
intrusion into private relationships, but on the lack of
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effective enforcement of the new labour provisions.4 If some 
still expressed concern that government's new power could 
eventually be used to restrict worker freedom and union 
strength, most voluntarists could accept the Act. It
strengthened union ability to negotiate in private
bargaining with employers, and thus fitted into that class 
of supportive legislation which voluntarists had long 
considered acceptable. And the virulence of employer 
resistance to unionization, coupled with the unfavourable 
depression conditions, convinced many unionists of the need 
to seek government assistance to increase union ability to 
organize and confront management5. As with Canadian 
unionists, recognition of their weakness in relation to 
business convinced union leaders to accept government 
involvement.
A strong element among business still believed
independent unions would mean disaster, and resisted 
adoption of Section 7(a) by Congress. Business leaders 
certainly did not want any changes which would disrupt 
existing relations with workers and require acceptance of 
"outside” unions. Critics from the National Association of 
Manufacturers derided this "forced acceptance of the
closed shop" as a "congressionally assisted union 
membership drive"6. Only a few business leaders publicly 
departed from the NAM viewpoint. It has been suggested that 
business opposition represented a reactionary rearguard 
action by small businesses unable to meet the wage demands 
of strong unions. However, the NAM by that time represented 
mostly large manufacturing concerns, of the type deemed 
most "progressive"; clearly the business mainstream saw 
harm in any government sanctioning of increased 
unionization.7
Despite these protests, the business community was not 
seriously concerned about the final content of 7(a). Rival
proposals current at the time - for a thirty hour week
(with no reduction in pay) to combat unemployment, or 
permanent state economic planning - were certainly more
dreaded8. Many business leaders wanted some form of
collective bargaining to force recalcitrant wage slashers
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into line, so wage rates and prices could be stabilized and 
cut-throat competition eliminated; wage stability could 
also undermine the arguments of union organizers peddling 
independent organization as a guarantee against 
unpredictable wage reductions.9
In addition, "from management's standpoint the final 
version left ample opportunity to avoid dealing with trade 
unions. 'Labor Organization' [the phrase used] was broad 
enough to include trade unions, unaffiliated independent 
unions and company unions".10 Business merely had to ensure 
that the measure was not interpreted stringently to exclude 
company unions. Business could also see the political 
advantages of including 7(a) to balance the concessions 
made to business via the suspension of anti-trust.11 Since 
either direct repression or labour revolt presented 
untenable and undesirable alternatives, "[rjecognition of 
trade unions by Section 7(a) would [hopefully] appeal to 
the interests of the established union bureaucracy which 
could then control any attempt at militancy by the rank and 
file".12 Hence business leaders concentrated thier efforts 
on resisting stronger provisions13.
But business certainly hoped to avoid the implication 
that 7(a) eliminated the open shop or forbade the use of 
company unions and insisted that the provisions did not 
require acceptance of "radical" AFL organizations. Business 
conducted a campaign of resistance to independent unions 
which led to violent strikes and fuelled the spread of 
company unions, perhaps the greatest immediate effect of 
7(a). Whenever the National Labour Relations Board sought 
to intervene against recalcitrant employers, injunctions 
were sought to delay recognition proceedings, often 
effectively thwarting organization bids. To be sure, even 
the granting of rights to form into company unions 
potentially generated worker contact and solidarity which 
later could be turned toward independent labour activity. 
However, the conservative strategy of the AFL leaders, as 
concerned to prevent the spread of dual or industrial 
unionism as of company unions, contributed to a failure to 
take full advantage of the provision, since its usefulness
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in organizing newer mass production industries was 
minimized. The NIRA regime was therefore not a serious 
threat to business as usual in industrial relations? 
although in the long term, the impetus to organization 
provided by company unions may have fuelled labour demands 
for independent unions.
Some observers believe the progressive administration 
of Franklin Roosevelt was responsible for the labour provi­
sions of the NIRA. Having opted to promote economic 
recovery via the suspension of anti-trust, the 
administration sought to balance matters by strengthening 
unions to act as policemen of the labour dimensions of 
ensuing trade agreements14? the executive branch may also 
have sought to encourage labour electoral support for 
Roosevelt by extending these important concessions15. But, 
by other accounts, Roosevelt was unenthusiastic about 
direct use of government auspices to encourage union 
organization, preferring to leave organization to private 
union efforts and to provide protection for union rights 
once recognition was won in private dealings.16
Once the labour provisions were incorporated into the 
NRA, the administration position was ambiguous:
[o]fficially it stood committed to the program of 
self-organization announced in 7a. But in 
administering 7a, it could not outrun the actual 
power situation. Where labour leadership was 
strong, as in coal and the needle trades, 7a 
benefitted labour. Where labour leadership was 
weak, as in steel or automobiles, 7a could not 
make up the deficit. ... In practice, government 
became less the impartial administrator of a law 
than a battleground of conflicting forces, some 
favouring the rise of an independent labour 
movement, others reflecting the apprehensions 
of the employers.17
Disappointment with enforcement led to creation first 
of a National Labor Board and later a National Labor 
Relations Board to oversee cases. Rivalries developed 
between the National Labor Relations Board, in charge of 
immediate proceedings in disputes over recognition and 
bargaining rights, and the National Recovery
Administration? the latter overarching body adopted a more 
conservative approach to collective bargaining which
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hampered the extension of government intervention in 
recognition elections and facilitated employer resistance 
to the spread of trade unions18. The National Labor 
Relations Board saw its jurisdiction eroded by combined 
resistance of business and the NRA; "the board had no 
effective means of forcing an unwilling employer to 
comply", an acute problem since "much of industry simply 
refused to cooperate"19. The uncertainty of the admin­
istration rendered it unable to resolve these problems.
c) Development of the Wagner Act
The declining enforcement of 7(a) was eventually 
reversed not by administration action but by 
congressional response to labour pressure. Led by Senator 
Robert Wagner, Congress acted to give labour not only 
paternalistic social security but also the ability to 
assert itself in collective bargaining with employers. 
Considering labour's right to organize as essential to 
democracy, Wagner also expected increased bargaining 
power to lead to a fairer distribution of the fruits 
of production throughout society. This would result in a 
healthier economy, since the tendency to overproduction 
would be cured if purchasing power were more widely 
diffused. Economic peace, obtained through a reduction of 
costly disputes over union recognition, would also 
contribute to industrial recovery.20
Wagner hence introduced a measure which would enforce 
effectively the proscriptions on employer interference with 
labour organization and encourage the regularized 
resolution of recognition strikes. This bill affirmed the 
workers' right to independent organization, outlawed 
discrimination against activists, provided for majority 
selection of representatives of an entire bargaining unit 
in free elections, required good faith bargaining by 
employers with representatives so chosen, enjoined employer 
subsidies for company unions, and established permanent 
boards to resolve disputes over recognition. Wagner's 
approach used the state to ensure increased effectiveness 
of the private bargaining process: Schlesinger suggests
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this represented a departure from the New Dealer's 
paternalistic progressivism, which "thought instinctively 
in terms of government's doing things for working people 
rather than of giving the unions power to win workers 
their own victories"21. The act represented a qualitative 
change in the role of the federal government in labour 
matters: "Government shifted from what was essentially a 
laissez-faire position (intervening mainly to prevent 
violence or major economic disruptions) to the role of 
rule-maker and umpire in the collective bargaining game".22
d) Union Response
Since it reinforced union bargaining strength, the 
measure drew support initially from the AFL.23 This union 
watched with dismay as enforcement of NIRA proved 
ineffective. Union spokesmen echoed Wagner's call for
the strengthening of union bargaining power to increase 
wages and promote economic stability.25 Most importantly, 
the Act forbade employer interference in union 
organization, by coercion, persuasion or financial
contribution; this measure was welcomed as a means of
displacing the dreaded company unions. Labour leaders also 
supported the enhancement of democracy inherent in the 
guaranteed selection of representatives by majority vote26. 
The experience under 7 (a) coupled with increased employer 
resistance to unions had convinced many that there was 
something to be gained from government intervention 
to ensure union recognition27.
The supportive attitude of the National Labor
Relations Board in matters of recognition and 
prevention of discrimination against unionists were 
reassuring to a union movement accustomed to distrusting 
state agencies28. But the AFL recognized the inadequacy of 
existing legislation: "There were loopholes in procedure 
that enabled every employer unwilling to concede labour the 
right to organize to carry Board decisions into the courts 
and thus secure delays effectively defeating the purpose of 
section 7 (a)".29 When the NLRB ultimately proved unable 
to effectively overcome such employer resistance, the AFL
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became committed to the Wagner plan. New legislation was 
essential to correct the unbalanced enforcement of NIRA 
since increased employer organization had not been matched 
by adequate unionization.30 The legislation was also seen 
as a corrective for the natural imbalance in bargaining 
power between labour and business in a capitalist system.31
The AFL*s acceptance of stronger state regulation of 
industrial relations did indicate a move away from 
earlier staunch rejection of government intervention. In 
Bernstein*s words, "the AFL was now firmly committed to 
legislation, voluntarism, like last year's bonnet, being 
cast into discard".32 Some AFL spokesmen even seemed 
sympathetic to calls for wider redistribution of material 
wealth, albeit in an American capitalist framework.33 The 
Wagner bill was seen as a "constructive statement of the 
fundamental principles which motivate the workers in their 
struggle to realize the rights which ... are essential to 
build up an approach to justice in our system of wealth 
production and distribution"? opponents of the proposal 
were condemned as opposing "freedom".34
But wariness of government remained35. The Federation 
intended to ensure that "the extent of federal 
intervention was restricted to effective guarantees of 
freedom to organize and bargain collectively, leaving 
determination of the substance of both processes in the 
hands of the parties directly concerned."36 In addition, 
the AFL leaders sought to obtain a strong position in 
the enforcement and administration of the new legislation, 
so that they could influence its implementation and 
impact.37 The AFL proposals "reflected a specific attempt 
to safeguard the freedom of the established national
unions to formulate their own organizing strategy and ... 
[to protect] established rights", particularly against new 
industrial unions seeking to expand into traditional AFL 
domains.38 The "unprecedented authority the bill gave to 
a public agency, though perhaps unnerving, seemed a
necessary price to pay to overcome employer
intransigence.1,39 But the AFL was determined to influence 
the direction of use of this new found power; there was
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particular concern once it became apparent that the 
aggressive organizing tactics of the rival Congress of 
Industrial Organizations were assisted by the Wagner 
provisions.
e) Employer Opposition
Employer associations, saw Wagner as a radicalization 
and extension of the disagreeable elements of 7(a). The 
legislation "was opposed by organized industry with a force 
and fervour and expenditure of funds perhaps 
unparalleled".40 Led by the National Association of 
Manufacturers, the business community fought against the 
measure from Congressional committee until after enactment. 
The act was attacked on constitutional grounds41 as 
unwarranted interference with the freedom of contract 
between employers and individual workmen.42 Employers were 
critical of the restrictions on company unions, which 
were considered a limitation on the free choice of 
employees.43 They also attacked the closed shop and 
majority rule provisions, seen as impositions on the rights 
of minorities.44 They scorned the duty to bargain 
provisions as a "pious wish", and as inappropriate for 
legislative action.45
Spokesmen criticized the bill's apparent failure to 
impose any restrictions on union coercion of prospective 
members or threats against employer property, to match 
the specific prohibitions on employer interference, 
intimidation or discrimination. The Commercial and 
Financial Chronicle called it "one of the most 
objectionable, as well as one of the most 
revolutionary pieces of legislation ever presented to 
Congress." It would invite "unions to use without 
restraint or responsibility, the most dangerous weapons 
of social coercion".46 Accordingly, business conducted 
an increased campaign of resistance to unions, resorting 
to legal devices,47 strikebreakers, intimidation, spies, 
discrimination, use of vigilantes and incitement to 
violence.48
There were a few progressive business leaders who
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supported the strengthening of NIRA's labour provisions.
In testimony on Senator Wagner's proposed amendments, Wood
F. Axton, a tobacco industry spokesman, argued:
My experience has convinced me that organized 
labour is a great constructive force in the 
betterment of economic growth .... the
application of this philosophy has made
consistently for the betterment of conditions of 
employment and progress of my company.
Established unions were a stabilizing force, for Mr. Axton
continued, they "prevented agitation from the outside and
radical agitation from the inside". The unions and
collective agreements prevented the constant raising of
trivial complaints by individual workers or agitators and
regularized the raising and resolving of grievances.49
Citing U.K. experience with strong unions, which did not
make British industry "socialistic", H.M. Robertson hoped
"the proposed bill will facilitate the organization of
labour to the ultimate benefit not only of the workers but
of industry itself"50. R.G. Wagenet, Director of the New
York Building Congress, declared: "the Wagner bill, by
establishing equalization of bargaining power will mean
more stable management for American industry" and will
reduce costs for security against violence and upheaval.51
These were voices of a small minority and were not echoed
by any of the major business organizations.
f) Evolution of Attitudes and Policy
Attitudes towards state action had therefore reversed 
since the railway labour amendments of the 1920s. The 
labour unions had come to see the federal government as a * 
potential ally in efforts to extend their organization. The 
actual gains to labour may have been limited since 
enforcement again left something to be desired; ultimately 
the benefits accrued only to rather conservative labour 
organizations, who may have gained at the expense of more 
radical, politically motivated or class conscious 
alternatives. But the perception of these representatives 
was at least temporarily positive.
On the other hand, business had become less enamoured 
of the state and its impact. If the deradicalization
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attained by the Wagner provisions was ultimately beneficial 
to capitalists, some businessmen could only see the 
inconvenience of dealing with any outside unions, let alone 
ones whose power was strengthened with the aid of the 
federal administration. Clearly, in this moment of crisis, 
the state had temporarily moved away from its customary 
adherence to the wishes of prominent employer groups, and 
acted contrary to the expressed wishes of some business 
sectors52. It would only be with hindsight that the benefits 
of Wagner would come to be appreciated, and this only after 
alterations in favour of business, after the emergency and 
threat of radicalization had subsided.
This alteration in positions reflects the ideological 
inconsistency of these two important interest groups. 
Rather than judge according to any consistent idea of 
the proper sphere of government, business and labour 
positions reflected an assessment of the immediate impact 
of labour legislation on their own interests. This is 
borne out in the labour case, since the AFL position 
became less supportive after it became clear the Wagner Act 
had assisted in the spread of the industrial unions. The 
Congress of Industrial Organizations, which broke from the 
AFL in 1935, quickly became the most significant rival for 
labour loyalties to have appeared in decades. The 
willingness of the NLRB to intervene in recognition 
disputes between AFL and CIO affiliates made the AFL wary 
of the usefulness of Wagner provisions, since recognition 
elections often went in favour of the aggressive 
organizers of the new rival.53 The NLRB explicitly 
rejected the jurisdictional boundaries (i.e. crafts) 
which the AFL considered sacrosanct. Leading Board members 
urged organized labour to consider the new industrial 
model as a possible unit of labour representation which
would keep pace with the changing nature of American
industry. The spectre of government interference with 
the rights of existing unions seemed set to become reality 
as the NLRB used its authority in a manner which
encouraged new unions to challenge AFL affiliates. The
Wagner Act sparked a remarkable period of industrial union
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expansion: "without government support, unionism and
collective bargaining in the mass production industries 
would not have taken hold in a period of mass unemployment.
.. . The New Deal government ... provided the decisive 
counterforce to the corporate resistance, which was
powerful and bitter".54
As the CIO scored increasing victories in recognition 
disputes, AFL spokesmen could be heard among the critics of 
the Wagner Act, and advocated reforms to reduce its
potential use to displace existing AFL union locals through 
new recognition elections. Some AFL spokesmen began to 
demand repeal of the Act or to support claims of its 
unconstitutionality. As Dan Tobin phrased it: "[b]etter to 
fight the antagonisms of the employers against 
organizations of labour than to have the power and the
machinery and the right of labour to settle its own
disputes within itself, destroyed".55 Condemning the
"excessive readiness" of some unionists to endorse 
government action, the AFL conservatives did not regard 
legislation as a cure all. Mirroring the Canadian 
unionists' view of IDIA, "they did not deny the value of 
legislation but insisted that it should be used only when 
labour's bargaining power was ineffective".56 Not 
surprisingly, the CIO did not join in this complete 
condemnation of Wagner, and despite some reservations 
remained more supportive of maintaining and extending 
government involvement in labour matters.57
On the part of business the earlier support for 
government supervision reflected the sympathetic cast of 
the railway labour policy of the Republican administration 
and the Railroad Labor Board. Given the aggressive 
pro-union emphasis of the NLRB, business altered its 
attitude and opposed state action in the 1930s. In 
essence, business feared the "proposed law would do more 
to foster trade union growth than had the NRA".58 In fact, 
this is what occurred. And the corresponding increase in 
the bargaining strength and militancy of trade unions was 
to fuel still further the wrath of employers, who mounted 
a strident campaign to impose state sponsored
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limitations on the new found power of labour. Indeed, the 
success of this campaign would again lead to a reversal of 
attitudes towards government action by both classes by the 
end of the next decade. But efforts to change government 
policy did not reflect a desire or expectation to eliminate 
state intervention in labour relations matters. Most 
business leader realized the new state prominence in labour 
relations with appropriate amendments "could be used to 
help management reduce labour power, restrict union 
influence, and create a stable framework of law within 
which businessmen were happy to live and operate".59 As in 
the past, both parties sought to utilize state power and 
resources to promote their own ends.
The New Deal collective bargaining policy did increase 
the level of government intervention to unprecedented 
levels? it affirmed the influence of interventionist 
progressive public ideologies, as state actors extended 
what was seen as their legitimate role in settling 
industrial disputes in the public interest. It "represented 
a natural extension of a process that had been evolving 
since the turn of the century in respect to national 
labour-management policy."60 Sentiment among state actors 
had long favoured this enhanced role? it was recommended by 
the Commission on Industrial Relations in 1915, backed 
during the war by Wilson's War Labor Conference board, 
enforced by the War Labor Board during the conflict, and 
advocated as permanent policy by the administration in the 
Industrial Conferences at war's end. But prior to the great 
depression, business opposition had always succeeded in 
dissuading politicians from pursuing the ideal. It was only 
with this crisis - and its resultant weakening of business 
influence and heightened fears of labour radicalization, 
that the state could attain the autonomy necessary to act 
in decisive fashion. The opponents of state action among 
business, labour leaders and conservative congressmen, were 
temporarily unable to resist this initiative. After crisis 
subsided, and state-business relations entered a more 
normal phase, the situation would again reverse, with 
important consequences for the nature of industrial
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relations legislation.
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14 War and Cold War American Policy
a) Wartime Policy Innovations
American labour's distrust of state involvement in 
disputes' resolution increased during World War Two. The 
ordinary regime in labour relations was supplanted by 
state-sponsored disputes' resolution which left little room 
for free collective bargaining. The Smith-Connally War 
Labor Disputes Act contained strong emergency provisions 
for state intervention to resolve disputes, including delay 
of strikes pending presidential investigation, (which 
extended the railroad model of the 1920s to other 
industries). While the wartime administration enforced 
labour's right to representation and freedom from 
discrimination, wage freezes and strike bans were common, 
severely limiting labour's scope for negotiation, despite 
its strong bargaining position. Increased corporate- 
government cooperation in this crisis weakened labour's 
position by the end of the conflict, creating a fear that 
the strong new federal powers could be employed by a 
less sympathetic administration to restrict labour rights. 
For labour leaders, peacetime requirements would best be 
met by a return to the democratic model of collective 
bargaining, rather than a retention of authoritative 
state decisions.1
Management also had doubts about the desirability of 
wartime state interventions. Maintenance of membership 
clauses and entrenched grievance procedures impinged upon 
managerial discretion in the conduct of business.2 Business 
also criticised the increasing centralization of union 
organizations, which created more powerful opponents. These 
criticisms merged with a more generalized attack on the 
New Deal approach of increased government action; in 
Tomlins' words: "this entrepreneurial antipathy towards 
unions and "pro-union" labor relations policies merged with 
renewed conservative condemnations of New Deal social and 
economic policy to become a widespread assault on 
"collectivism" and on the administrative state which had 
fostered it".3
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b) Business Assault on the Wagner Act
Whether the New Deal collective bargaining policy 
was in fact pro-union in its impact could be debated. 
Court interpretations of the Wagner Act ensured that it 
did not entail a major infringement of management's ability 
to conduct business according to its desires.4 The National 
Labor Relations Board also amended its practice in accord 
with the changing climate through the "relaxation of 
strictures on management and imposition of them upon 
employees and unions", especially after World War Two. For 
instance, the Board supported management in its efforts to 
enjoin as unlawful strikes called by a new rival union to 
unseat an incumbent, certified union.5
Nonetheless, business leaders attempted to exploit 
the difficult post-war economic circumstances and the 
increased anti-labour climate to reduce state protection 
for unions. New legislation was advocated to curb union 
"abuses" and eliminate perceived inequalities in the intent 
and impact of the Wagner Act.6 A post-war epidemic of 
strikes caused by jurisdictional rivalries and high wage 
demands (to catch up after war-time wage restrictions) 
added impetus to business concerns.7 Corporate leaders 
beleived that labour was too powerful and was foisting its 
demands on society as a result of the biased New Deal 
policy.8 Led by national organizations like the National 
Association of Manufacturers, business campaigned to end 
labour's "monopoly" position.9
Discontent with existing legislation did not produce 
a desire to eliminate state intervention in industrial 
relations matters. Leading business advocates sought to 
employ the state for their purposes, rather than to return 
to laissez-faire in industrial relations.10 Corporate 
management "had discovered that federal regulation of labor 
relations could be to its advantage if government entered 
on the side of 'order' and against the exercise of labor 
power, where that was overwhelming".11 Hence business 
efforts sought amendments to federal collective bargaining 
and organization policies to prevent the development of
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unions able to bargain from a position of strength on an 
industry-wide basis; such powerful unions hurt competition 
and contributed to inflation through artificial imposition 
of industry-wide contracts.12 On the other hand, business 
recognized that voter discontent with unions was real but 
limited, and would not sanction a wholesale dismantling of 
organization and bargaining guarantees.13
Accordingly, management avoided a pious invocation of 
laissez faire. Rhetorically, some spokesmen referred to the 
need to "minimize the direct intervention of government in 
labor disputes", based on "the assumption that under 
competitive capitalism, the economic functions of govern­
ment are limited". But in fact proposals actually called 
for clearer administrative machinery, "remedial 
legislation" to correct imbalances of Norris-LaGuardia and 
Wagner, and increased regulation of unions through anti­
trust and enforced decentralization.14 As Harris observes, 
at the 1945 Management-Labor Conference sponsored by 
President Truman, management proposals
displayed a new sophistication, a readiness to 
use the law selectively to assist in the solution 
of labor relations problems rather than to seek 
freedom from legislative intervention and 
administrative action. The latter were welcome, 
provided they were on the right side, helping 
management to deal with, and to get the better 
of, a powerful labor movement that existed and 
would continue.15
After the conference, management plans indicated
recognition that, given the "monopolistic" power of unions
in certain circumstances, private bargaining could not
provide a complete solution. "Only further government
intervention, in the right spirit, could measure up to the
task".16
Having recognized the usefulness of the state, it 
remained for business spokesmen to reconcile the 
conflicting demands of rival factions. Conservative 
spokesmen from large heavy industries like automobiles and 
steel, wanted strict limits imposed on the scope of 
bargaining, the types of eligible union members, and the 
acceptable forms of strike action. Their aim was to limit 
collective bargaining to a narrow realm? some spokesmen,
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like that of Chrysler, continued virulent opposition to any 
collective bargaining, which was regarded as "an assault on 
liberty, as an evil thing which is against the public 
interest, as something which will increase poverty .... one 
chick in the foul brood of vultures that seek to pick meat 
from the bones of honest men".17 Liberals, like President 
Johnson of the United States Chamber of Commerce, preferred 
to accept the current legal rights to organization and 
collective bargaining in return for a continuation of a no 
strike pledge by union leaders into the reconversion 
period.18
However, most business leaders opted for a middle 
path, seeking major changes to the Wagner Act to restore 
"balance" to labour relations law. Business advocated a ban 
on coercion for or against union organization by any 
source; a requirement that unions bargain in good faith? 
compulsory adherence to the terms of a collective agreement 
once signed? a restriction of bargaining to single 
employer units or firms? a prohibition on jurisdictional or 
sympathy strikes, and secondary boycotts? a ban on union 
security clauses in contracts19? a ban on supervisors
unions? and restoration of employer "free speech" in
• • • •  • • • • 20 countering union positions during recognition disputes. In
short, business mounted a selective attack on perceived
union abuses.21 For business , collective bargaining "must
be freed from artificial restraints wrapped around it by
poor laws" and "from the exercise of monopolistic power
... by unions ... on a scale far beyond any ever dreamed of
by now outlawed business combines in their heyday".22 The
"public interest" demanded an end to the damage of monopoly
practices like secondary boycotts, mass picketing and
pol itical strikes.23
c) The Taft-Hartlev Act. 1947
The Taft-Hartley Act as finally adopted over 
President Truman*s veto contained significant changes 
of Wagner Act policy. Supervisory personnel were excluded 
from the category of employees and the right of 
employees not to participate in unions was strengthened.
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Restrictions were imposed on employee activities in 
pursuit of collective agreements, encouragement was 
extended to craft organizations, and Board authority to 
resolve jurisdictional disputes between rival craft and 
industrial unions was increased. The Board was empowered 
to obtain injunctions to aid in the resolution of disputes; 
while the business demand that private industry reacquire 
this right was denied, the Board was required to respond 
to business complaints and seek injunctions in damaging 
disputes. Strikes could also be delayed pending reports by 
Presidential Commission for up to 80 days. Registration of 
unions, accompanied by financial statements and
affidavits disavowing communist leanings were required for 
certified bargaining agents. The closed shop was banned 
for all employers under federal jurisdiction and support 
of a majority of all employees in a unit (as against the 
majority of those voting) was required for certification. 
Encouragement was given to mediation, conciliation and 
formal grievance procedures. Unlawful union practices 
were specified and lawsuits for breach of contract were 
facilitated. The Act distinguished unions from other 
voluntary associations; since union security provisions 
gave these organizations considerable power over their 
membership, Congress believed itself justified in 
regulating their internal affairs, to guarantee the rights 
of the rank and file.25
The NAM was influential in initiating these changes26, 
and business certainly exalted at the outcome.27 But 
business pressure cannot be given exclusive credit. The 
prevalence of damaging industrial disputes, stemming 
often from jurisdictional conflicts or secondary boycotts 
to assist other unions, created the backdrop against which 
congressional and administrative actors and public opinion 
moved towards restrictive legislation.28 Postwar inflation, 
the result of problems of transition to a peacetime 
economy, was blamed by critics on the wage demands of 
unions, prompting calls for a reduction of union power.
In Congress itself, a significant conservative faction 
had emerged after the elections of 1946. This involved a
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coalition of rural Republicans and southern Democrats, 
joined against the urban peril of union monopoly. 
Responding in part to an overall climate of reaction 
against New Deal approaches - encouraged but not created by 
business propaganda campaigns - Congress considered bills 
which went further than the official NAM line and reflected 
the conservative minority preference.29 The House of 
Representatives, over-representative of rural areas, put 
forward a highly restrictive bill. Senate pressure 
moderated the final outcome. But despite the opposition of 
administrative actors, including the President30, this 
restrictive measure was adopted as law with few changes 
from the major demands of business.31
d) Union Criticism
Labour leaders expressed vitriolic criticism of the 
measure and the Congress which passed it.32 Prominent among 
the targets of critics was the so called "cooling off 
period" of 80 days.33 This was rejected as unnecessary by 
unionists? most collective bargaining agreements already 
included a provision for advance notice before strike 
action or termination of a contract to permit negotiation 
for changes to occur in orderly fashion. Union leaders 
feared the enforced delay in the right to strike would be 
used by employers to stall, to prepare for a lengthy strike 
and ultimately to defeat unions in disputes. In terms 
reminiscent of Canadian IDIA critics these spokesmen 
feared: "[i]f employers know unions cannot strike for a 
specified time, they will not negotiate in good faith".34 
Unions only employed strikes as a last resort after all 
efforts at peaceful resolution had been exhausted; if a 
period of unproductive delay were introduced, the workers 
might feel added frustration or pressure to strike and 
numbers of strikes would likely be increased. This 
provision would promote "a state of involuntary servitude 
which is abhorrent to our way of life" by forcing men to 
stay on the job under intolerable conditions and 
"[crippling] the right to strike, which is the inalienable 
and constitutional democratic right of our working
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people".35 The terms of this debate thus paralleled Canada's 
earlier discussions, as the United States government seemed 
to match its northern neighbour in degree of intervention 
in labour disputes.
Labour leaders were critical of the removal of what 
were seen as the equalizing effects of Wagner on an 
inherently inequitable balance of power in industrial 
relations.36 Unions needed the protection and encouragement 
of the state in collective organization and bargaining 
because they were at a disadvantage in dealing with 
employers who controlled their livelihood.37 The laws of the 
1930s had merely prevented industry from using its power in 
an unnatural or unjust fashion; they forbade efforts to 
prevent "trade unions from carrying out their legitimate
m 7 0  , 1 ' 1 ' • ........
role in our economy" . The International Association of 
Machinists feared the "Taft-Hartley law, by disrupting the 
tendency to balanced power brought about by previously 
enacted labor legislation, has made it possible for 
industry once again to have recourse to unnatural powers, 
and ... it lends the services of the federal government to 
industry in the exercise of these powers."39 The 
re introduction of injunctions40, the "right to work"
ita
provisions , and reduced enforcement of union workshop 
rules42 were also criticized: by increasing the power of 
business in negotiations, the act would "aggravate the 
unbalance [sic] between wages, prices and profits which 
already endangers our prosperity".43
These and other criticisms of the Act by the AFL44, 
CIO45, and other unions46 undermined labour's support for 
government intervention in labour matters. George Meany, 
Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL, decried the subservience 
of Congress to reactionary business interests, seeking to 
"restore the old conditions of vast inequality between the 
individual worker and employer, to return to the medieval 
concept of master and servant, with the master arbitrarily 
commanding and the servant meekly submitting".47 By 
proscribing vital union bargaining techniques, and limiting 
political activities by unions48, the Act restored the 
hostile role of the state in industrial relations and
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revived union opposition to government intervention49; the 
Act showed that "government interferes now on the side of 
the employer to delay the exercise of union rights”.50 The 
measure certainly gave credence to voluntarists' claims 
that any augmentation of state action, even through 
favourable laws like Wagner, would eventually facilitate 
restrictive measures.51 While advocates of the law claimed 
hostility was confined to labour leaders52, the massive 
pressure from unions calling on President Truman to veto 
the measure is indisputable.53 The union campaign to repeal 
the measure was continuous for years after its inception.54
Despite their concerns about the measure, and their 
apparent awareness of business strategy,55 labour leaders 
were perhaps ineffectual in using the opportunities at 
their disposal to influence the draft legislation. The 
leaders of both the CIO and the AFL refused to concede 
that any abuses in the use of jurisdictional and secondary 
strikes existed or suggest any constructive compromises for 
legislation.56 In the political climate of the day this 
failure was crucial. The Congress was convinced of the need 
to implement remedial legislation, and widespread strike 
action - plus inflation conveniently blamed on unwarranted 
union wage demands - had created a climate of opinion 
unfavourable to the union viewpoint. Certainly, the union 
movement was on the defensive: "Labor looked more like a 
reactive than an initiating force in the process of social 
change? a weak institution in a powerfully organized, 
pervasively capitalist society”. While business did not 
create all its opportunities in the post war climate, "it 
certainly seized them" and thereby "was the dynamic force 
in the shaping of the environment"57 in which industrial 
relations transpired for the next decades. Although the 
administration accepted many of labour's criticisms, and 
maintained pressure for repeal of the Act, Congressional 
support could never be secured.58
e) The Impact of Taft-Hartlev
In practice, the Taft-Hartley law fulfilled neither 
the hopes of business leaders nor the fears of union
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bosses. It did not become a "slave labor" law infringing 
the rights of union organization. It did aid some anti­
union firms in resisting union expansion; organizers were 
hampered in some cases by "right to work laws" which 
restricted their recruitment tactics. Anti-communist 
campaigns were assisted and radical unions were encouraged 
to behave more "responsibly". Politically, the Act 
reassured business that the uncertainty and dangers of the 
New Deal period were receding and business dominance in 
national politics was being restored. But the exact nature 
of its impact was still subject to specific economic 
conditions and to the precise conduct of industrial 
negotiations. And the hastily drafted provisions often 
produced disappointing results from a business viewpoint. 
Problems of featherbedding, union shop, fringe benefit 
bargaining and so on continued to trouble business leaders. 
In general, Taft-Hartley "provided a legal framework for 
labor relations within which business would be happy to 
operate. But it had not provided all the answers".59
Labour maintained its agitation through the 1950s for 
the repeal of Taft-Hartley. Experience under the Act 
revealed its tendency to increase the litigious nature of 
industrial relations, with a plethora of injunctions, 
damage suits and criminal prosecutions hampering labour 
union organization and collective bargaining.60 Every 
opportunity was taken to pressure Congress to remove the 
new restrictions and return to the Wagner Act regime. On a 
couple of occasions, this pressure resulted in serious 
Congressional considerations of repeal or replacement. 
However, business vigilance and counterpressure ensured 
that the pro-business Congress and administration of the 
Eisenhower years would not act to weaken the Taft-Hartley 
policy. After 1953-54, labour abandoned high profile 
efforts to alter Taft-Hartley, recognizing the 
intransigence of the conservative Congress. Labour also 
feared that, by raising the question of amendments, it was 
opening the possibility for even more undesirable 
legislation, given the agitation of business and the anti­
labour tenor of the times. Unions thus contented themselves
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with preventing adoption of harsher measures.61
f) Business Demands for Stricter Regulation
Business pressed through the 1950s for even greater
state regulation including precise controls on the internal
organization and activity of unions, seeking path-breaking
intrusions into the affairs of voluntary associations in
American life.62 This approach was fuelled by reports of
internal union corruption: racketeering, questionable
financial transactions, undemocratic local union practices,
violation of union members' rights, and conflicts of
interest.63 Evidence mounted through the 1950s of the spread
of these abuses to major unions like the Teamsters and
Longshoremen. Many of the practices were revealed by
investigations initiated by the AFL and CIO? others were
uncovered by the Congressional McClellan Committee. Key
union spokesmen condemned these abuses; errant affiliates
were expelled and some union leaders endorsed remedial
legislation, calling for full financial disclosure, with
prosecution for abuses.64
While these activities evoked concern, employer
organizations had motivations other than protection of
union members' rights in mind in seeking new legislation.
Thus the United States Chamber of Commerce
admitted that its major interest in labor reform 
legislation was to restrict the alleged excessive 
power of unions. The problem, according to the 
Chamber, was not whether the rights of union 
members were properly guaranteed but whether the 
institution of unionism as practised today offers 
a major threat to national well-being.65
The National Association of Manufacturers' President Milton
Lightner also complained that the "power of a few large
unions, grown to monopolistic proportions in most of our
basic industries, has undermined some of the fundamental
principles of sound economic management along with some of
the fundamental freedoms of -our nation's economic faith,
ultimately affecting all of America's people”.66 Not
surprisingly, business leaders were unimpressed with labour
efforts to address the problem of corruption and abuse of
authority within union ranks? ethical union government
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simply did not address the chief concerns of business 
leaders unhappy with the emergence of influential unions.67
As Congress began consideration of bills to eliminate 
corruption and encourage labour efforts to reform from
within, business leaders pressed for more sweeping
• • 68 • legislation. . "Employer groups and powerful forces within
Congress wanted to use the McClellan disclosures as a base
for a campaign to restrict the powers of unions in
• • • 69 •collective bargaining". Business concerns revolved around 
such issues as recognition and jurisdictional picketing, 
hot cargo agreements (whereby unions refused to handle 
cargo or use materials from a plant where workers were on 
strike or where non-union labour was employed) and other 
powerful devices employed to back union demands70. Compul­
sory union membership and dues, which swelled organized 
labour's ranks, and union political contributions and 
activity, which increased labour's influence in government, 
were also criticized.71 In this, business found support from 
the Eisenhower administration which in 1956 proposed new 
restrictions on the rights of unions to use boycott methods 
and "blackmail" picketing.72
g) Labour Vacillation and Opposition
Many union leaders were supportive of legislation to 
address internal abuses73. They were concerned about the 
negative publicity and were anxious to appear cooperative, 
recognizing that "some further convincing steps were 
necessary to rebuild the waning prestige of labor as a law- 
abiding group worthy of public respect. Since the problem 
was not amenable to correction from within the labor 
movement itself, the necessity for action by the federal 
government was clearly indicated".74 But labour had its own 
agenda, which involved reversal of the most undesirable 
features of Taft-Hartley. Union leaders held out for such 
things as special union shop rules for the construction 
industry, right of economic strikers to vote in 
representation elections, a narrowing of the categories of 
workers excluded from unionization as supervisory workers, 
and other changes to the Taft-Hartley provisions. And
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unionists were wary of the particular proposals debated in 
Congress, which appeared to some to infringe upon the 
rights of legitimate law-abiding unions.75 The Kennedy-Ives 
proposals of 1957 met most of the AFL-CIO's chief concerns, 
and included a regimen of internal regulation which the 
AFL-CIO considered acceptable; it was still attacked by 
unions like the Teamsters and Mine Workers.76
Ironically, with some labour voluntarists critical of 
new legislation, and some labour leaders holding out for 
more beneficial measures, labour's uncertain stance may 
have strengthened the conservatives' hand.77 Labour 
criticism of moderate proposals in Congress contributed to 
their defeat78? by keeping the issue alive, labour thereby 
created the opportunity for its opponents to seek even more 
restrictive legislation.79 As consideration continued, AFL- 
CIO leaders demonstrated an unwillingness to support propo­
sals for a legislated "Bill of Rights" for union members,
objecting to the provisions incorporated by Senator 
80 • •McClellan. Unionists feared the extension of government 
authority to regulate the internal affairs of unions and 
the burdensome reporting requirements; they also doubted 
the efficacy of laws designed to enhance union democracy.81
However, the AFL-CIO's policy of insisting on a 
perfect measure - based on their confidence after the 
election of more pro-labour members in Congressional 
elections in 1958 - gave the appearance of recalcitrance, 
thus assisting those portraying labour as unwilling to 
reform of their own accord.82 In the end, labour appears to 
have squandered the opportunity to secure favourable 
amendments and opened the possibility for restrictive 
measures favoured by business, Congressional conservatives 
and the administration. Instead of the Kennedy bill, 
incorporating the bill of rights and desired Taft-Hartley 
amendments, the eventual bill also included the more 
restrictive Taft-Hartley changes sofcght by business.83
h) Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 
1959, or Landrum-Griffin Act, was a compromise measure.
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While the House and Senate Conference Committee watered 
down some of the tougher provisions, it still weakened 
labour's power in collective bargaining. "Hot Cargo" 
agreements were outlawed, except in construction and 
garment trades; organizational picketing could not extend 
beyond thirty days; secondary boycotts and picketing in 
jurisdictional disputes were further restricted.84 It also 
protected union members1 rights and ensured democratic, 
non-corrupt internal union affairs.85 Business lobbyists and 
conservative congressional86 and administrative leaders had 
succeeded in securing a bill which did more than rectify 
the abuses, and altered the balance of power in collective 
bargaining. They had taken advantage of the controversy 
over corruption to enact a wider legislative agenda - aided 
by the ineptness and divisions of the union movement.
This episode again reveals the efforts of both major 
industrial classes to employ the state as an instrument for 
their own ends. Business leaders had abandoned the pretext 
of laissez-faire. In the more complex economy of the times, 
corporate leaders did not feel able to dominate labour 
through private negotiations backed only by occasional 
state coercion. Now, a continuous state presence was seen 
as essential to regulate increasingly powerful unions and 
ensure their power would not intrude on management 
prerogatives.87 Some business spokesmen feared that strong 
state interference in the internal affairs of unions could 
eventually lead to state regulation of industry. Charles 
Brooks, a management representative, feared Congress could 
be called upon to regulate internal business practices in 
connection with collective bargaining, destroying free
negotiations, and ultimately replacing the free enterprise
• • • 88 • system with "dictation by government". But most business
• • • 89complaints centred on the bill's failure to go far enough 
to limit union "monopoly power", compulsory membership and
* • t • 90 • •political activity. While the Act was considered an 
improvement, it was clear business would not be satisfied 
until union power was still further reduced.91
Unions had also rejected the voluntarism of the past, 
confronted as they were with an existing unfavourable
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legislative regime. Labour leaders naturally sought 
amendments to Taft-Hartley to eliminate some of its more 
undesirable and restrictive elements. They adopted an 
aggressive political strategy to elect congressional 
friends and defeat potential foes. Confident after the 
success of these efforts, they considered themselves to be 
in a strong position to influence outcome and to attain 
positive reform of existing laws; not merely the prevention 
of undesirable new provisions.92 Only after the failure of 
these efforts and the emergence of a more restrictive 
regime did labour become critical of state action per se. 
But even then, past voluntarist extremes were avoided, as 
recognition of the inevitability and desirability of a 
state presence had developed.93 Thus the union movement 
continued efforts to alter the content or mould the 
implementation of the Labor-Management Reporting and Dis­
closure Act.94 As in past episodes the union movement and 
business leaders adjusted their rhetorical stance on state 
action according to the outcome of a specific case of 
legislative activity. But both groups now recognized the 
need for a continuous, pragmatic effort to secure the most 
favourable state policies possible.
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15 Canadian Wartime Labour Policy
a) Labour Demands for Protection
By the outbreak of World War Two, Canada had still
failed, at the national level, to emulate the key reforms
of the Wagner Act: the compulsory recognition of trade
unions and the mandatory acceptance of collective
bargaining between freely chosen representatives of
labour and management.1 Business pressure, constitutional
problems, the absence of political necessity to placate
labour, and a preference for the British voluntary approach
to union expansion dictated a minimal federal presence in
this field.2 This less supportive state attitude toward
union growth left Canadian labour poorly organized and less
influential. Collective bargaining was not established
practice, outside the traditionally organized sectors in
the railways, printing, building trades, coal mining, and
textiles; employee committees (or company unions) were
preeminent over bona fide trade unions.3 Unionists still had
to deal with judicial interference with peaceful
picketing, by means of injunctions.4
From the mid-nineteen thirties, pressure was brought
to bear on the government to adopt the American reforms,
particularly by the growing industrial unions, in the
C.I.0.-linked Canadian Congress of Labour. As Sefton-
MacDowell comments, this issue split the industrial from
the craft unions:
The new unions, which lacked the economic 
strength to establish collective bargaining 
relationships, required government intervention 
to protect their organizations. The craft unions, 
which were strong and entrenched, did not need 
government intervention to gain recognition 
from employers, and were wary of the increased 
role of government implicit in the "Wagner" prin­
ciples.5
In fact, the American model of government intervention in 
the settling of jurisdictional disputes seemed 
threatening to the established craft unions, which feared 
the rapid spread of the rival industrial unions. The 
pre-war tension reached a peak when the C.I.0.-linked
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industrial affiliates were expelled from the T.L.C. in 
1938, partly under A.F.L. pressure, but also because of 
internal tensions on the fundamental question of "craft 
exclusivity". While these tensions were to persist up to 
the merger movement of the 1950s, the onset of war, the 
corresponding economic changes, and the nature of
government labour policy in the crisis were eventually to 
unite the two wings of labour in a joint political demand 
for the "Wagner" provisions.6
b) Wartime Labour Demands
From the outset of conflict in 1939, labour 
acknowledged the need for strong state direction during the 
wartime crisis.7 Trade union leaders made suggestions for 
wartime federal administration of labour matters8, with 
union representation in regulatory agencies. Unions also 
expressed a willingness to forgo strike action during the 
war, but rejected compulsory arbitration.9 As the reward 
for cooperation in wartime activity, the union centrals 
expected a greater recognition of the equal place of 
labour in the productive sphere, greater consultation in 
the making of government labour policy, and the 
introduction of the Wagner provisions.10
But there was also a desire on the part of labour to 
take advantage of the wartime labour scarcity to augment 
both organizational strength and income levels. These 
designs eventually ran foul of government policy, aimed at 
keeping the costs of war to a minimum. And the Canadian 
state, even in these crisis circumstances, still refused 
to follow the American lead and require employers to 
respect workers* rights to organize and to select 
representatives to collective bargaining. A plethora of 
administrative orders were adopted under the War Measures 
Act, but most dealt with wage levels, and labour requests 
for enforcement of compulsory collective bargaining were 
ignored11. The best that was offered was an exhortation to 
employers to respect these rights voluntarily12. Government 
also gradually expanded its machinery to investigate 
complaints of employer discrimination.13
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Government practice was infuriating to unions, who 
protested via National Labour Board inquiries and lobby 
efforts. Unions criticised the lack of consultation with 
labour on restrictive measures14, and wage controls15, the 
failure to compel employer recognition of union bargaining 
rights16, and the absence of the Wagner rights even in 
government-run operations.17 These policies, adopted by a 
government closely linked to the private sector in the 
running of the war economy, gave labour leaders the 
impression of insensitivity to their needs; major in­
dustrial disputes, such as the battles at Kirkland Lake, 
where the state tolerated employer defeat of union 
organization, sharpened this view.18 Labour was being asked 
to sacrifice in a war effort where its voice went 
unheard, and in which capital was profiting 
handsomely.19 This situation undoubtedly contributed to the 
unity of purpose and the vigour with which labour tried, by 
intensive lobbying, militant industrial action and by 
direct participation within the burgeoning C.C.F., to have 
the Canadian industrial relations policy transformed.
Labour pressed the federal government to live up to 
its commitment to guarantee the right to organise in trade 
unions, to negotiate agreements through collective bargain­
ing, and to establish a satisfactory minimum wage and 
working conditions.20 The T.L.C. proposed the extension of 
the IDIA to all industrial sectors, as "the most effective 
way of reaching industrial accord if disputes arise which 
cannot be settled by mutual agreement"21 Union leaders 
argued that employer recalcitrance and legislative 
inadequacies were the real source of labour unrest in 
Canada.22 Patrick Conroy, Secretary of the All Canadian 
Congress of Labour, underlined how a just and equitable 
labour policy, based on a broadly accepted labour code 
respected as the basis of industrial relations was 
essential to wartime stability. In particular, "until 
working class legislation is anchored with a collective 
bargaining policy that will be just and have attached to 
it a preventative means to trouble", no increase in 
industrial stability could be expected.23 Criticizing
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company unions24, unionists urged that "the government delay 
no longer in the passage of a law that will oblige any ... 
employers of labour to recognise a trade union once that 
union has been chosen by a majority of the employees".25 
This call was echoed by many unionists during the early 
part of the war.26
By early 1943, both the TLC27 and the CCL had28 
presented the government with plans to apply the lessons 
of Wagner to the Canadian setting. While distrustful of 
government action based on the past record, labour did not 
favour a diminution of the state role and made it clear 
that respect for authority was dependent on the character 
of prevailing legislation at any given moment. By acting to 
correct problems as identified by the unions, government 
could demonstrate its usefulness and regain labour 
confidence? its assistance in overcoming employer resis­
tance to labour organization was indispensable.29 Pat Conroy 
expressed this view, seeing state action as the key to 
recognition of Labour*s place as an equal partner in 
economic life. "As an essential partner in the nation's 
production, Labour must and should have its right as such 
established by law".30
c) Canadian Business Conservatism
Business leaders resisted the demands of labour for 
state protection of the right to organize and bargain 
collectively. This form of industrial interaction was 
viewed as merely one option among several? given the 
independent position it accorded to labour, it was 
considered with suspicion.31 Canadian business had been no 
less vociferous than American corporate figures in 
condemning union collective bargaining as interference by 
outside agitators in the relations between business and 
individual worker32? they had expressed scepticism about 
prior efforts to introduce the Wagner model into Canada.33 
Even the voluntary exhortation of the initial wartime 
orders was condemned as "unnecessary and ... calculated to 
do more harm than good".34
The Canadian Manufacturers Association expressed
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satisfaction with the existing methods of employee 
representation? individual personal relations in small 
firms and employer sponsored shop committees and works 
councils must have "given satisfaction to the great 
majority of employees” since merely 18 per cent of workers 
had joined trade unions.35 Legislation to protect 
independent unions was characterized as a concession to 
minority interests since trade unions represented less 
workers than company unions, which were considered more 
"responsible" representatives of workers.36
The CMA also rejected labour claims that increased 
unionization would lead to industrial peace. Citing U.S. 
figures, the brief suggested an increase in strike 
activity in unionized plants since the Wagner Act, which 
contrasted with the more harmonious relations in 
unorganized industries. Resisting labour's demand to make 
free organization and collective bargaining compulsory, 
the CMA claimed this would enable the unions to begin a 
massive and disruptive organization drive, calling on the 
votes of recent recruits to industry with promises of high 
wages and increased influence.37 In general, it was "not 
sound or wise to determine employer-employee relations for 
the whole future on the basis of the abnormal conditions 
of war time".38
While concerned about aggressive organizing by 
"radical" unions,39 The Canadian Chamber of Commerce was 
more willing to accept the principle of collective 
bargaining as long as the representatives of labour were 
selected by the majority under state auspices.40 The Chamber 
considered binding, voluntary agreements between the two 
parties as the best means of settling disputes in 
industrial affairs.41 But the Chamber was not willing to 
accept that a single trade union should be sanctioned as 
representative simply because it obtained majority support; 
rights for individual and non-unionized workers should also 
be assured by government action. In particular, the Chamber 
showed a preference for the craft model of bargaining to 
take account of the different skills and needs of various 
classes of employee. Thus the American Wagner precedent
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was not viewed favourably by Canadian employer associations 
who preferred to avoid state "sponsorship" of 
unionization.43
But if business was critical of proposed state 
guarantees of collective bargaining rights, it had its own 
agenda for intervention. In particular, business sought an 
even tougher regimen of wartime controls on unions, to 
prevent them from exploiting the favourable market 
conditions to secure wage increases.44 There was a strong 
desire for legislation to reduce the likelihood of strikes, 
by providing machinery to settle disputes before they 
escalated into work stoppages.45 Forced to recognize that 
American precedent plus the growing economic and political 
strength of organized labour might induce government 
acceptance of compulsory organization and collective 
bargaining, the Canadian Manufacturers' Association 
emphasized the need to consider labour duties alongside 
such rights. Thus, registration of unions, filing of 
constitutions, by-laws and finances, compulsory union 
fulfilment of contract, and annual elections to ensure 
genuine union democracy were urged as companion measures.46 
Using British Columbia and Nova Scotia precedents, the 
employers sought to ensure that unions could be held 
accountable to their members and financially responsible 
for their actions (i.e. liable via civil actions for any 
costs imposed or damage caused by strikes, boycotts, 
organization drives, etc.). In the words of the Chamber: 
"[a]s unions have become more powerful it becomes hard 
to justify their remaining outside the scope of the 
ordinary law. If a union is given the right to represent 
a group of employees it must logically be put in the 
position where it is bound by its own acts".47
Freedom of association in the form of a guaranteed 
right of employees not to join unions was also
advocated, which meant prohibitions on closed shops, 
compulsory union due deductions and union intimidation. 
The right to join "independent unions", in the form of 
works committees, shop councils, should also be protected, 
since this was the preferred means of dealing with
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employers and would promote cooperative, not conflictual 
relations.48 The Chamber also advocated closer contacts 
between management and workers to allow a greater 
interchange of views and greater trust through more 
personal contact; joint production councils and internal 
grievance machinery should be "progressively extended". But 
such aims could best be achieved via private channels.49
d) Government Policy Evolution
Despite the purported interventionist leanings of
• • • • • 50 •Prime Minister King m  Labour matters , and internal 
lobbying from labour board members,51 the government was 
slow to respond to these combined pressures, utilizing 
constitutional restrictions as an excuse for inaction. 
Token gestures only were employed. In contrast with the 
New Deal policy of government intervention to redress the 
imbalance between capital and labour, and to encourage 
systematic collective bargaining, "Canadian labour policy 
... was concerned only with eliminating industrial 
unrest".52 Increased labour strife, notably the steel 
strike of 1943, revealed the inadequacy of existing policy 
and increased pressures for change.
Labour*s growing cooperation with the C.C.F. helped 
precipitate a massive increase in support for this social 
democratic party? during 1942 and 1943, it became a 
credible alternative to the established parties. 
Government leaders finally sensed that significant policy 
alterations were politically expedient.53 The first 
measures were adopted by the Ontario provincial regime, 
which, fearful of the growing C.C.F. electoral presence, 
adopted a collective bargaining act in spring, 1943. This 
first formal recognition in Canada of the rights of 
organization and collective bargaining increased the 
pressure on the federal regime to adopt similar nation-wide 
measures. While the Ontario law facilitated the 
certification of union organizations, and reduced the need 
for recognition strikes, it did not prevent the defeat of 
the provincial Liberal government and the remarkable rise 
of the C.C.F. to official opposition status in the
305
province, spurred on by labour support.54
These developments caused the federal Liberals to
alter their resistance to labour law reforms. A broad
inquiry into labour grievances and the causes of labour
unrest was conducted by the National War Labour Board55.
This led to the adoption of Privy Council Order 1003,
designed to make previously voluntary collective bargaining
arrangements mandatory. This enactment
brought the national labour code more into line 
with the American pattern. It included the main 
principles of the Wagner Act and established much 
the same machinery to enforce it? guarantees of 
labour*s right to organize? selection of units 
appropriate for collective bargaining? 
certification of bargaining agents? compulsory 
collective bargaining? and labour relations 
boards to investigate and correct unfair labour 
practices56
But it also placed proscriptions on union coercion and 
recruitment methods, forbade stoppages by either party 
during negotiations and provided criminal penalties for 
violations in prosecutions screened by the Board. It also 
retained the IDIA principles of conciliation, investigation 
and strike delays, and established compulsory binding 
arbitration to settle disputes where agreements were in 
force. The outcome was an interesting mixture of 
established Canadian precedent, American Wagner elements, 
and more recent American business proposals for reform of 
Wagner, by outlawing some union activities.57
e) Labour Response to Priw Council Order 1003
As a result, the reaction from both industrial classes 
was mixed. Labour welcomed many elements, especially the 
central tenet of compulsory collective bargaining. But 
provisions differing from Wagner, in the direction of 
Taft-Hartley, were condemned and amendments advocated. 
Major proposals included certification only for bona fide 
trade unions, certification on majority vote of 
participating workers and not of the whole workforce, 
provision for union security clauses and dues check-offs, 
and mandatory reinstatement for workers discharged 
unfairly, etc.58 PC 1003 did not adequately protect trade
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unions from employer efforts to promote company unions, 
undermine union security and avoid “good faith” collective 
bargaining.59 PC 1003 was seen as a weak measure which was 
readily and frequently ignored by employers.60 Unionists 
wanted stronger provisions requiring collective bargaining 
with union representatives, even suggesting that it be 
"compulsory that contracts be signed where unions had been 
certified by the Labour Relations Board".61
Also of concern was the government's continued 
restraint of wage increases, which had prevented the unions 
from using the favourable labour market to their advantage. 
With few exceptions62, unions remained largely critical of 
continued state economic controls, particularly after wage 
restraint was extended past the end of the conflict and 
into the reconstruction period in 1945.63 The practice of 
limiting wage increases if price rises would result was 
condemned as giving the employer the ability to avoid all 
wage claims, since employers were free to raise prices at 
any time. The failure to consult labour in the selection of 
labour "representatives" on the price control boards was 
also attacked.64 Like good American voluntarists, the 
Canadian unionists "resent[ed] the denial by [government] 
Order of the right of Labour to use its age-old means of 
defence, the right to strike".65 Laissez-faire rhetoric 
again was used to promote a retreat of state intervention: 
"the time has come whereby liberty of action be restored, 
giving the right to all law-abiding organizations, to 
collective bargaining between employer and employee".66
Despite these problems, labour feared the collapse of 
wages and rise in unemployment in the post war period, with 
the end of war time production and the return of 
servicemen. Unionists remembered the difficult conditions 
after World War I, when wages plummeted and union 
membership shrank. Government intervention was required to 
avoid a repeat of this experience.67 Unions were also 
concerned about the temporary emergency nature of PC 1003, 
fearing a retreat to piecemeal inconsistent provincial 
legislation at the end of the conflict.68 Hence, labour 
leaders began to advocate an extension of the provisions of
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PC 1003 through amendments. The ultimate aim was a 
permanent National Labour Code to cover all industries 
across the country, not just industries under federal 
jurisdiction: a labour "Magna Carta" on the Wagner model 
"granting the workers the protection and union security 
they deserve".70
f) Business Response to Priw Council Order 1003
Business also had a divided reaction to the wartime 
orders. Business spokesmen indicated support for provisions 
requiring majority vote of all unit members for 
certification.71 But they sought changes to certification 
procedures. Concern over the influence of American 
unionists led to a demand that Canadian union leadership be 
a prerequisite for certification. Procedures for 
decertification should be invoked, on application of the 
employer, if the union was considered no longer 
representative of the employees. Similarly, employers 
should be given the power to call for secret ballot votes 
during a strike to ensure members still wished to follow 
their leaders. Provisions against improper picketing were 
also required, because of the aggressive tactics of the 
industrial unions. Liability of unions for any damages 
caused during strike action was also sought, sanctioned by 
fines and civil actions. 72 Unions should be required to 
register and report on their finances, to guard against 
mismanagement. Employers also supported clarification to 
ensure that the supervisory personnel should not have the 
rights to union organization.
Employers saw the usefulness of the wage control 
provisions and did not want them removed precipitously 
after the conflict? a carefully planned withdrawal of such 
measures was required to ensure orderly transition back to 
a free enterprise economy.73 The cost of living bonus, a 
novel wartime measure, was criticized; business hoped to 
keep this element separate from the regular wage rate, to 
permit reduced wages after the conflict.74 Manufacturers 
resisted labour calls for prohibition on bargaining in bad
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faith, broadened scope of grievance procedures, the
"majority of members voting rule", compulsory union
security and dues check-off, or strengthened limitations on
company unions.75 The Canadian Chamber of Commerce opposed
efforts to ban "independent" company unions, to broaden
collective bargaining to cover more conditions of
employment, and to compel union security provisions or
closed shop and dues check-off. The Chamber was more
willing to agree to certification with a majority of voting
employees, if at least fifty per cent of the whole unit
participated.76
The Canadian Manufacturers' Association also attacked
the requirement that workers join the majority union as an
intrusion on the rights of individuals.77 But it also had an
economic motivation for opposing the closed shop. Thus, a
spokesman complained: "The closed shop tends to give the
unions so dominant a voice in the management of a business
that the balance between management and labour necessary
for the effective and socially sound functioning of the
enterprise is upset". He continued:
[t]he closed shop tends to give the unions a 
monopoly control of labour which is undesirable 
and even dangerous both economically and 
socially. Thus a monopoly acquired by trade 
unions in the controlling of wages might, if it 
were exercised unwisely, have economic and social 
effects that would be disastrous. The community 
has a right to object to such far-reaching power 
being concentrated in the hands of any economic 
group.78
Union's control of worker loyalty, and their ability to 
dictate employee behaviour, would allow actions 
inconsistent with the interests of the employer. The power 
which the closed shop conferred was unprecedented among 
private associations; incorporation and supervision of the 
internal affairs of unions would clearly be a required 
concomitant of such a measure.79 The Chamber also resisted 
a compulsory union shop: "Such provisions would place a 
very great and unwarranted power over the whole business 
economy of the country in the hands of a few trade union 
organizations. Such compulsion is the antithesis of 
collective bargaining and we again urge most strongly that
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no such compulsion either upon employer or employees should
• • 80 be introduced into collective bargaining agreements".
g) Evolution of Interest Group Attitudes
Thus both unions and management had clear ideas about 
acceptable and unacceptable state intervention in 
industrial relations. Throughout this period, unions sought 
increased guarantees of their right to compulsory 
collective bargaining and union security, and measures to 
eliminate rival forms of employee representation. They 
resisted regulation of their internal financial affairs, 
legal liability for strike or other damages, or state 
limitations on maximum wages. Employers favoured strong 
state regulation of picketing, supervisors' unions, 
decertification, strike ballots, and union liability. But 
they rejected state involvement in guaranteeing union 
security, compelling deductions of union dues, or 
broadening the scope of collective bargaining. Obviously, 
no consistent attitude was displayed toward the role of the 
state in industrial relations, even in any particular 
submission. Ideological convictions seemed to take a back 
seat to specific interests in these lobby efforts. The 
terminology of laissez-faire (voluntarism, and anti-compul­
sion) were used selectively by both parties to legitimate 
a particular attitude on a specific proposal? business and 
labour lobbyists were not concerned about the consistency 
of their position when advocating, often simultaneously, 
increased state presence in other aspects of industrial 
relations.
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16 Post-War Canadian Labour Policy
a) Post-War Policy Debates
Despite the dramatic changes brought about through the 
adoption of P.C. 1003, Canada's industrial relations system 
emerged from World War II in an uncertain state. As the 
country returned to peacetime, the temporary federal orders 
were rescinded and new industrial relations legislation was 
debated. The situation was complicated further as groups 
sought to amend the hybrid P.C. 1003 in different 
directions, based on favourable or unfavourable assessment 
of the American laws. Basically, unions sought changes to 
bring Canada into line with the Wagner regime in the United 
States, by entrenching the gains of PC1003 into a permanent 
national labour code. Business favoured new American trends 
of restrictions on unions, which culminated in the Taft- 
Hartley legislation. These positions were reflected in the 
two-year debate over draft bills to replace the temporary 
wartime measures. Policymakers sought to preserve the PC 
1003 compromises in the draft legislation of 1947-1948.1
b) Labour Reaction to Bill 338
Labour reaction to draft bill 338 in 1947 differed 
between the two major congresses. The Canadian Congress of 
Labour was ambivalent about state involvement, demanding 
increased government authority over areas deemed 
advantageous to labour, but requesting restrictions where 
state authority could be used counter to union desires. The 
Congress recognized the advantages of equal representation 
for labour and employer on the Canada Labour Relations 
Board, certification of unions instead of individuals and 
clearer delineation of "confidential employee" to limit 
those excluded from the benefits of the Act.2 However, this 
Congress complained about the weakened statement of federal 
jurisdiction in labour matters as compared to the IDIA of 
1907, especially respecting the applicability of the act to 
all industries under the legislative authority of the 
government of Canada, to foreign companies, and in 
emergencies.3
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The CCL insisted that recent court rulings upholding
the power of the federal government to legislate for the
"Peace Order and Good Government of Canada", allowed
enactment of a more comprehensive national labour code,4
These spokesmen also attacked the failure to prohibit
dismissal of employees for union activity. This Congress
sought stronger wording prohibiting employer-dominated
unions, to include past influence (over their formation)
as well as contemporary control or manipulation of their
activities by employers. The Canada Labour Relations Board
should be given power to disestablish company unions.
Furthermore, no single employer veto should be allowed over
industry wide union certification; government should be
empowered to enforce industry wide negotiations if desired
by most workers and employers.5
On the other hand, proposed augmentation of the Labour
Board’s power to revoke certification of unions was
criticized since
[i]t will operate as an invitation to 
unscrupulous employers to meet a certified 
union's notice to negotiate with a claim that 
since certification proceedings commenced, the 
union has lost its majority; or else to dilly­
dally along with negotiations for some months and 
then claim that the union has lost its majority 
and that therefore its certification should be 
revoked.6
Even if the employer were proven wrong in his claim, 
investigations would take time and could help defeat the 
union's cause. It could be used to pressure union members 
to drop their allegiance; new unions would likely be the 
victims of such an effort. Furthermore, the Board should 
not be given discretion to allow new craft unions to 
supplant existing industrial unions. The CCL also felt 
conciliation procedures prior to a strike vote were too 
long; these "cooling off" procedures could take up to three 
months, after which the most opportune moment for a strike 
might be lost.7 Thus, the CCL leadership sought limitations 
on Board discretion, to permit the private power of 
industrial unions in organization drives and strikes to 
remain effective.8
By contrast the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada
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supported Bill 338, despite a desire for a broader labour
code encompassing all Canadian industries.9 The bill was
• • • • 10 welcomed as "a step in the right direction”. It was
praised for establishing union organization rights and for
prohibiting employer interference. In addition, it placed
greater restrictions on company unions, provided special
protection for craft organizations, permitted negotiation
of closed shop agreements, and allowed certification votes
based on majority of votes cast11. The actual impact of the
bill remained in doubt, as much depended on how it was
administered. Nonetheless, on balance, the TLC commended
the government for introducing this measure, and
recommended "that all provinces enact legislation of equal
value”.12 The TLC resisted efforts by both business13 and
rival trade unions14 to delay or derail Bill 338.
While the major national congresses expressed
disappointment that a full fledged National Labour Code was
not adopted, the principal Quebec union central, Le
Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada (CTCC)
declared its approval for the King governments cautious
concern for constitutional propriety. In a brief in March
1947, this organization noted the clamour for a
'National Labour Code1 as a federal code intended 
to regulate the industrial relations in all 
fields of economic activity, without taking into 
consideration the jurisdiction of the provinces 
established by the Canadian Constitution. The 
CTCC objects to such a labour code. It favours 
the upholding of the jurisdiction of the 
provinces ... and admits the justification of a 
national labour code provided it will only govern 
the industries over which the Canadian 
Constitution recognizes federal jurisdiction.15
Substantively, the CTCC expressed approval of the bill's
guarantees of union organization and collective bargaining,
its establishment of grievance procedures, and its
prohibition on employer discrimination. The CTCC also
called for stronger legal guarantees of the right to strike
and picket, and for the reduction of costly and protracted
legal appeals against Board decisions. Aside from the
constitutional position, which conformed to dominant
thinking in Quebec, the CTCC's position seems similar in
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many respects to that of other labour bodies. While the 
bill was considered to have weaknesses, it was hailed by 
this body as "without doubt the most progressive piece of 
industrial legislation yet presented".16
However, all unions joined to criticize the 
government's refusal to remove the wartime wage control 
order. Some advocated retention of both wage and price 
controls to ensure employers could not take advantage of 
unions as demobilization produced surplus labour supply17 
However, most unions wanted the immediate restoration of 
the right to bargain collectively and to strike if 
necessary. Wartime inflation caused workers' wages to lose 
purchasing power; assertive action, using all the tools at 
the unions' disposal, was essential. Thus, most union 
officials advocated prompt abolition of PC 9384, the wage 
control order? on this issue, voluntarist rhetoric was the 
order of the day. An Oshawa union leader, M.J. Fenwick, 
declared that "this obnoxious order should be abolished and 
employers and employees should be allowed to bargain on 
their own without government interference".18 Resentment of 
government interference on this score was to be frequently 
expressed by the union movement in subsequent months.19 
While seeking increased government involvement in other 
areas, the unions remained resentful where their advantages 
in private markets were restricted by government action.
c) Business Reaction to Bill 338
Business views had evolved from the staunch 
conservatism of early wartime. As American business had 
previously, Canadian management "conceded that [union] 
recognition and [collective] bargaining were established, 
and consequently wished to 'balance' the increased power 
of organized labour by making labour more clearly 
responsible for the exercise of its power".20 They now 
sought to ensure that the unions were required to recognize 
their obligations, and were denied sweeping ability to 
secure union security provisions in contracts.21 "The 
employer's obligation to respect the right of employees to 
organize, and the obligation to bargain collectively were
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acknowledged, and it was suggested that employees should 
recognize management's right to plan, direct and manage 
industry and admit the right to those workers who so desire 
to refrain from joining a union"22. The Canadian Manufac­
turers' Association acknowledged, for instance, that 
employers should "respect the right of employees to 
associate for all lawful purposes ... [and to] bargain 
collectively, in cases where representatives have been 
freely chosen by a majority of the employees affected, on 
wages, hours of work, and working conditions". But in turn, 
unions should be made to act responsibly, to respect 
managerial prerogatives and accept the right of individual 
employees to refrain from joining a union.23
While recognising that the draft bill only applied to 
industries under Dominion jurisdiction, employers remained 
concerned lest the provinces use the measure as a model and 
enact this unsatisfactory regime for all industries.24 This 
motivated pressure on the federal government to adopt a 
code which would contain provisions desired by business.25 
The desire for a return to peacetime regulations may have 
reflected a belief among some businesses that fragmented 
provincial labour statutes were less likely to incorporate 
comprehensive guarantees of union organization rights? 
Quebec business also sought restoration of provincial 
jurisdiction on nationalist grounds.26 But many companies 
sought a uniform legal framework for industrial relations 
tailored to their requirements.27 In the words of the Board 
of Trade of the City of Toronto, "[n]ational uniformity in 
labour laws is important to national employers in applying 
nationally established employment policies".28 The 
International Nickel Company of Canada expressed a 
preference for maintaining federal jurisdiction over its 
labour affairs after the war because the federal Department 
of Labour had a good understanding of that company's 
requirements. This firm even suggested that basic metal 
mining and coal mining industries be considered 
"undertakings for the general advantage of Canada and 
should be declared as such under the provisions" of the 
Act.29
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This effort to secure a suitable national labour code
was reflected in CMA proposals for post-war policies.30 As
Drennen suggested:
the CMA proposals recognized the fact that union 
recognition and collective bargaining should be 
made compulsory in the postwar legislation as 
they had been since 1944 under the wartime 
regulations. Since this constituted an increase 
in union power, the CMA felt that steps should be 
taken to insure that labour unions exercised 
responsibility commensurate with their increased 
power.31
Thus the Association called for provisions to outlaw unfair 
union practices, such as slow-down, mass picketing, 
secondary boycott, and sympathy strikes.32 Prohibition on 
unionization of foremen, supervisors and other 
"confidential” employees with access to company secrets was 
also sought.33 Concern remained over the closed shop 
provisions? Canadian manufacturers sought to copy American 
changes and eliminate this vexatious device.34 Registration 
and liability of unions for illegal actions35, and 
revocation of certification procedures were sought36 to 
restrict union power and control union activity.37 
Manufacturers also wanted to protect company unions from 
government restriction, protesting that these unions 
promoted harmonious relations between labour and
T O
management. The CMA was disappointed with the Bill 338 m  
as much as it failed to meet these requirements.39
The Canadian Chamber of Commerce demonstrated the 
influence of American precedents in its brief of February 
1947. Union privileges, conferred by the wartime 
regulations, should now be matched by recognition of union 
responsibilities, rights of individual workers, union 
unfair labour practices, and other proposals associated 
with American debates over the Taft-Hartley Act. The 
Chamber asserted the right of employees to refrain from 
joining a union, and of employers to communicate directly 
with individual workers? it asserted the right of employers 
to change conditions of employment at will where collective 
agreements were not in force? it called for prohibition of 
mass picketing, sympathy strikes and secondary boycotts. It 
also called for unions to be held responsible for any
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damages occurring during labour action. Making unions 
legally liable for their actions and restricting their 
ability to use coercive strikes would help restore the 
"balance” between the partners in industry.40
The Chamber attacked the draft bill for its imbalance 
between the rights and responsibilities of unions and 
management•
These provisions constitute an unwarranted 
interference with the necessary right of an 
employer to manage his own business. Just as we 
condemn any unwarranted interference by an 
employer with the formation or administration of 
a trade union among his employees, so also do we 
condemn any unwarranted interference by 
employees with the proper functions of 
management.41
The Chamber of Commerce also emphasized the undesirable 
power accruing to the quasi-judicial Canada Labour 
Relations Board.42 Giving the Board powers not subject to 
court appeal would mean important quasi-judicial decisions 
would be reached without the normal legal safeguards 
expected in a democratic society.43 Wording in the Bill 
permitting the Minister to "do such things as seem 
calculated to maintain or secure industrial peace" was 
feared as "broad enough to permit serious interference with 
the rights of an employer, employee or trade union".44 The 
Chamber also objected to the clause requiring ministerial 
approval of any prosecution under the Act.45 Clearly, more 
safeguards were seen as necessary to prevent an undesirable 
concentration of power in the hands of the administration.46 
This desire for greater legal safeguards47 was expressed by 
other business leaders suspicious of a strong state
/o
presence. But this purported fear of excess of state power 
was inconsistent with the simultaneous desire for strong 
state supervision of union activities and organization.
Business was not uniformly critical of the Act. The 
Board of Trade of the City of Toronto praised the bill 
since
compulsion, both negative and affirmative, has 
been in the main limited to negotiating with a 
view to reaching a collective agreement and ... 
management and labour have been left such a large 
measure of freedom of agreement as to the terms 
and conditions of collective bargaining. Only
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legislation so conceived can be successfully 
integrated into our political, economic and 
social life with its tradition of individual 
freedom.49
The Board believed that "the Bill does not involve any 
material infringement of management functions". But it 
would ensure that unions acted more responsibly.50 These 
characteristics of the Bill reflected the thinking of the 
government, whose spokesmen asserted that "responsibility 
for the content of a collective agreement with very few 
exceptions lay with the parties to the agreement. The 
government was seen as having the responsibility to 
guarantee that bargaining would take place, but details of 
the relationships between employer and employee were to be 
settled by industrial self-government".51 Nonetheless, 
business opposition contributed to a delay in consideration 
of the bill, which led to its reintroduction in 1948.
d) Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act
The content of the new Bill 195 of 1948 varied little 
from its predecessor; hence the lobbying position of the 
various labour and business organizations was similar to 
the above discussed debate. The TLC maintained its support 
but other union centrals exhibited more scepticism.52 
Business maintained its criticism, with only minor 
modification.53 One notable change was the effort of the 
business community to persuade the government to follow the 
Taft-Hartley precedent and introduce a requirement that 
union leaders file affidavits disavowing past or current 
affiliation with any communist organization.54 The Chamber 
suggested that "the privileges and protection of the Act 
should not be extended to any organization which in the 
opinion of the Board is led or dominated by communists, 
communist sympathizers, or members or supporters of any 
organization that believes in or teaches overthrow of 
government by force or unconstitutional means".55 Canadian 
business leaders were obviously oblivious to any Canadian 
tradition of tolerance for ideological diversity in this 
instance.
The Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation
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Act of 1948 finally extended Wagner-style guarantees to all
industries under federal jurisdiction. While its coverage
was narrower than the emergency provisions of PC 1003, its
content contained some improvements from a labour
standpoint. One observer has gone so far as to suggest that
the "majority of significant changes ... emanat[ed] from
the requests of organized labour".56 However, business
complaints were also taken seriously. Drennan notes, for
instance, the proscriptions on unfair union practices,
guarantees of rights to individual workers and minority
union members, wider exclusion of supervisory employees,
decertification procedures and a requirement that the
majority of union members be in good standing before the
bargaining unit could be recognized.57
Certainly, labour thwarted some business demands for
the more stringent restrictions of the Taft-Hartley law.
Canadian law took a more hands-off attitude respecting the
closed and union shop (left up to private negotiations) ,
union dues, political contributions, communist affiliation,
financial reports, jurisdictional and secondary strikes,
and other matters strictly regulated in the U.S. The more
extensive list of unfair labour practices and the readier
access to court remedies under Taft-Hartley "constitut[ed]
a correspondingly greater government encroachment into
industrial relations".58 In Drennan's assessment:
The ease with which disputes may be carried into 
court under the Taft-Hartley Act makes such a 
course of procedure the easy way to avoid the 
responsibility of industrial self-government.
Certainly, the possibility of litigating every
dispute concerning the interpretation of a 
collective agreement stands to bring the 
government much more intimately into the 
collective bargaining process.59
The ministerial control of prosecutions in Canada would
ensure that less litigation occurred to interfere with
private labour negotiations. As in the Wagner period
American lawmakers took a more interventionist approach
than Canadian leaders in industrial relations.
e) The Search for a National Labour Code
Furthermore, the Canadian act extended to only a few
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sectors under federal jurisdiction. The belief that the 
IRDI Act would lead to uniformity in labour law, by 
inspiring similar provincial legislation, proved 
exaggerated. Eugene Forsey demonstrated the "bewildering 
complications and variety with which employers and workers 
are confronted because ... each province goes its own sweet 
way".60 The federal statute of 1948 did stimulate 
development of legislation supportive of basic collective 
bargaining rights in most provinces.61 But considerable 
variation in provincial practice remained, with the IRDIA 
guarantees unevenly applied across the country.62 This 
caused union agitation for a national code to end the 
capricious, unpredictable differences in the treatment of 
union rights in different provinces.63 Both the TLC and CCL 
applied pressure on the federal government to secure the 
necessary constitutional authority to enact a comprehensive 
code. Only the Quebec unions demurred, with the CTCC asking 
for extension of the Act's benefits to those under federal 
jurisdiction who had been initially excluded, like federal 
civil servants, arsenal workers, and King's Printer 
employees.64 No federal administration accepted the futile 
task of pursuing these constitutional amendments in part 
because of Quebec opposition.
Constitutional inertia continued to preclude 
development of a National Labour Code. However, unions 
continued to press the federal government for advancement 
in treatment of workers under its jurisdiction, to set a 
precedent for provincial legislative changes. Business 
resisted such federal initiatives, fearing they would 
disrupt established provincial practices. In 1964, the 
federal government introduced the Canada Labour Standards 
Code, specifying hours of work, paid vacations, holidays, 
overtime, and minimum wages for federally-regulated 
employees. This measure drew comment from all the major 
employer and labour groups. While disagreement over the 
desirability of the law was evident, a marked softening of 
rhetoric can be discerned. No longer was the issue of the 
legitimacy of government action at stake in the debate, 
since government's place was accepted. Instead, group
331
submissions to the minister emphasized particular concerns 
and complaints respecting the Act's impact.
Business still feared the potential impact on 
provincial legislation, and the psychological effect on 
collective bargaining, as unions sought to match federal 
standards for hours and minimum wages, holiday and overtime 
pay. The Act's inflexibility in delineating maximum daily 
and weekly hours was condemned by businesses who needed 
flexibility in shift lengths to successfully function.65 
While not directly challenging the state's right to 
regulate such matters (as had happened in the past), 
business demanded that any parties to a collective 
agreement be allowed to voluntarily set aside the 
government limits.66
Unions showed some willingness to cooperate with 
business concerns where a need for greater flexibility in 
scheduling hours was essential, as in transportation 
enterprises, (which could not, for instance, grant all the 
statutory holidays),67 However, they remained suspicious of 
business motives in seeking to exclude any collective 
agreements from the protection of the federal standards.68 
Unions were divided respecting the efficacy of government 
regulations depending on their own gains or losses from the 
standard hours, vacations, or wages. The debate generally 
reflected the desire of business to limit government 
restrictions on possible collective agreements and of 
unions to secure the best possible arrangements for 
protecting the wages and conditions of their members? 
general notions of the appropriate government role did not
• • 69enter into this debate.
Also as a consequence of constitutional restrictions, 
the Canadian Government has not acted as comprehensively to 
regulate the internal affairs of unions in the manner of 
the American Landrum-Griffin Act. Thus, the Task Force on 
Labour Relations in the late 1960s reported few, but 
significant violations of worker rights by unions and 
recommended measures to rectify the problem.70 It concluded 
that, due to constitutional limitations
Attempts to promulgate federal legislation on
trade unions per se would probably fail in whole
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or in part.... Parliament can enact permissive 
legislation, but it cannot require all unions to 
conform to standards it sets.
This did not restrict federal power to^ enact legislation
requiring certain standards in union constitutions, and in
collective agreements for unions under federal
jurisdiction, in those fields covered by past federal
statutes? indeed some laws did require certain standards
of union organization before rights were granted under
federal law. But no comprehensive bill could be considered.
In practice, this field was left up to provincial
regulation, since those unions where the greatest abuses
were uncovered, notably construction trades and Teamsters,
were largely under provincial jurisdiction. Significant
investigations of union abuses were conducted, most notably
the Cliche Commission in Quebec, after union rivalries
spilled over into costly violence at major construction
sites. Considerable concern focussed on infringements on
the "exercise of freedom of association, which was
[alleged] to be violated by acts of intimidation and
threats”.72 The Commission usefully exposed the widespread
abuses and intimidation? its report led to legislative
measures designed to ensure "a return to normal union
democracy as soon a possible.1,73 Outlawed were
featherbedding practices74, union office for those convicted
of abuses, and the use of "job-site stewards” to coerce
employers or promote slowdowns? the Commission's
recommendations also led to trusteeships for flagrantly
abusive unions and closer supervision of union finances.75
Other provinces adopted some provisions to deal with abuses
in the construction trades unions.76 Hence, there may be
similarities between Canadian and American supervision of
such union actions? a careful survey of provincial trade
union laws would be required to make this determination.77
f) The Evolution of Interest Group Attitudes
The reaction of business and labour to industrial 
relations legislation seems to have been influenced more 
by transitory interest than by any ideological 
predisposition respecting state action. Debates over
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legislation in Canada in the post-war years has featured a 
similar range of attitudes and proposals in the United 
States. In fact, the actors in Canadian business and labour 
groups frequently used American precedents as a blueprint 
for desired legislation in this country. Canadian debates 
were complicated by the delay in adopting legislation 
supportive of union organization and bargaining rights. 
This lag meant that legislation to this effect was 
discussed at a time when American debate had moved in a 
direction favouring increased restrictions on union 
activity. The result was that Canadian legislation emerged 
as a hybrid. Its principal thrust, based on an extension 
and solidification of wartime policy into permanent law, 
was the adoption of the Wagner principles, with some 
modifications based on wartime experience. But along the 
way, some of the Taft-Hartley provisions found there way 
into the act, albeit without the full cold-war ethos of 
American law. Subsequent Canadian federal action was 
limited by the constitutional assignment of authority over 
voluntary associations like unions to the provinces. 
However, certain provincial practices seemed to involve 
intrusive regulation of internal union affairs, as in the 
American case.
Pragmatic considerations as opposed to ideological 
notions certainly seemed to dominate interest group 
attitudes by the end of this period? their certainly seemed 
to be a reduction in laissez-faire rhetoric and criticism 
of the state role in industrial relations, as both parties 
accepted the inevitable place of government in their 
affairs. As in the United States, the parties more 
explicitly sought to influence legislation to their 
benefit, and dropped all pretext of eliminating all state 
regulation. They merely tried to maximize state involvement 
where private economic forces were disadvantageous, and to 
minimize state interference when they could secure a better 
deal through unregulated private bargaining.
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IV ASSESSMENT AND CONCLUSIONS
17 Industrial Relations Assessment
a) Summary of Policy Development
Industrial relations policy in both countries evolved 
considerably with alterations in economic and social 
conditions, with emergency exigencies, and with shifting 
political influence of various class interests. Initial 
policy did not vary significantly? both states intervened 
extensively in the last century in a fashion calculated to 
retard the expansion of unions and assist employers in 
preventing or suppressing strike action. The extent to 
which the state intervened and the devices employed did 
differ. American courts and legislatures acted more widely 
at first, reflecting the greater degree of 
industrialization and greater spread of labour organization 
(and greater perceived threat to managerial prerogatives); 
American courts also had recourse to that country*s more 
advanced anti-trust provisions, which were turned into a 
device to thwart strike action as a "conspiracy in 
restraint of trade". However, Canadian lawmakers acted 
later than American judicial actors in recognizing the 
basic legality of unions. On the whole, both federal 
regimes pursued interventionist anti-labour policies which 
deviated significantly from professed laissez-faire 
precepts; workers were denied the right of freedom of 
association to protect the rights of contract and property 
prized by the entrepreneurial class.
After the turn of the century, both governments 
grappled with disruptive strikes affecting the public 
interest. American lawmakers moved tentatively, but 
steadily to establish machinery for resolution of disputes 
on the railways. Although initially restricted to voluntary 
conciliation or mediation measures, this legal framework 
eventually developed more compulsory elements, including 
strike delays in emergency disputes. Canada did move 
earlier to enforce such compulsory delay of strike or
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lockout until after public investigation of disputes on 
railways and in other key utilities and mines; but there 
was no provision for enforcement of awards or compulsory 
arbitration. And this intervention can hardly be said to 
reflect socialistic influences on Canadian law; the IDIA 
may have assisted business by depriving labour of the 
ability to take rapid strike action to press its demands.
The American government adopted the first measures 
designed to assist the development of union organization 
and to enforce acceptance by business of collective 
bargaining. The Norris Laguardia Act prohibitions on 
injunctions, plus Railway Labour Act guarantees preventing 
discrimination against union members began the trend by the 
early 1930s. The NIRA and Wagner provisions cemented the 
federal governments recognition of the legitimacy of union 
organization and ushered in the modern era of systematic 
collective bargaining. Notwithstanding the alleged 
socialist elements in the political culture, the Canadian 
regime did not enact such measures until almost a decade 
later, despite considerable pressure from labour 
organizations. After the war, the American government 
undertook drastic steps to regulate the internal affairs of 
unions, a measure not emulated in Canadian federal law, 
although some elements of this nature were introduced at 
the provincial level.
b) Summary of Group Attitudes
Attitudes towards the role of the state in this field 
appear comparable in the two countries. Essentially, the 
major business and labour groups in each sought to utilise 
the state to promote their own ends. Laissez-faire or 
voluntarist rhetoric emerged in both countries only to 
legitimate opposition to undesired state initiatives. Farr 
observes:
Thus we see both labour and management eagerly 
and vociferously professing disdain and distrust 
of the government at the very time they were 
seeking to use it to their own ends. Both groups, 
however, sought only particular kinds of 
legislation. The highest priority was accorded to 
laws which broadened their individual spheres of 
action; this meant laws to bestow positive
344
advantages directly or to reduce the influence of 
"outsiders" on their activities, without at the 
same time exacting the price of direct government 
participation in their internal affairs.1
American labour voluntarism seemingly influenced union
attitudes to a degree in the early period? but this
philosophy was then consonant with the interests of a
labour movement confident of its ability to secure gains
on its own in private bargaining. When the union movement
was clearly depleted in size and bargaining strength in the
depression, it did not hesitate to support government
action. Subsequently, the American labour movement
"travelled a long way from classical Gompersian
voluntarism", taking "the hard-headed view that political
action is an essential concomitant of collective
bargaining".2
Thus, a general pattern emerged, which saw management 
and labour in both countries favouring or opposing state 
action in accord with their own strength in the private 
economy. When worker organizations were embryonic and weak, 
state assistance with organizational rights and disputes 
settlement seemed attractive? when unions were stronger, 
government involvement seemed to constrain potential gains 
in private bargaining and was thus shunned. As the stronger 
party to industrial negotiations, business was generally 
more distrustful of state interference, preferring to use 
its natural strengths in industrial negotiations to secure 
gains through private channels. However, the state was 
urged by business in both countries to prevent the growth 
of "monopoly" union power? business desire for state 
regulation of union affairs was predicated upon the 
advantages of government restraint of the most militant and 
successful unions.
Shifting business and labour opinions were initially 
expressed towards state action in general, as political 
debate still focused on the nature of acceptable state 
action. Later, these business and labour views became 
increasingly focused on the particulars of state action as 
the presence of government in industrial relations became 
an irreversible reality.
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c) Policy Differences and Ideological Traditions
If interest group attitudes and demands reflected a
similar range of concerns and issues, the extent of state
intervention in each country was not always the same. Many
observers of Canada1s industrial relations scene suggest
that Canadian policy has been more interventionist than in
the United States. Stuart Jamieson argues: "It is a safe
generalization to state that the degree of government
intervention in industrial disputes has been, and continues
to be, much greater in Canada, than in the United States".
This is especially so, he suggests, with respect to
"compulsory delay and two-stage conciliation of 'interest*
disputes arising out of the negotiation of new or revised
agreements" and "compulsory arbitration of unsettled
'rights' disputes and prohibition of strikes while
agreements are still in force".3 Canadian practice has
varied between provinces4, but A.W.R. Carrothers notes that
the PC 1003 model of compulsory arbitration and
conciliation has been widely applied? American practice
favours voluntary mediation on the request of both
parties.5 G.A. McAllister also suggests that Canada went
far further than the United States, where only compulsory
negotiation is required.
In prohibiting strikes and lockouts prior to 
negotiations, in providing state assistance with 
a view to completion of an agreement, in 
requiring, without resort to strike or lockout, 
final determination of all disputes arising under 
an agreement, and in prescribing penalties for 
the non-performance of an agreement, Canada has 
been a continental pioneer in state 
systematization of labour relations. The Canadian 
'way' is established.6
Certainly, the pervasiveness of conciliation requirements
for most forms of industrial dispute, and the arbitration
of all grievances arising under an agreement - which appear
in most provincial statutes - constitute forms of state
intervention less prominent in the United States.
But American statutes also contain interventionist
elements. Certainly the Wagner provisions were an earlier
interference with the rights of business to hire and fire
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at will, and to run their affairs without negotiating with 
labour representatives. In this respect, American law 
seemed more "socialistic" in promoting labour rights to 
collective organization. Later, American law retained a 
strong state presence in industrial relations, albeit in an 
anti-labour direction, especially respecting internal union 
affairs. While the state role in conciliation and mediation 
of disputes may be more pervasive in Canadian law, certain 
elements of the Canadian approach have also been used in 
American emergency provisions and on a more voluntary basis 
in other laws. Moreover, many progressive features of 
Canadian law favoured by unions were copied from the United 
States: Canadian adoption of Wagner style guarantees in
World War II restricted "the previously unfettered 
authority of management" and improved the position of 
workers on the shop floor.7
Moreover, the gains to labour from the Canadian 
disputes resolution approach - arguably significant in the 
early years of weak unions - are not as evident in more 
recent times, when independent and strong unions have felt 
themselves constrained by the strong government role in 
resolution of industrial disputes. The author of Canada's 
early and influential IDIA, William Lyon Mackenzie King, 
harboured a corporatist vision of an organic society in 
which labour, although possessing legitimate interests, was 
to be subordinate to the requisites of management and 
capital; the "organic role of the working class is thus of 
a lower order than that of the directing principles of 
capital and management".8 In disputes resolution, the need 
of the latter for stability and control of the industrial 
process should be paramount.9 There can hardly be a 
socialistic inspiration behind a regime in industrial 
relations which constrains labour from using its natural 
strength (e.g. through strike action) to improve its 
position in negotiations. As Jamieson argues, Canadian 
legislation appears to have been "particularly favourable 
to employers as against unions in situations of industrial 
strife, to a degree exceeding even that in the United 
States".10 The frequent use of government power to legislate
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an end to strike action in that country also indicates the 
often unsympathetic character of state action for Canada's 
labour movement.
It has been the relative weakness of business and 
labour organizations which has impelled a greater Canadian 
reliance on state action. Morton and Copp note how a 
"scattered, feeble" Canadian labour movement looked more 
frequently to the state to provide supportive legislation 
in matters of hours, bargaining rights, safety and so 
forth. Unions did distrust the established parties of 
lawyers, doctors, farmers and merchants, inducing them to 
seek direct representation in government. Nonetheless, in 
periods of weakness, government was still viewed as an 
essential ally.11 But as Jamieson notes, both parties to 
indstrial conflict have relied on state intervention in 
times of weakness (as the above cases illustrate). An 
inconsistency in ideology and policy has developed with 
both parties depending on government protection against the 
other in "free" collective bargaining. And much of the 
intervention has come at the expense of effective labour 
action. "Weaknesses in organization on both sides further 
contribute to excessive dependence upon legal prescriptions 
and procedures, particularly the frequent issuance of court 
injunctions against unions".12 This is hardly evidence of a 
socialist influenced political culture.
In short, the complex content and shifting character 
of industrial relations legislation does not permit the 
ready classification of one country's experiments as more 
interventionist or socialistic than the other. But the two 
countries may have witnessed a different pattern of policy 
development based on a different response to crisis and its 
aftermath. In normal times, both systems seemed to share 
the aim of ensuring the containment of industrial conflict 
to ensure the maintenance of stability and production so 
desired by business leaders. In essence, the state in both 
countries seemed to be constrained by the need to maintain 
business confidence in designing an industrial relations 
policy geared to encourage responsible "business unionism" 
of the conservative craft variety, while limiting the
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prospects for more radical labour activism.
At times, - particularly in crisis situations, when 
political instability or radicalism threatened this stable 
order - deviations from this approach have been evident, as 
the state reacted to the growing political strength of 
labour. This was evident in the IDIA period when public 
utility strikes threatened transportation and fuel supplies 
on the fragile Canadian frontier? from the late 1800s when 
transportation strikes threatened to disrupt American 
interstate commerce? in the first world war in both 
countries? in the American great depression when the Wagner 
policy temporarily assisted the expansion of the more 
militant industrial unions? and in World War II in Canada, 
when the fear of strikes and unrest, coupled with the 
growing strength of the socialistic third party, threatened 
the Canadian administration.
d) Political Institutions and Policy Development
If similar crises brought innovation, the two 
countries differed in their readjustment patterns after 
crises had subsided. This may reflect differences between 
the political structures of the two countries. In Canada, 
the IDIA regime, strengthened in wartime, remained the 
framework for industrial relations until the second great 
war, albeit weakened by judicial rulings. The United States 
adopted some guarantees in the railway labour field, but 
altered the policy several times with shifting coalitions 
in the legislative branch? Congress ultimately acted in 
anti-union fashion after the first world war. Canadian 
policy alterations were perhaps more subtle, with the IDIA 
provisions being enforced in varying fashion, and acting as 
a hindrance or reinforcement for union strength at 
different times. Canada acted later than the United States 
to respond to the depression crisis, but this reflected 
constitutional uncertainty more than ideology. In the 
United States, the end of depression and war brought a 
retrenchment, as a conservative congress increased state 
restriction on the powers of unions under Taft-Hartley. If 
Canada did not follow the Taft-Hartley reaction completely,
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it was as much because of the continuing threat from the 
labour-backed third party, and the continued efforts by the 
Liberal administration of Prime Minister King to 
reincorporate labour voters in the party faithful, as to 
any ideological difference between Canadian and American 
decisionmakers. In general, due to the directive role of 
the Canadian administration in the development of policy, 
the Canadian system allowed less role for the opponents of 
existing policy to seek changes through the legislative 
branch. The United States acted more directly to regulate 
the internal affairs of unions? Canada did not follow 
nationally, since the errant unions in question were not 
under federal jurisdiction.
Thus many variations between the evolution of Canadian 
and American policy in this field seem more attributable to 
political institutions than to ideology or even the 
influence of interest groups. These institutional 
differences led to distinct policy traditions in each 
country which legitimated different state roles in
industrial relations. Possibly, the interventionism of a 
King or the conservatism of congressional actors do
represent different public ideologies resulting from
different institutional possibilities and policy histories. 
But the extent of policy differences may have been
overestimated in the past? the evidence on the attitudes of 
decisionmakers must thus be examined systematically, in 
light of institutional differences between the two 
countries. There is no evidence to suggest formal 
ideological traditions produced policy differences in this 
field.
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18 Income Security Assessment
a) Summary of Group Attitudes
The income security case studies cast doubt on the 
stereotype that Canadians more quickly achieved a 
ideological consensus on income security policy than 
Americans.1 Each of these major income security policy 
proposals provoked a similar range of debate in Canada and 
the United States, dividing business, professionals and 
labour in each country. While the views of individual 
groups at times diverged from this general pattern, basic 
similarities in group reactions to income security seem 
evident, based on class position.
American unions were initially hesitant to support 
state income security programmes. But this reflected the 
voluntarism so closely associated with Samuel Gompers? 
higher wages and stronger unions were the preferred means 
of promoting income security for workers. Union conventions 
indicated the support of the rank and file and local union 
affiliates for government action to assist the aged, sick 
and unemployed. Voluntarism among the leadership induced 
procrastination in effective lobbying? nonetheless, by the 
Great Depression, American labour support was assured. 
Although the earlier hesitancy may have contributed to the 
delay in enactment of an income security system in that 
country, unions eventually became a major force seeking 
liberalization of the programme. By contrast, Canadian 
union leaders were more consistently supportive of income 
security; and their advocacy, via sympathetic members of 
parliament in and the CCF\NDP, did help produce government 
action in pensions, unemployment insurance and health 
insurance. After adoption, their desire for increased 
benefits and liberalized qualification terms closely 
resembled the positions of American union leaders.
Business associations shared similar concerns in the 
two countries. Public income security was feared as a 
threat to thrift, as an economic burden, and as an 
unwarranted intrusion by government into an area of 
individual and family responsibility. The dynamic economies
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of these two countries were held to allow any prudent, 
frugal individual to save sufficiently for all 
contingencies. Business in both countries pursued voluntary 
alternatives in all major income security fields, favouring 
company plans as rewards to loyal employees? the 
shortcomings of such plans were recognized but seen as 
preferable to the removal of freedom with government 
compulsion. As the inevitability of adoption loomed, 
progressive business leaders urged cautious design? 
contributory self-financing systems were usually preferred 
to those drawn from public revenues, which would contribute 
to high tax burdens. Corporate spokesmen sought to limit 
public programmes to the needy, keep benefit levels .to a 
minimum and to protect private alternatives to retain 
employee good-will. After adoption, business leaders sought 
to restrain benefit increases, limit liberalization of 
qualifying terms, and preserve or improve the financial 
arrangements to prevent insolvency and fiscal drain.
Despite the stereotype of American rejection of state 
action in health insurance, the AMA actually proved 
sympathetic to the idea around World War I. But 
conservative elements soon induced a durable hostility to 
the proposal? even in depression, only limited policies of 
aid with the medical bills of the indigent was considered 
acceptable. After defeating the Truman administrations call 
for comprehensive, public health insurance, the AMA 
maintained opposition even to scaled down proposals for 
public insurance for the aged and poor? voluntary provision 
with some public subsidy of premiums, was preferred. 
Doctors maintained an individualist preference for autonomy 
from bureaucratic control, reinforced by a desire to 
maximize earnings in the medical market place, which 
dictated opposition to extensive government involvement.
Canadian doctors followed the early interest of their 
American colleagues, and likewise turned away from health 
insurance in the booming 1920s. The severity of the 
depression in this smaller country and its drastic impact 
on doctors incomes, ensured renewed support of a carefully 
designed insurance plan, which would provide benefits for
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the indigent, while maintaining market relations for better 
off patients. This proposal was further adjusted to 
diminish state control by the 1940s. In the prosperous 
aftermath of war, doctors abandoned support for any public 
insurance programme, calling instead for public subsidy for 
the private insurance premiums of poor and aged patients. 
It has been argued that the "profession in Canada was 
prepared to play a much more positive and constructive role 
than its United States counterpart in developing ... health 
care plans". But the work stoppages of the last three 
decades reinforce the suggestion that the mood of organized 
medicine can perhaps be described as one of "wariness but 
essentially constructive cooperation despite heated 
disputes with government on specific issues".2
b) Summary of Policy Development
Hence the range of concerns and debates over income 
security policy was not dissimilar in the two countries. 
But, policy development was at times divergent, although 
not always in a manner confirming greater Canadian 
attachment to socialist influences or statist preferences.
Canadians were not initially more disposed to move 
into the field of old age pensions. Bryden has demonstrated 
how a market ethos in Canada delayed and later skewed 
Canada*s old age pension system, as a concern for financial 
expediency overmatched concern for recipient welfare. 
Canada did act first in adopting old age pensions. But 
these non-contributory pensions were limited to residents 
of long-standing, over the age of seventy, and were quickly 
eclipsed by the hybrid American combination of social 
assistance for the needy and contributory social security, 
which surpassed the Canadian plan in scope of coverage. 
Canada only slowly moved to a similarly comprehensive 
programme. Moreover, both plans currently feature 
regressive financing, relying on payroll taxes. Rather than 
acting to redistribute income, the Canadian pensions 
exaggerate income differences. Benefit levels are 
comparable in the two countries although the American 
benefits are less sensitive to pre-retirement earnings.
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In unemployment insurance, the Americans set the pace 
in 1935, and enacted a programme with a tax on payrolls of 
employers, and not employee contributions. Canada was among 
the last of the industrial nations to adopt such a 
programme, holding for a protracted time to the belief in 
individual responsibility. Canadian policy-makers relied on 
conservative traditional remedies for the duration of the 
depression, citing fiscal responsibility and avoidance of 
disincentives at the low paid end of the labour market as 
the principal reasons for stalling. Constitutional 
considerations were not the only source of delay. Once 
adopted, the Canadian policy imposed contributions even on 
low paid workers, thus surpassing the American plan in 
regressive financing. Both countries have since sought to 
find a balance between the political pressures for 
liberalization and the requirements of fiscal 
responsibility. Although they have varied depending on the 
state, American benefits generally are higher than those in 
Canada's national plan, while the number of workers covered 
is usually narrower and benefit periods often shorter.3
In the health insurance field, the American government 
gave consideration to the proposal years before the 
Canadians. The reluctance of Canadian decisionmakers to 
act, even in the post-war reconstruction phase was in 
striking contrast to the full-fledged support of the Truman 
administration? only the successful professional lobbying 
effort on the conservative caucus in Congress forestalled 
a comprehensive American programme at this stage. While 
proponents maintained a desire for a complete medical 
insurance plan, political expediency caused a retreat to a 
partial programme for the elderly and poor. In Canada, 
provincial action, and the minority position of the Liberal 
governments of the 1960s eventually forced introduction of 
a comprehensive plan, constituting the most significant 
policy deviation between the two countries. But the plan 
as devised was hardly detrimental to the profession, since 
it raised incomes considerably.
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c) Policy and Ideology in Income Security
With the adoption of health insurance and the 
liberalization of other income security policies, Canada 
moved beyond the United States in the extent and generosity 
of its programmes. This does not represent any initial 
ideological preference, but a recent evolution in Canadian 
attitudes. Aucoin notes how the precedents set at the 
provincial level in Saskatchewan prompted increased 
"acceptance of the legitimacy and inevitability of social 
welfare reforms" in Canada.4 Dennis Guest also charts an 
evolution from a belief in market and family responsibility 
to one of state social security. But he cautions: 
"[a]lthough there has been a shift there remains an 
undercurrent of belief that the private market should still 
provide the mechanisms for meeting adversity and the 
tension between the two views continues to affect the 
social policy process".5 As A.W. Johnson expressed it: "most 
Canadians believe people should save for the contingencies 
of life, including retirement, not be guaranteed an income 
by others" Social security should guard against temporary 
contingencies, not provide for socialistic redistribution, 
which would undermine work incentives? there is still a 
belief that the deserving needy must be separated from the 
undeserving.6
Critical analysts would suggest similar motives in 
development of social policy in the two countries. Bound 
either through elite ties, or economic imperatives to the 
adoption of policies beneficial to the capitalist economy, 
each country devised income security measures to legitimate 
the existing order and stimulate economic activity. 
Canadian social policy has not gone further than American 
policy towards income redistribution7? indeed if the 
incidence of taxes is taken into account the overall impact 
of the Canadian welfare state could be viewed as 
regressive.8 Preservation of inequality, is after all, 
essential to the successful operation of the incentive 
system of capitalism.9 Canada has a similar individualist
tradition which has impeded development of income security
• • • 10 • and redistributive programmes. The recent conservative
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trend towards reduction of the fiscal burden, through 
retrenchment of the welfare state has been evident in 
Canada as well as the United States.11 Hence, Canada does 
not exhibit more altruistic motives in the creation of the 
welfare state; rather, pragmatic considerations appear 
dominant.
Any differences in policy do not appear to have an 
ideological element; there is no evidence that Canada has 
pursued a more socialistically oriented policy, aimed at 
income redistribution. Instead the income security policies 
of the two countries are only marginally different and 
eminently liberal in their content. Income security policy 
in both countries was designed to reinforce a capitalist 
economy, not to transform it.12 As Manzer argues for 
Canada, despite changes in specific arrangements, tests, 
and criteria for eligibility: "at every stage liberal
beliefs in individual responsibility, private property, 
income inequalities, and public charity for the deserving 
poor have determined particular policy responses”.13 In 
short, Canada’s liberal reforms did not move beyond 
equality of opportunity to promote the socialist goal of 
equality of condition, as claimed in conventional 
comparisons of the two political cultures.
d) Political Institutions and Policy Development
But a strict instrumentalist or structuralist position 
cannot explain the variations in policy in the two 
countries. Why did Canada’s welfare state eventually expand 
beyond American practice? There are many possible 
explanations. But, as in industrial relations, political 
structures seem of particular importance. Canada's 
parliamentary system, with its executive direction of 
policy, allowed governments to pursue new initiatives 
without hindrance from opposing lobbies in the legislative 
branch. In addition, the bureaucratic continuity of the 
Canadian civil service differs from the instability among 
America's bureaucratic mandarins with changing Presidents: 
this continuity may have been a key factor in the 
development of the unemployment insurance policy, as
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bureaucratic policy development continued unabated under 
several different cabinets. Moreover, minority governments 
have been subjected to pressure from a social democratic 
third party, the CCF-NDP, which demanded social programmes 
in return for its parliamentary support. This factor seems 
important in old age pensions (1926 and 1965) and health 
insurance.
While federal-provincial conflicts, and judicial 
interpretation of the division of powers did slow some 
policy developments in income security, this factor was 
perhaps offset by the efficient decision-making of 
executive-dominated parliamentary government; Banting shows 
how federal provincial competition for jurisdiction has 
spurred both levels of government to assert their 
sovereignty over income security matters by adopting new 
programmes? executive summitry between federal and 
provincial leaders permitted resolution of disputes and 
steady growth of the Canadian welfare state after World War 
H .14
This situation contrasts with the American decision­
making fragmentation, which frustrated reforms like health 
insurance. In the 1930s, a liberal Congress pushed the 
Roosevelt administration into action on unemployment 
insurance and social security. Indeed, despite the 
reforming reputation of that President, administration 
attitudes at that time may have served to restrain action 
to fairly limited, regressive programmes, gradually 
liberalized by Congress in latter years. The creation of 
the powerful Social Security Administration aided in this 
liberalization, by providing continuity of bureaucratic 
policy development and expertise. By the late 1940s, a 
conservative coalition holding the reins in Congress, may 
have acted a brake on the Truman administration's health 
insurance programme. Through the 1960s, the alliance of 
conservative Southern Democrats and Republicans managed to 
prevent development of a comprehensive health care plan. 
While other forces may be cited, political structure seems 
more useful than ideology as an explanation of variations 
in North American income security policy.
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19 Are Public Corporations an Exception?
a) A 11 Public Enterprise Culture11?
Critics might suggest that the two policy fields 
selected are not fully representative of the range of 
possible transnational comparisons. Policy developments in 
other areas might reflect the predicted greater Canadian 
acceptance of state action. Of course, any study cannot 
survey all possible policy types? it would be wise to avoid 
overgeneralizing from the selected cases.
But one policy device merits brief consideration here. 
Public corporations are often cited as a prime example of 
Canadian-American policy differences. Canada has employed 
this device far more frequently than the United States, in 
sectors ranging from transportation and communications to 
steel and petroleum. By the standard account, the 
conservative elements in the Canadian political tradition 
made for acceptance of a strong state role in creation of 
enterprises. George Grant suggests this explains the role 
of Canada's Conservative Party in creating the Canadian 
National Railways, the Bank of Canada, the Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, and provincial electrical 
utilities.1 Horowitz had also argued that the distinctive 
Canadian tradition was reflected in the "far greater 
willingness of English-Canadian political and business 
elites to use the power of the state for the purpose of 
developing and controlling the economy".2 Herschel Hardin 
has portrayed Canada's "public enterprise culture" as its 
principal distinguishing feature in a North American 
context.3
b) Pragmatic Basis of Canadian Public Corporations
Several recent studies of Canadian public corporations 
have challenged the view of Canada as ideologically more 
predisposed to adoption of this device. Rather, pragmatic 
considerations have necessitated development of government 
owned companies in certain economic sectors. In Gracey's 
estimate:
In only a few cases can the development of public
enterprises be attributed to any particular
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political philosophy. In the main, our 
significant reliance on public enterprise can be 
attributed to the Canadian situation: a vast
country, rich in natural resources but small in 
population, bordering on the United States, the 
most dominant economic power in the world.
This has necessitated government action to create vital
infrastructure and to keep key resource industries under
Canadian control.4 Allan Tupper concurs for the early
period: "many major experiments with state ownership are
attributable, not to powerful ideological concerns, but
rather to the reluctance of private enterprise to extend,
promptly and cheaply, vital transportation, communication
and hydro services to remote and scattered centres".5 He
agrees with Innis that "government ownership in Canada is
fundamentally a phenomenon peculiar to a new country".6
There was a great fear that in some fields, such as
electronic broadcasting and air transportation, American
businesses would displace domestic entrepreneurs because
of their technological superiority and cheaper costs from
a larger domestic market.
c) Transportation in an Underpopulated Nation
Preliminary consideration of major Canadian public 
corporations confirms that there was no ideological 
consensus in favour of government enterprise. Although John 
Eagle claims the Borden government favoured development of 
the government-controlled Canadian National Railway 
system,7 Canada only acted to acquire ownership of railways 
because of the financial difficulty faced by the many small 
private lines in this sparse market.8 Criticism by private 
business of the government stock takeover was protracted 
and intense.9 When C.D. Howe was presiding over the 
creation of Trans-Canada Airways (later Air Canada) in the 
late 1930s, he met resistance from private interests 
supporting either government subsidy (via mail carrier 
rights) to a Canadian firm10 or opening of the market to 
private American investors.11 While rejecting these 
overtures, government met its critics half-way by creating 
a company with partial stock ownership by the government- 
owned Canadian National Railways?12 even this concession did
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not please all the critics of government involvement.13
d) Public Broadcasting: "The State or the United States"
The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation has also been 
cited as an example of transnational variation. But it also 
seems to have been created for primarily pragmatic reasons. 
Certainly there was no consensus surrounding its birth14? 
some business lobbyists argued vigorously in favour of 
private alternatives, particularly manufacturers seeking an 
advertising vehicle15, promoters of a private Canadian 
network, led by the Canadian Pacific Railroad,16 and the 
Canadian Association of Broadcasters, representing private 
American radio interests.17 Public broadcasting received the 
support of nationalists in the Canadian Radio League, 
admirers of the British model of the BBC18, of unions19, and 
of some Canadian business advertisers fearful that leaving 
the field to American stations and private Canadian
affiliates could give American advertisers a major market
20 • • • advantage. Ultimately nationalism, not socialism,
motivated the government. 11 As in earlier Canadian
enterprises, there was no commitment to public ownership
in principle, but once convinced that the choice was
between 'the state or the United States', most Canadians
of the 'thirties had a ready answer".21
e) Hvdro Power and Industrial Development
Kenneth Dewar has directly challenged the traditional 
interpretation by analyzing the creation of Ontario Hydro, 
the provincial electrical utility. He notes that the 
progressive businessmen who sponsored its creation were 
mostly concerned about promoting the economic development 
of the economy? it would both provide a cheap reliable
source of energy for industry and broaden the consumer
market for electric devices through a programme of
province-wide electrification. The principal proponents of 
this public utility were business leaders who woiild benefit 
from cheap power, not politicians or consumers. The 
movement represented business interests, not ideology?
"[f]ar from expressing a Tory conception of Canadian
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society, the power movement strove to infuse state 
institutions with those values of economy, efficiency, and 
expertise that were the hallmarks of progressive commercial 
enterprise".22 This thesis has been confirmed by Nelles, 
who argued that Ontario Hydro was designed by the business 
community to keep the cost of electricity down and ensure 
that major projects like Niagara were not entirely exported 
to the United States.23
In more recent years new motives have emerged to 
foster such government action: a desire to keep resource 
rents in Canada, and promote regional development, for 
instance. Thus, western governments have acted to assert 
control over resources, ensure local processing, develop 
essential infrastructure for industrialization, or promote 
economic diversification.24 Quebec has used public companies 
to enhance the participation of francophones in the 
provincial economy and permit displacement of the 
anglophone business elite of the past.25 In Atlantic Canada, 
public corporations have been used to support declining 
industries or to compensate for lack of new investment in 
this depressed, peripheral economy. 26
f) American Public Enterprise
The United States also has witnessed many examples of 
government action to fill an essential economic void where 
private capital was unwilling or unable to act effectively. 
Musolf notes how states and local governments acted to 
provide railroads, roads, canals and other infrastructure 
in the frontier economy of the day. As private capital 
increased in availability, individual entrepreneurs took 
over such enterprises. Generally, the Jeffersonian vision 
of limited government prevailed over Hamilton's blueprint 
for assertive state action in economic affairs.27 The 
emergencies of the twentieth century required government 
action, starting with the temporary takeover of the 
railways during World War I. During the Great Depression, 
public corporations such as the Tennessee Valley Authority 
were employed to stimulate economic activity in areas of 
the country where private enterprise did not see profitable
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opportunity. World War II also gave birth to numerous new 
public companies, some of which outlived the conflict.28 
Finally, as the passenger railway ceased to be economically 
viable, faced with increased competition from automobile 
and aircraft, the federal government stepped in to create 
a public corporation, Amtrak, to ensure continuation of 
service.29 As in Canada, the range of public corporations is 
quite wide, with emphasis on financial services, credit and 
insurance, electric power, transportation, and other areas 
"skewed toward supporting the economy rather than operating 
segments of it”.30
The principal difference is to be found in Canada's 
more frequent use of public companies in manufacturing and 
resource sectors: steel, coal-mining, petroleum, atomic
energy, and marketing boards. This reflects the weaker 
domestic economy, especially in depressed regions and a 
desire to prop up essential, or politically visible 
enterprises. The United States, with its , buoyant 
manufacturing market, has had less reason to create public 
companies in such areas. However, it has acted in this 
fashion in the vital defence sectors.31 It has also become 
so enmeshed in providing grants, loans or guaranteed sales 
to defence and high technology companies, that the lines 
between public enterprise and private capital have often 
become blurred. In Gailbraith's terms: ”[f]or the large, 
specialised weapons firm the cloak of private enterprise is 
already perilously, indecently thin”.32 Robert Lively sums 
up the state-business partnership in the U.S. in these 
terms: [o]fficial vision and public resources have been
associated so regularly with private skill and individual 
desire that the combination may be said to constitute a 
principal determinant of American economic growth”.33
g) The Liberal Basis of Public Corporations
While the observations here are only preliminary, they 
do indicate that the differing degree of employment of this 
device does not reflect basic ideological differences; 
Canadian public corporations have been designed to 
supplement, not supplant, the private economy. Americans
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have also been willing to supplement the market, where 
weak, with public companies or public subsidy; the less 
frequent use of such a device reflects "undercurrents of 
doubt about its appropriateness in a setting where private 
enterprise has been vigorous and assertive”.34 In Canada, 
where the economy has not always been so vigorous and 
potential markets not so attractive, a public alternative 
has been necessary to forestall foreign penetration. Hardin 
may be correct in suggesting that greater acceptance of 
public corporations developed in Canada after the success 
and popularity of the initial experiments. Nonetheless, the 
practice had its origins in pragmatic adjustment to 
economic conditions and international challenges and not in 
any traditional ideological predisposition. As Dewar 
concludes:
The political debate over public ownership offers 
no evidence of a peculiar collectivist 
mentality... . The dominance of businessmen in
the public ownership movement and of businesslike 
pragmatism in the case presented for state 
intervention suggests that state action has a 
social bases which has been downplayed in the 
general interpretations.35
Clearly, Canadian public corporations have been designed
to support a liberal economy, not to introduce a socialized
one. The recent government moves to privatize major public
corporations, such as Air Canada, casts further doubt on
any sacrosanct tradition of government ownership? clearly
Canadian decisionmakers have been following international
trends in this respect.
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20 Principal Findings
a) Summary
This thesis traced the development of public policy 
in industrial relations and income security in Canada and 
the United States, to assess the conventional distinction 
between Canadian interventionist and American laissez-faire 
traditions as the source of contemporary policy 
differences. It did not seek to provide a comprehensive 
depiction of the evolution of programmes in each policy 
area. Research was focused on an assessment of interest 
group reactions, as indications of societal attitudes 
towards the appropriate role of the state in social and 
economic affairs. An overview of the ideological character 
of major policy developments was also provided. These 
findings will now be assessed.
b) Divergent Ideological Traditions?
These cases cast doubt on the proposition that 
ideological traditions, rooted in the early development of 
these two nations, explain variations in these two policy 
areas. Despite some differences, the overall pattern of 
attitudes and the pattern of policy development both cast 
doubt on the stereotype of Canadian interventionism as a 
national consensus. The orthodox political culture model 
assumes national ideological consensus which was shown to 
be absent in most of the cases examined; in both countries, 
significant class-based differences in attitudes towards 
state activity were evident. As in all nations, groups 
reactions to those policies studied were based on short­
term perceptions of self-interest, not on any enduring 
ideological tradition. Societal demands certainly did not 
conform to the stereotypes of national values.
Early Canadian policy in the selected cases also did 
not reflect a distinct tradition of interventionism. 
Rather, as Preece argued, a common Anglo-Saxon liberal 
tradition of limited government, individual self-help, and 
free enterprise appeared dominant in policy development. 
Both nations initially preserved individual responsibility
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for social provision, and unfettered freedom for business 
to resist union development and demands. Hence both were 
slow to provide social welfare or to guarantee rights of 
unions to bargain collectively. This was not a purely 
laissez-faire approach, as state action often assisted 
considerably in aiding business resistance to union growth, 
both through coercive police actions, and through judicial 
strictures. But the motivations in both nations was 
similar; private enterprise should be unimpeded in its role 
as the principal engine of economic development. Where 
deviations from the limited state did . occur, as in the 
repression of unions or expansion of public enterprise, the 
aim remained promotion of the private economy; public 
relief was a supplement to individual effort and private 
charity was similarly an expedient to preserve the social 
order required for economic growth.
There was no shortage of support for liberal ideology, 
limited state, and individualism in Canada at any period. 
Subsequently, both societies developed alternative popular 
ideologies seeking reform of the system through state 
intervention, regulation and social programmes. Ideological 
heterogeneity in the United States has been much more 
evident than Canadian observers acknowledge. Socialist and 
progressive movements developed prior to Canadian 
counterparts. While the mainstream labour unions in the US 
did initially resist state action, because of the Gomperist 
doctrine of voluntarism, they had moved closer to Canadian 
and European unionists in their demands by the time of the 
Great Depression. As the cases outlined show, American 
labour has since espoused reform policies similar to the 
social democratic measures promoted by unionists in Canada 
and Europe.
It is possible that the ideologies of principal 
politicians and bureaucrats in Canada were more tolerant 
of state action. The thesis did not provide direct evidence 
on this question. Nonetheless, indirect observations, based 
on policy developments, indicate that such "state friendly" 
attitudes have been a recent development, rooted not in 
initial traditions, but in subsequent policy precedents and
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practices. Only in recent decades have such attitudes 
produced significant divergence in policy; and statist 
approaches have also made some impact on American 
policymaking at critical junctures. Further research on the 
presence or absence of "state friendly" attitudes among 
public sector actors would be necessary to disprove the 
conventional political culture perspective.
c) Public Ideology and Political Institutions
There is no doubt that recent Canadian policy has been 
interventionist. Canada has differed in its approach to 
industrial disputes resolution, health insurance, and 
public corporations. However, the presence of greater 
interventionism among Canadian decisionmakers does not 
necessarily confirm that traditional values are directly 
responsible for such contemporary policy variations. 
Instead, as Peter Hall has argued, institutional factors 
may significantly affect the parameters and content of 
culture.1 While a definitive assessment of the relative 
importance of these factors cannot be made here, some 
possible influences of institutional variations on public 
ideology and policy may be suggested.
One key difference appears to be the nature of the two 
electoral systems and the possibility for development of 
third parties in each country. The American system is 
particularly stifling of third party efforts, given the 
need to win across an entire state or throughout the whole 
nation to gain executive power. In addition, dissidents 
could assume positions of influence in a political party 
via the primary system; this strategy weakened the ability 
of third parties to develop on an ongoing basis. The social 
democratic CCF-NDP in Canada has benefitted from an 
electoral system which, lacking the primary election, has 
forced dissidents, such as socialist labour and radical 
agrarian movements, to form new parties to promote their 
policy preferences. Creation of a distinct party 
organization induced increased credibility and support for 
social democratic values in Canada, via socialization of 
successive generations of party loyalists. Ultimately, this
371
third party exercised significant influence on policy 
development through provincial policy experimentation 
(especially in Saskatchewan) ; the party also made its 
presence felt through electoral pressure in the Depression 
and in World War II, which caused the Liberals to move to 
the left to secure increased support, by liberalizing 
Canadian industrial relations and income security policy.
This party's influence is linked also to the 
parliamentary system of government, which occasionally 
permits minority factions in the parliament to hold a 
balance of power. With the survival of the Cabinet resting 
on support from a majority of members, minority parties 
have been able to extract concessions from government in 
exchange for support, to influence policy through 
ministerial anticipation of minority party demands, or to 
induce major parties to compete for third party voters by 
stealing policies originated by the minor parties. In this 
fashion the CCF-NDP has influenced in particular the policy 
of Liberal governments on various occasions since the 
1920s. While liberal Democrats and their labour allies in 
the United States have often favoured similar policies, 
their lower profile and influence in a larger party, and 
the barriers of Congressional politics (as discussed below) 
certainly lessened their influence.
The responsible government model also concentrates 
decision-making in the hands of the executive. Canadian 
cabinets, like British ones, have had the ability to secure 
enactment of their programmes more readily, without the 
interference of parliamentary opponents. This permitted 
cabinet proponents of policy innovation to secure action, 
rather than face the constant disheartening interference of 
Congressional committees and filibusters. No Canadian Prime 
Minister has had his legislative programme so harshly 
treated as Truman's health insurance proposal. The Canadian 
system also gives greater influence to the permanent 
bureaucracy in administrative departments. Unlike the 
American approach, in which many key decision-makers are 
displaced with the election of a new President, the 
Canadian administration, following British tradition,
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theoretically rests on a non-partisan permanent civil 
service.
This Canadian system promotes continuity in 
administrative approaches to key social and industrial 
relations policy. The most notable intervention in Canadian 
industrial relations, the 1907 IDIA was initiated, and 
designed by Mackenzie King, as Deputy Minister of Labour. 
Subsequent developments in this programme also had 
bureaucratic origins. Pal has demonstrated the importance 
of this continuity for the emergence of the unemployment 
insurance plan, which was discussed and developed by 
departmental experts, following actuarial criteria, and a 
conservative concern with programme solvency. A perusal of 
the files of the Labour Department at the Public Archives 
of Canada reveals that the same experts continued 
preparations for this policy under Liberal and Conservative 
governments? this process continued from the late 1920s 
until adoption of the policy in 1940, with considerable 
continuity in the essentials of the programme through two 
changes in the party of government. The policy adopted by 
the Liberals under King in 1940 was not dissimilar in 
essentials from Bennett's proposals of 1935.
While some continuity was also evident in American 
policy making, especially by the Social Security Board with 
regard to social insurance, it would be interesting to 
study in further detail the implications in this differing 
model of the relations between civil servants and 
politicians. Changes in administrations brought significant 
alterations in policy preference - witness the abandonment 
of health insurance as a project by the Eisenhower 
administration in the 1950s. Continuity in demand for such 
policies comes from the longevity of key Congressional 
proponents, such as Claude Pepper and Edward Kennedy on 
health insurance.
The presence in the United States of an independent 
Congress, lacking the party discipline and executive 
leadership of the parliamentary system became an important 
constraint on policy development after the New Deal era. 
Congressional organization is ripe for blockage of policy
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innovation, given the possibilities for stalling proposals
in committees and the need to secure support in two
independent and politically distinct chambers. As Robert
Bendiner phrased it:
A United States congressman has two principal 
functions: to make laws and to keep laws from 
being made. The first of these he and his 
colleagues perform only with sweat, patience and 
a remarkable skill in the handling of creaking 
machinery; but the second they perform daily with 
ease and infinite variety. Indeed, if that 
government is best that governs least, than 
Congress is one of the most perfect instruments 
of government.2
Herzberg has examined the many structural complexities of
Congress, which make policy blockage so simple. She
emphasizes the "status quo bias implied by such a
cumbersome decision process. Blocking makes change more
difficult ...",3 In addition Congressional emphasis on
seniority in committee assignments ensured
overrepresentation in vital committee positions of those
politicians with political longevity - often drawn from the
most conservative (especially Southern) states - creating
a powerful oligarchy resistant to change and able to use
committees to stall legislation.4
In the deepest crisis of the Depression, the President
and liberal Congressional leaders were able to innovate in
labour and social security policy, moving American ahead of
Canadian practice at the time. Once the immediate crisis
had subsided, by the late 1930s, Congress reasserted its
independence, and the election of a conservative Republican
majority ensured restraint on further executive
initiatives.5 In the Truman administration, Republican
dominance of Congress prevented fulfilment of the
President's ambitions for a liberal labour policy and for
expansion of social security to include health insurance.6
Subsequent studies have demonstrated the strength of the
cross-party conservative coalition in the American Congress7
over the subsequent decades, as it influence was sustained
and increased.8 This coalition involved an alliance of
Southern Democrats with conservative Republicans.9
Conservative Southern Democrats' hesitancy to support
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labour reform was subsequently matched by unrelenting 
hostility to further social security programmes.10
These decades of Congressional independence coincided 
with the period of policy innovation in Canada, as the 
welfare state expanded and labour policy did not follow the 
American conservative lead. This situation was slightly 
attenuated by the 1960s, allowing a period of more liberal 
social policy development in the United States, including 
adoption of medicare.11 Nonetheless, American policy 
proponents often had to adjust to instittuional 
disincentives by limiting the scope of their ambitions, as 
with the partial medicare scheme.
d) The Significance of Tradition
Therefore, the most significant impact of traditions 
seems to be the Canadian rejection of republicanism, 
preservation of a parliamentary system of government, and 
resistance to populist reforms such as primary elections. 
Early public policy indicates that Canadian political and 
central elites shared the American's preference for a 
limited state, voluntaristic charity and liberal economy. 
But Canada's founders had less concern about the possible 
concentration of authority within government. Hence, the 
centralized executive model of Britain's constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary system was adopted. While the 
scope of government activity was to be limited, the state 
was accorded greater freedom of action, through the fusion 
of powers and rejection of democratic devices like the 
primaries, recall, initiatives and so forth. The result was 
the flexible system described above. Therefore, by 
following British practice, the Canadian founders 
unwittingly set the stage for policies inimical to their 
own liberal policy preferences. The impact of tradition was 
thus indirect, and did not involve the rejection of 
liberalism. A procedural ideology favouring concentration 
of authority in the political executive, created the 
possibility for future substantive policy variations 
between the two nations.
It is necessary to reassess the relationship between
375
political structure and political culture. While 
distinctions in the founding traditions of these two 
societies were important in creating varying political 
institutions, the institutional arrangements themselves 
subsequently became influential in determining which 
interests and ideologies would actually be reflected in 
policy. As Peter Hall suggests, "some differences in 
behaviour that we might be tempted to ascribe to 
distinctive cultures may be more directly attributable to 
the ways in which a particular institutional setting 
conditions the perceptions and expectations of those within 
it, by affecting the contigent matrix of incentives they 
face".12 Differences in political structures between Canada 
and the United States provided different institutional 
possibilities for the successful political expression of 
certain interest groups. Thus, while American popular 
groups found direct political involvement stifled by 
republican executive and electoral structures, Canadian 
groups attained greater success via third party efforts; 
and congressional complexity aided central groups to resist 
interventionist policies inimical to their interests. Over 
time, these differing institutional "routines and 
rationalities"13 modified the demands, expectations and 
political activities of various societal interests. Despite 
the early prominence of liberal and laissez-faire exponents 
in Canadian political life, alternative interventionist and 
social democratic influences were facilitated by the 
parliamentary legislative and electoral systems.
Therefore, the impact of tradition may have been 
significant but in a more indirect fashion. Rather than 
concluding that Canadians share a different conception of 
the role of the state in society, analysts should 
acknowledge the ideological diversity and similarity in 
both countries, and examine more thoroughly the impact of 
institutions. An exploration of this linkage is crucial to 
an understanding of continental differences.
e) Continental Convergence or Ideological Divergence?
Many Canadian scholars suggest that the development
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of substantial cross border economic, educational, cultural
and personal interconnections has led to the demise of
Canada's ideological distinctiveness. They point to such
factors as continental media flows14, business interactions,
organizational linkages, educational interchanges15,
technological interdependence16 and other factors as
undermining the viability of distinctive Canadian political
values. Westell exclaims:
What is now happening in Canada is that U.S. 
attitudes are infusing political debate and 
changing the traditional relationship between the 
citizen and the state. Canadians, like Americans, 
are coming to see government not as friend and 
protector but as fool, knave and potential 
oppressor.17
Certainly, such continental pressures cannot be 
disregarded. American perspectives and policy approaches 
have been very influential over the years, acting as 
precedents for Canadian policy in many instances? American 
policy debates receive significant attention in Canada
However, the historical importance of this change 
should not be exaggerated. Transnational influences and 
policy similarities are not a recent phenomenon; the cases 
here show similar debates and transnational policy 
borrowing by Canada from the early twentieth century. At 
the same time, American and Canadian policy makers were 
well versed with social democratic and socialist 
experiments in Europe and the Commonwealth. And, as Mildred 
Schwartz argues, while transnational government contacts 
have been extensive, policy similarities reflect as much 
the similar challenges facing two large, evolving 
industrial democracies, not simple American domination of 
Canadian thought. In her words, "there are many situations 
where both countries face common problems, and given a 
relatively restricted range of alternatives, come up with 
similar solutions. What may appear to be influence then is 
the result of a common fate".18 Therefore, the myth of 
Americanization of Canada's ideology must be called into 
question, as similar historical influences and changing 
social and class circumstances always moved policy in 
similar directions.
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similar directions.
The flexibility of the parliamentary system may have 
induced some transformation in Canadian political values 
over time which took Canada further from, rather than 
closer to American substantive ideology. Thus, as the 
system permitted more interventions in social and economic 
affairs, popular and bureaucratic support for such measures 
increased, as more persons benefitted from extensions of 
government activity. Hence, an interventionist state ceased 
to be considered unacceptable, and tolerance among the 
population for intervention may have increased. In 
particular, support for high levels of spending in income 
security fields has been considered a recent feature of 
Canadian political life. At the same time, the continued 
presence of a visible, distinct social democratic party has 
enhanced support for such policies in contrast to the 
United States, where such advocates have been buried within 
the larger Democratic Party.
But the recent prominence of neo-conservative views 
in Canadian political life and public policy has reversed 
this trend. Moves to privatize government assets, to revamp 
the tax system in regressive directions, and to reduce 
government expenditures on social and educational or 
cultural programmes indicates that Canada has not become 
immune to the influence of liberal, limited state 
ideology.19 Comparative opinion surveys of contemporary 
Canadian and American attitudes reveal few differences in 
the attachment to liberal laissez-faire among Canadian 
conservatives, with the Red Tory element not prominent. On 
the left, English Canadian and American attitudes revealed 
few significant differences; it was only the radicalism of 
the Quebec left by the 1970s which separated the two 
countries.20
f) State Constraint and Policy Similarities
Moreover, policy differences between the two countries 
do not indicate that the Canadian state has been more 
willing to go against central group pressures. Canada often 
followed American innovations in the case study fields up
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to the 1960s, with a lag attributable to delayed 
development and lesser societal demand and labour political 
power.21 In addition, Canadian deviations from liberal 
practice have been marginal, not approaching the social 
democratic model of Europe. If Canadian labour relations 
policy, particularly in the public sector, encouraged 
greater union militancy from the 1960s, the frequent use of 
back to work legislation reveals the state's determination 
to maintain the industrial stability required by business.22 
OECD statistics reveal only marginal differences in 
aggregate welfare spending by the two countries in 
percentage of GNP, with both ranking below European 
nations.23
These cases reveal a pattern of policy influence 
consistent with a neo-pluralist conception of the liberal- 
democratic state. The impact of both electoral calculus and 
economic constraints seems evident in the pattern of policy 
evolution. Thus, the capitalist system gives business 
interests greater influence over state policy in such 
economically sensitive fields as income security and 
industrial relations. The pressure to meet business needs 
to ensure successful economic performance - crucial to 
government for reasons of revenue and popularity - ensured 
attention to business views in all the cases. But the state 
did not exclusively act as the instrument of capitalists, 
as its policies were often sympathetic to labour concerns 
respecting income security, collective bargaining and 
organization rights. What do these cases indicate about the 
conditions likely to produce greater state independence 
from business desires and greater attention to popular 
interests?
One possibility involves a crisis situation, of 
international or domestic economic, military or political 
nature. Manley notes how the normal lethargy of 
Congressional policy-making, caused by structural 
complexity and lack of political discipline, can be 
overcome in major crises, only to revert quickly to a time- 
consuming, constraining process when crisis subsides.24 
Atleson notes the movement by American legislators to
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liberalize the collective bargaining regime in directions 
desired by labour during World War I and the depression, 
when worker militancy and unrest was considered dangerous 
to domestic and international security.25 Skocpol has 
similarly sensed the greater willingness to make 
concessions to labour in social policy when faced with a 
major crisis. To preserve their own positions, state 
managers respond to electoral challenge or violent unrest 
with policies which may be opposed by business.26 Leman 
detects this sort of response to crisis in American social 
policy development, noting the advances in American social 
security programmes in the depression and amidst the civil 
strife of the 1960s.27 However, as the industrial relations 
cases demonstrate, the passing of crisis often permits 
policy retrenchment, as in the Transportation Act moves to 
limit union bargaining power and the elimination of the 
Wagner Act provisions in Taft-Hartley; "normalcy" ensures 
renewed attentiveness to business requisites, to ensure the 
smooth operation of the capitalist economy.
Observers like Leman feel Canada deviates from this 
pattern, exhibiting a steadier, evolutionary development 
of welfare policies. This would be consistent with the 
political structure of this nation, featuring executive 
leadership and bureaucratic constancy. However, the cases 
here indicate that Canada was often also adopting a crisis 
management approach in deviating from the dictates of 
business. It also innovated significantly in times of 
domestic economic problems and international conflict, as 
in the adoption of the IDIA and PC 1003 in industrial 
relations. But the Canadian government faced a different 
type of crisis, caused by the parliamentary system's 
greater possibilities for third party development. Actual 
minority government situations (as with old age pensions 
in the 1920s, and health insurance and the Canada Pension 
Plan in the 1960s) or threatened increases in third party 
support (family allowances and PC 1003 in the 1940s) 
induced significant policy innovations in directions 
demanded by popular interests. Canadian governments have 
had to manage this type of political crisis by compromising
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with the opposition parties or by borrowing their 
platforms, causing some instances of "contagion from the 
left". This forces government leaders to temporarily ignore 
business entreaties and meet popular pressures. This 
situation does not face the independently elected executive 
in the American presidential system. Thus, while neo- 
Marxists and neopluralists have usefully specified the 
common pressures facing the liberal-democratic state, 
consideration of institutional variations is crucial to 
explain "cross-national variations in policy".28
Some Americanization has occurred in recent years, 
involving procedural ideology. A number of American 
political institutions have gained support in Canada.29 The 
1982 Constitution Act introduced a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms which for the first time protected fundamental 
freedoms and democratic rights? qualifications allowing for 
"reasonable limits" and parliamentary supremacy through a 
"notwithstanding clause" limited the constraints on the 
political executive and the scope for judicial review of 
legislation. Support is now growing for an elected Senate, 
with more powers, to replace the ineffectual appointed 
Chamber.30 Such an innovation could reduce the flexibility 
of the system, by introducing a more complicated process of 
lawmaking; the possibility of American style "blocking" if 
two effective chambers competed for policy influence cannot 
be discounted.
How would such restructuring of the Canadian state 
affect state-society relations? Nordlinger notes the 
importance of state "resilience" - the capacity to 
counteract actual or potential opposition from societal 
actors.31 For many analysts, decentralization of political 
authority and dispersion of power to numerous actors 
weakens state authority and results in greater 
vulnerability to societal pressures. If the neo-pluralist 
analysis is accepted, this would mean that states with low 
resilience would be more susceptible to business pressures. 
This analysis has illustrated how the institutional 
constipation of the American congressional system prevented 
executive agencies from following other liberal democracies
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in extending the welfare state. The prospects for 
innovative interventionist policy in Canada, imposed 
against the desires of central interests, might be reduced 
by institutional restructuring. Political culture may not 
preserve a uniquely Canadian approach to public policy if 
constitutional evolution proceeds unfavourably. Liberal 
democracies face similar economic and electoral pressures, 
but institutional arrangements determine how societal 
demands are translated into public policies. Constitutions 
do matter.
g) Concluding Assessment
Analysis must avoid unicausal explanations when 
examining comparative public policy. To attribute policy 
developments to a single factor, such as traditional 
political cultures is to overlook important complexities 
of comparative analysis. The thesis suggests that founding 
traditions (preserved as formal ideology), are not 
irrelevant to contemporary policy? but their impact must be 
precisely specified, as in this case via institutional 
variations. Neo-pluralist methodology, when sensitive to 
institutional considerations, can help balance 
consideration of material, political and ideological 
forces. This approach indicates the complicated electoral 
and economic constraints facing the liberal-democratic 
state, while taking account of the complexities and 
variations in state structures. Analysis cannot generalize 
beyond the case studies, since each policy warrants 
empirical investigation. However, this thesis has shown the 
need to consider ideology, interests and institutions as 
explanations of policy differences.
Future research should extend our understanding of 
developments in other policies which delineate the 
boundaries between private and public responsibility - 
notably family allowances, blind and disabled benefits, 
combines and anti-trust laws, regional development 
programmes, interprovincial fiscal equalization, industrial 
subsidies and regulation of the workplace, of product 
quality and of the environment. Further exploration of the
382
governments, of intergovernmental32 and international 
relations and influences, and regional and cultural 
variations within these nations is required to solidify the 
selected cases? in particular, the rapid transformation of 
Quebec in the 1960s from anti-statism to policy innovator 
must be contrasted with persistant Southern conservatism in 
the United States. A broader picture of the policy 
communities and the diverse interest groups and 
bureaucratic actors who influence policy decisions in a 
given area and at a specific time, is also needed33; as Hall 
suggests, social institutions, such the organization of 
capital and labour, and the balance of class forces must be 
considered integral to an adequate institutional analysis.34 
This thesis is merely a preliminary exercise in this 
enormous, but essential, task.
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